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A meaningful social life relies on understanding others’ minds and behaviours. Theory of 
mind (ToM) is the ability to reason about an individual’s mental states such as beliefs and 
desires, and to understand and predict how these mental states shape an individual’s 
behaviour.  
This thesis aims to develop a systematic approach for understanding the underlying 
processes of a simple theory of mind and to evaluate the performance of theory of mind 
ability in a social context. For this purpose, two case studies using agent-based modelling 
methodology has been conducted.  
An original set of basic processes underpinning ToM ability, termed Belief Representation 
Systematic Approach (BRSA) has been explored through these two models. BRSA 
reconstructs ToM processes into four main phases: Perception, Memory, Reasoning beliefs 
and desires, and Action.  
BRSA clarifies that there is a difference between having ToM and ‘using’ it. The reasoning 
involved in the third and fourth phases of BRSA influences the agents’ performances. 
BRSA shows that false belief tasks require two preconditions, resources and reasoning, to 
be considered as an acid test for ToM competence.  
Both models demonstrate that developing agents’ understanding of others’ mental states 
on the micro level will lead to significant improvements in their social performances on 
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“Everyone became my friend from his own perspective; none sought out my hidden feelings 
from within me.” 
                                                                               Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi 
 
“[Common sense is] the mental skills that most people share. Common sense thinking is 
actually more complex than many of the intellectual accomplishments that attract more 
attention and respect, because the mental skills we call “expertise” often engage larger 
amounts of knowledge but usually employ only a few types of representations. In contrast, 
common sense involves many difficult kinds of representations and thus requires a larger 
range of different skills.”             
                                                                                  (Marvin Minsky, 1988, pp. 327)   
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
Humans are a social species; they understand their own and others’ behaviour in their day-
to-day life. Their capability to make spontaneous inferences about others’ invisible 
thoughts and feelings enables them to communicate with others.  
Humans’ natural ability to mentally process others’ behaviour is central to their social life. 
This mental process relies largely on understanding the essential constituents of others’ 
behaviour such as their beliefs, desires and goals. Unsurprisingly, people infer others’ 
mental states in everyday life; adults are competent in flexible and complex social 
reasoning while infants start from tracking eye direction effortlessly and automatically 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Intriguingly, from the simple to the complex, mental 
processes influence the actions people take to reach their goals. How do humans infer 
others’ mental states? How does understanding others’ beliefs and desires improve one’s 
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performance in terms of achieving her goals? What are the basic processes through which 
we can understand others’ mental states? What are the heuristics employed in this process?  
A large body of research addressing such questions consistently suggests that humans have 
theory of mind; the ability to take others’ mental states into account and apply this coherent 
information to infer their actions (Frith, 2012). People understand, predict and even defend 
others’ actions by reasoning about others’ beliefs and desires. They distinguish others’ 
belief, desires and goals from their own one, they use others’ beliefs and desires to 
rationally predict their actions. Moreover, they may reason backwards to infer others’ 
beliefs and desires from their actions (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009).  
The nature of theory of mind has become more clearly understood through ever increasing 
number of studies in the last three decades (Wellman, 2014). Yet, the areas of confusion 
and gaps are increasing and lack of standardization in the literature has been recently 
identified by researchers (e.g. Apperly, 2012; Schaafsma et al., 2015). For example, some 
of the experimental methods involved abilities, which are not related to theory of mind and 
have therefore misinterpreted the theory of mind processes. 
The problem arises because some researchers tacitly regard theory of mind as a single, 
indivisible process, some consider it as a single brain network and other researchers 
combine varieties of theory of mind into one process (Schaafsma et al., 2015). Despite an 
increasing number of studies, theory of mind literature lacks a systematic approach to its 
basic processes, leading to confusion in many of its experiments and the results that arise 
from them.  
The objective of this thesis is to develop a systematic approach for understanding the 
principles of a simple theory of mind, thinking about others’ beliefs, desires and goals, and 
to evaluate the performance of theory of mind ability in a social context. For the purpose 
of this thesis, two case studies using agent-based modelling have been conducted. Agent-
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based models comprises of agents interacting in an environment. Typically, agent-based 
models facilitate the simulation of social processes through the interactions between 
individual agents (micro level) that can generate certain social phenomena (macro level). 
Agent-based models are capable of representing the rules and relationship between 
individual’s mental states, their actions, the environment and the way that they infer others’ 
mental states on the micro level. Whilst the macro level represents the effect of these 
actions, for example, how successful individuals perform in the environment. These 
characteristics of agent-based modelling provide a reliable framework for interactions 
between the individual’s mental states and their actions with others within the virtual 
society.  
This thesis argues for three theoretical and one methodological points. Firstly, this study 
offers a robust and transparent systematic set of basic processes comprising a simple theory 
of mind ability including the ability that enables success on some key tasks, such as false 
belief tasks. This systematic approach consists of four main phases.  
Secondly, the systematic approach proposed by this thesis demonstrates that false belief 
tasks, as a common decisive methodology for theory of mind competence, might involve 
more than understanding others’ beliefs.  
Thirdly, reasoning is a central information processing part of theory of mind. The various 
levels of theory of mind originate from different levels of reasoning. The lowest level of 
reasoning may produce an automatic version of theory of mind.  
Fourthly, the agents, which are able to construct inferences about others’ beliefs, desires 





To the best of the author’s knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to explain underlying 
processes of a simple theory of mind through an agent-based model and the first model to 
evaluate the link between the potential performances of agents with their simple level of 
theory of mind ability in a competitive society. 
1.1.2   Thesis Structure 
The first chapter of this thesis provides a general introduction to the two subjects of this 
study; theory of mind and agent-based modelling. This chapter summaries the core 
terminology and background literature in these two realms. 
The empirical chapters consist of an introduction, a detailed description of the 
methodology, hypotheses, predictions and implementation of the model, varieties of 
simulation runs, the results, a discussion regarding the simulation results and a conclusion 
in addition to the related questions in the field and a comparison between the simulation 
results and the developmental literature.  
The first empirical chapter, chapter 2, represents an agent-based model to understand the 
abilities that might underlie success on standard false belief tasks. Three types of agents’ 
strategies and their diagrams are depicted, along with the explanations of the impact of 
their different theory of mind abilities in their performances, the cognitive phases that occur 
within the agents, and the resources they require for their abilities.  
The second set of simulations is provided in chapter 3. This model consists of a variety of 
agents with different levels of understanding of their own and others’ mental states, 
clarifying how the agents’ micro level rules have impact on their macro level behaviours. 
The agents’ range of abilities varies from having no understanding of own and others’ 
mental states to being able to infer others’ mental states through their actions. The 
relationship between agents’ different abilities and their performances is discussed in 
depth. Chapter 3 describes the advantages of understanding others’ beliefs and desires 
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though their actions in a competitive environment. The study outlined in chapter 3 
identifies a standard approach to theory of mind processes similar to the first model in the 
previous chapter. In light of this approach, chapter 3 clarifies the main distinction between 
minimal theory of mind ability and theory of mind competence in the simulation. The 
outcome of the simulation is compared with the relevant theories in developmental 
psychology literature. 
Chapter 4 specifically focuses on the main shared result of both simulations, a novel 
standard approach for belief representation processes. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is 
to develop on this concept, explain where it comes from, and what its implications in the 
literature are. This important chapter illuminates how this standard approach can be 
beneficial in explaining some of the controversial issues in the literature. The standard 
approach is discussed in depth, firstly in regards to false belief task, and secondly in terms 
of developmental literature. The reasons of failure in false belief tasks, the link of this 
approach with minimal theory of mind and the conditions in which the false belief task is 
a decisive test for theory of mind are explained in this chapter. 
The final chapter of this thesis provides an overview of the main results. In chapter 5, an 
endeavour is made to shape these findings into a general framework that addresses theory 
of mind processes in a systematic way. Moreover, the necessary resources needed to enable 
agents to infer others’ mental states, and the role of each of these resources are explained. 
The discussion regarding the important role of reasoning in belief representation, and also 
the effect of theory of mind ability on agents’ performances is presented in this chapter, 
through interpreting the results of the models. Finally, the limitations and possible future 




False Belief task, Theory of mind, Minimal theory of mind, Belief Representation, Agent-
Based model. 
1.1.3   Glossary 
Inhibition (cognitive inhibition):  
“Cognitive inhibition is the stopping or overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, 
with or without intention. The mental process so influenced might be selective attention or 
memory retrieval or a host of other cognitive processes.” (MacLeod, 2007, p. 3) 
Self-perspective inhibition: 
 The ability to temporally prevent one's own perspective to consider others’ perspective 
(Samson et al., 2005).  
Belief-like: 
A simple form of mental content from recent visual experience in which the information is 
no longer immediately available but registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). 
Mental states:  
The condition of activity of any simple part or process of the mind at a certain point in time 
(Minsky, 1988).  
1.2   THEORY OF MIND (ToM)   
How could humans be able to participate in their social life without understanding others’ 
beliefs, intentions, desires or emotions? Imagine humans could not attribute or interpret 
others’ mental states at all or inversely everybody could completely understand others’ 
beliefs, intentions, desires and feelings in human society. Both cases might indirectly result 
in a perfect chaos or perfect mindreading. However, this is not the case - the real human 
society differs entirely from both situations where perfectly understanding others’ mental 
state or completely not making sense of others.  
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Since the mental states of others cannot be directly perceived, it is commonly supposed 
that theory of mind involves one or more processes of inference, whereby representations 
of others’ mental states are inferred from what they do or say. 
Premack and Woodruff were the first to coin the term “Theory of Mind” in 1978 by asking 
a crucial question in an article: “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” A system 
of inferences about others’ mental states that are not directly observed can be used as a 
theory to make predictions about others’ behaviour. They define that one has a theory of 
mind if one could impute mental states to self and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  
"Mindreading" is another theoretically natural term that captures the characteristics of the 
problem more than 'theory of mind' (Apperly, 2011), and allows us to understand and 
explain meaningful behaviour and actions of other people and predict or influence 
individual’s behaviour.  
After more than thirty years of extensive research in theory of mind, Apperly (2012) argues 
that ‘consensus’ on what theory of mind is and how it could be studied, requires revision. 
He suggests three distinct approaches to study theory of mind: The conceptual domain, the 
cognitive perspective and the social competence that can vary across individuals. Apperly 
suggests that future research will benefit from clearly expressing in what aspect of theory 
of mind we wish to measure, because each of these directions considers different questions 
that require different approaches. A concise literature review based on the conceptual 
domain and the cognitive domain is described below, after the explanation of false belief 
task, two system account and minimal theory of mind. 
1.2.1  False Belief Task 
From its inception, theory of mind research has evolved with various experiments to assess 
different characteristics of theory of mind abilities in non-human and human children. 
However, one type of tasks, false belief tasks have been the most frequently used task and 
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have stimulated the developmental research widely (e.g. Apperly, 2011; Doherty, 2009; 
Bloom & German, 2000). There are various styles of false belief tasks, but all 
methodologically are based on a perspective difference between the child and the target by 
making a child friendly story (Apperly, 2011). The most common and standard task relies 
on a change of the location of an object.  
The logic behind false belief task was first outlined by (Dennett, 1978) , in a review on 
chimpanzees’ theory of mind by Premack & Woodruff (1978). Dennett reasoned that to 
avoid the misunderstanding between associated behaviour and mental state attribution, it 
is essential to clearly test the chimpanzees’ mental state attribution by giving the subject a 
false belief. This was in response to the general doubt that some of the experimental set 
ups that involve only some physical and behavioural events rather than unobservable 
mental states to examine theory of mind ability. Wimmer and Perner (1983) were the first 
that implemented Dennett’s idea to an “unexpected transfer task” as the first false belief 
task for children (Hedger & Fabricius, 2011).  
1.2.2  Verbal false belief task (Explicit)  
Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) revised Wimmer and Perner’s task to a simpler version for 
children to understand. The task, so called “Sally and Ann false belief task”, has been used 
widely in the literature and is identified as standard false belief task to test children's ability 
in understanding others’ beliefs.  
The scenario of the task includes two puppets, Ann and Sally. The subject child who is 
being tested for belief representation watches as Sally puts the ball in the basket.  Then 
Sally leaves the room and when Sally is out, Ann moves the ball from the basket into the 
box.  Sally returns, and the child is asked where Sally will look for the ball. The Sally and 




Figure 1. Sally and Ann False Belief Task from Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) 
 
The general design of false belief tasks solves the behavioural aspect of understanding 
others’ beliefs by introducing two separate beliefs about the location of an object (the ball), 
one is the real location of the object and another is the protagonist’s (Sally’s) perspective 
that is a false belief about the location of the object. In standard false belief task, the real 
location of the ball is in the box, where Ann moved the ball. However, in Sally’s 
perspective, the location of the ball is in the basket where she last put and saw the ball. The 
child needs to predict where Sally will look for the ball when she returns. The correct 
answer to this question is the basket where Sally put the ball. The child needs to answer 
the question correctly to pass the false belief test. 
The standard false belief task is a verbal explicit task and the child is required to reason 
about the Sally and Ann scenario to answer a question correctly. The child needs to 
distinguish Sally’s belief about the location of the ball from his/her own perspective that is 
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different (because the child saw Ann moved the ball and Sally did not see). If the child 
passes the standard false belief task, then he/she is thought to have the conceptual 
competence to understand others’ beliefs.  
The Sally and Ann false belief task is a change of location task. There is an alternative false 
belief task, called the “unexpected content” task. For example, the subject child sees a 
smarties box. The child then opens the box and sees there is a pencil in the box instead of 
smarties. The verbal reasoning question for the child is that what someone who has never 
observed inside the box will think the box holds inside. The correct answer is smarties, 
which is different from the child’s perspective (as the child has observed that there is a 
pencil inside the box whereas the participant will have not). 
The false belief task is often considered as an acid test for theory of mind because it shows 
the understanding of others’ different perspective. The results of the both verbal false belief 
experiments, the Sally and Ann task and the unexpected content task, show that children 
under the age of 4 years fail the verbal false belief task (e.g. Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Wellman, 2014).  
There is also evidence that if the false belief task is simplified, most children at age 3 are 
able to pass the false belief task. For example, the question of the task was more specific 
and easier for children to understand, by assisting the child to remember the content of the 
box or by reducing the salience of the child’s own perspective (e.g. Lewis & Osborne, 
1990; Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Freeman, Lewis, & Doherty, 1991; Mitchell & Lacohee, 
1991; Moses, 1993; Freeman & Lacohee, 1995;  Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Wellman 
& Bartsch, 1988; Surian & Leslie, 1999; Yazdi et al., 2006). Moreover, these experiments 
indicate that failure to pass the standard false belief task is due to children’s inefficient 
processing capabilities (German & Leslie, 2000).  
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However, the meta-analysis by Wellman (2014) showed that the beneficial effects observed 
in these studies were small and children under 4 years are not capable of representing 
beliefs. Wellman describes two different meta-analyses including 600 variations of 
children’s false-belief performance as follows: 
The first meta-analysis comprising 178 studies with various false belief task manipulations, 
making it easier for children to understand (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). The second 
one includes experiments of false belief tasks across different cultures and languages (Liu 
et al., 2008). The results reveal that children in preschool years, at around the age of four, 
develop theory of mind universally. 
Although Wellman’s meta-analysis produces findings compatible with conceptual change, 
it does not determine any nature of mechanisms of theory of mind theoretically (Scholl & 
Leslie, 2001).  
1.2.3  Non-verbal false belief task (Implicit) 
Verbal (explicit) false-belief tasks are naturally complex, as they require the integration of 
linguistic information. In addition, these tasks may generate disruption for children in the 
process of tracking events from the protagonist’s point of view (Rubio-Fernández, 2013). 
Thus, researchers start to design nonverbal (implicit) false belief tasks with less cognitive 
demands to test infants’ belief representation competence.    
Onishi  and  Baillargeon  (2005)  developed  a  non-verbal  false  belief   task  for  15-
month-old infants concerning the change of an object location by using the “violation of 
expectation” (VOE) paradigm and measuremet of their looking time. Infants see that the  
protagonist places the object in a box (black box). Then protagonist leaves and does not 
see the change of the object’s location to  the white box. When the protagonist returns to 
the scene the infant expects her to be searching for the object. The results confirm that 
infants look longer at the white box. Therefore, by applying the VOE paradigm, infants 
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expect the protagonist to search the black box for the object as the infant looks longer at 
the white box which violates her/his expectation. The findings from this experiment and 
others (e.g. Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Baillargeon, 
Scott, & He, 2010; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Southgate & Vernetti, 2014) indicate 
that infants are able to pass non-verbal false belief tasks as young as 7 months, and in any 
case well below 4 years old. This contradiction has been a pivotal debate and issue in 
developmental literature, producing fruitful research and raising more questions. 
1.2.4  Discussion of verbal versus non-verbal false belief tasks  
The questions raised regarding the contradiction between verbal and non-verbal false belief 
tasks. Why preschool children fail in verbal false belief task whereas infants are able to 
pass non-verbal false belief tasks? Does it demonstrate infants’ attribution of understanding 
others’ beliefs? What is the difference between understanding of verbal false belief task 
versus non-verbal one? If the methodology is correct, how should we interpret the 
contradiction?  
Various valuable approaches explored their findings and suggested their perspectives to 
these controversial issues. All of these different opinions agree on the experimental results, 
and also that preschool children fail the explicit false belief tasks. Intriguingly, however, 
there is no consensus on whether infants understand implicit false beliefs. Although, there 
is a lack of consensus, these plausible opinions would provide fresh insights in 
understanding belief representation. Broadly speaking, there are three different 
explanations for this problem. The first explanation by Wellman suggests this is due to the 
developmental changes in preschool children. He argues that implicit false belief tasks 
require a simple attribution of desires and awareness rather than beliefs and false beliefs 
(Wellman, 2014). In general, he considers theory of mind as set of concepts which need to 
be acquired.  
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The second account argues that under 4 years children’s belief representation abilitiy is 
obscured through the complexities and tasks demands; for example the child participants 
in false belief task need to override their own natural belief about the right location of the 
object and point out other’s belief which is not the right location. This may be a prepotent 
response that a child struggles to inhibit ( “inhibition of prepotent responces”). According 
to the researchers of this line of argument (e.g. Leslie , 2005; Southgate & Vernetti, 2014; 
Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010) infants are basically 
competent at belief-desire reasoning likewise preschool children, and just fail to show this 
competence on tasks that exceed their capacity to inhibit inappropriate responses. 
The third account is offered by Apperly and Butterfill suggesting an implicit system for 
infants which is fast and limited, it enables infants to track others’ belief but not 
psychological representation as such whereas preschoolers’ belief undersanding is explicit, 
flexible and cognitively demanding (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). They suggest that infants 
may have an automatic emerging system that does not need much experience and it persists 
into adulthood (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).These two systems will be further described 
later in this chapter. 
1.2.5  Two Systems Account 
 Apperly and Butterfill have advocated ‘two systems’ account, as a parallel cognitive 
construction of theory of mind. The nature of these two distinct systems rests on a 
compromise between flexibility and efficiency. The first system is fast and cognitively 
efficient and capable of tracking others’ registration of an object rather than belief 
representation as such but inflexible and limited. They suggest that such a system may 
account for the success on some theory of mind tasks by human infants, some non-human 
animals such as chimpanzees and human adults under cognitive load. Whereas the second 
system associates with a cognitively demanding but flexible and slow processing. The 
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second system exists in human adults, parallel with the first system. They claim that there 
is only limited information flow between two systems. In addition, system one is automatic 
whereas system two is non-automatic and requires reasoning. 
They argue that the two systems account is a promising solution to a major puzzling pattern 
in theory of mind literature; the contradiction that infants pass the nonverbal false-belief 
task, yet children pass the verbal false belief task at around 4 years of age. Moreover, it 
answers to the polarized point of human adult efficiency and quick responses in their social 
interactions that demands theory of mind (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  
1.2.6  Minimal Theory of Mind 
Butterfill and Apperly (2013) proposed a novel approach to minimal theory of mind to 
represent the ability to track others’ perception, knowledge and beliefs in primitive species, 
infants with limited cognitive resources and human adults under load. In fact, this is an 
elaborated version of the first system of their two systems account. Apperly and Butterfill 
developed a distinctive minimal form of theory of mind cognition that purely involves 
representing “belief-like” states without any cognitive demands or conceptual 
sophistication. Their argument starts with a fundamental question that “what could 
someone represent that would enable her to track, at least with limits, other’s perception, 
knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs?” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 1) 
They then have formulated four principles to answer this question.  
The first principle relates to a basic concept of goal-directed action.  “A minimal grasp of 
goal-directed action” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 10) that one might understand the goal 
from bodily movements such as tracking others’ visual direction or a change in gaze 
direction.  
In the second principle, Butterfill and Apperly (2013) introduce two terms, “field” and 
“encountering” as a basic characteristics of perception. The concept of field relates to a set 
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of objects at any given time that is determined by factors such as proximity, eye direction 
and barriers. The concept of encountering is a relation between the agent and an object that 
is a true concept only if the object is in the agent’s field. According to Apperly and 
Butterfill, to act goal-directly on an object, it is necessary to encounter it first. 
The third principle by Butterfill and Apperly is called “registration”, which introduces a 
new notion of a belief-like concept. Registration is a relation between an agent, an object 
and its location. The agent registers the location of an object as it encounters the object. A 
correct registration is a precondition for a successful goal-directed action. Apperly and 
Butterfill state one’s correct registration of an object becomes incorrect by moving or 
destroying the object in her/his absence.  
One example for an application of the registration principle is scrub-jays re-cache food 
experiment by Clayton et al. (2007). In this experiment, scrub-jays have only chosen to re-
cache the food in the presence of competitors who previously saw they cached it. Apperly 
and Butterfill suggest that scrub-jays understand that competitors’ correct registration of 
food results to stealing their cached food as a successful goal-directed action. Therefore, 
they re-cache the food to prevent competitors from correctly registering its location 
(Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). 
Another example of the third principle is an experiment by Liszkowski et al. (2006). In this 
experiment, infants are pointing towards the locations of the accidentally misplaced objects 
to provide relevant information to adults. Apperly and Butterfill suggest that pointing 
expresses a correct registration and infants understand that correct registration results to a 
successful goal-directed action. 
The fourth principle involves a shift to thinking of a successful registration as a causal 
factor for the agent’s action. In other words, “when an agent performs a goal-directed action 
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with a goal that specifies a particular object, the agent will act as if the object were in the 
location she registers it in.” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 16) 
The nonverbal false belief task by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) is an application of the 
fourth principle. Infant subjects and an observer watch while an object is placed in a black 
box. In the absence of observer, the object is moved to a white box. When the observer 
comes back, infants looking times indicate that they correctly expect that the observer will 
reach into the black box. Onishi and Baillargeon suggest that the infants are ascribing 
beliefs about the object to the observer. However, Apperly and Butterfill’s alternative 
explanation is that infants track the registered location of the black box as a cause of action. 
They present an insightful example of minimal theory of mind. Suppose Hannah is able to 
distinguish whether someone can see her while she is stealing from others. She wants to 
escape others’ detection by “exploiting a fact about other’s mental states (namely that they 
usually cannot see Hannah’s acts of theft when Hannah does not have their eyes in view). 
Then Hannah has a theory of mind ability” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 606).  They 
continue that Hannah is able to use others’ visual perspective without any theory of mind 
that requires complicated cognitive ability. More importantly, they suggest that an 
individual with minimal theory of mind ability could pass many tests that were supposed 
to be acid tests of theory of mind such as false belief tasks. The reason for this is that 
minimal theory of mind does not require sophisticated resources for reasoning.  
Recently, the literature on theory on mind has increased greatly with a variety of 
methodologies and experiments. Thus, the aim of the following sections is to briefly review 
the literature related to the models proposed in this thesis, the two domains, the conceptual 
domain and the cognitive domain. 
1.2.7  The Cognitive Perspective 
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The cognitive perspective involves the architecture and process of theory of mind; it 
clarifies the way that belief representation works at a cognitive level. For example, the role 
of language in false belief task process and the way that people inhibit their own perspective 
and take others perspective in to the account (Apperly, 2012).  
Experimental research in cognitive processes of theory of mind has widely expanded for 
example by making inferences about others’ beliefs, storing information about others’ 
perspective in mind, and applying theory of mind in social context (Apperly, 2012).  
The evidence shows that language, memory, executive functions are critical in belief 
representation (e.g. Apperly et al., 2007; Hughes, 1998; Marcovitch et al., 2015). The 
parallel link between executive function and theory of mind competence has been studied 
extensively, particularly the inhibitory control role in taking others’ perspective into 
consideration and preventing egocentric version of information in children and adults. For 
example, Russell (1996) argues that deficit in executive control in autistic children 
underpin the emergence and expression of their theory of mind ability. However, Wellman 
(2001) states that theory of mind development corresponds with executive function but not 
directly.  
The study by Leslie and Polizzi (1998) offers a model to pass a false belief task; the false 
belief reasoning starts with identifying a true belief content. They suggest that theory of 
mind mechanism (ToMM) nominates a true-belief to the content of the belief and it is 
selected to attribute as the belief state. Hence, to pass the false belief task, it is necessary 
to inhibit the default content of the belief, which is true, and change the attention to 
alternative belief. In case of inhibition failure, the default content will be allocated to the 
belief state, which is inaccurate in the case where the target has a false belief.  In total, the 
sequence of false belief reasoning starts with allocating a true belief to the belief content 
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as a default and then inhibition starts to prevent the default and it redirects toward the 
alternative belief, which is a false belief.                        
 Leslie and Polizzi (2008) attempted to expand their theory by a change in Sally’s implicit 
desire.  In Sally Ann false belief task, the desire of Sally is to find the ball. Suppose Sally 
has no desire to find the ball. Thus, this avoidance of the ball needs to be consider as well 
as the belief about the location where she put the ball. Leslie and Polizzi suggest that firstly 
one needs to recognise the location of the ball, and then consider the desire of avoiding the 
ball. Therefore, the child participant needs to prevent the default desire, and choose the 
location, which does not contain the ball.  They concluded that this task requires two 
inhibitions, one for belief and one for desire, which cancel one another out. 
The concept of selection processing (SP) is “to select the most plausible belief content from 
a small set of plausible candidates” (Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005, p. 51). Leslie et al. 
(2005) explain SP as an automatic process, which is associated with ToMM and attributes 
beliefs and desires to the agent. The concept of inhibition and ToMM is identified through 
the algorithms of the two models in this thesis and will be discussed in section 2.5.3.3.      
Another aspect in theory of mind relates to the level of complexity involved in theory of 
mind. For example, there is a distinction between higher-level and lower-level processes 
of theory of mind in terms of the levels of inferences, storing and using information 
involved (Apperly, 2011). The question is how and why humans are capable of higher-
level theory of mind. Verbrugge (2009) suggests that competition, cooperation or mixed-
motive interactions may have played a role. Reasoning is a part of higher-level theory of 
minds process. Intriguingly, Perner and  Leekam (2008) analysed the results of 12 studies 
of false belief task with a similar task using a photograph of the location of the object as a 
non-mental representation version. Their study shows that the children still  cannot pass 
the non-mental version of false belief task, suggesting that representational demands are 
20 
 
not specific to the false belief understanding but they are general to non-mental 
representation as well. Therfore, they argue that belief representation is involved with 
reasoning of non-mental representation, which highlights the reasoning role in theory of 
mind ability. 
1.2.8  The Conceptual Domain 
The conceptual approach clarifies questions such as whether a child has belief 
representation or at what age this concept emerges or how children acquire theory of mind 
concepts (Apperly, 2012). The conceptual domain also includes conceptual knowledge of 
others’ beliefs and desires that interconnects with the behaviour (Apperly, 2012). Research 
in human infants and children through verbal and non-verbal false belief tasks, which have 
been already described, indicates an effective approach in the conceptual domain of theory 
of mind.  
In terms of adults’ theory of mind, the fact that they have the capacity to perform theory of 
mind does not mean that they use it automatically or use it without simple errors. They are 
prone to egocentrism and self-perspective resistance (Apperly, 2012). Regular adults’ 
theory of mind rests on evidence, as they are simultaneously under construction and are 
prone to constructive errors (Wellman, 2014). Altogether, the way that human adults use 
theory of mind in everyday life to infer others’ thoughts is still an unanswered question.   
In terms of non-human animals, there has been some controversy over theory of mind 
ability in non-human primates and Premack and Woodruff’s question in 1978 of whether 
the chimpanzee has a theory of mind. This question is still open to debate and under 
examination. Researchers Call & Tomasello (2008) proposed that chimpanzees' tactical 
deception requires more than just an understanding of surface-level behaviour. They 
conducted several different experimental paradigms leading to the conclusion that 
chimpanzees understand that others see, hear and know things. Their answer to Premack 
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and Woodruff’s question was that chimpanzees do have a theory of mind but they do not 
understand others in exactly the same way as the belief–desire concepts of humans. (Call 
& Tomasello, 2008) They also emphasize that chimpanzees do not understand false beliefs. 
Considering thinking as going beyond the perceived information to make inferences, they 
have argued that not only thinking is not exclusive in humans, but also making inferences 
is not either (Schmelz, Call, & Tomasello, 2011).  
However, recent research that measured the relationship between body orientation and eye 
gaze shows some of non-human animals’ understanding is limited to visual perspective 
taking. Research by Hare et al. (2006) explains that chimpanzees recognise what others are 
able to see (Level 1 perspective taking). Nevertheless, they do not understand how others 
see things (Level 2 perspective taking); “understand not only what is visible from a certain 
point of view but also how a given object is seen or presented” (Moll & Meltzoff, 2011, p. 
662) because they are attributing their own preference to others (Karg et al., 2016). 
Karg et al. (2014) in their experiment present a large and a small bread stick to great apes 
and then blocked the scene to appear reversed. Their results show that apes are able to 
choose based on the real size of the stick, not based on currently perceived ones. Apes did 
not choose similarly in a control condition which they have no previous experience of the 
true size of the sticks. Although chimpanzees are able to understand the difference between 
their own perspectives from reality, they are not able to understand that others’ perspective 
can be false and there is not enough evidence that they are capable to deceive and create a 
false belief in others (Karg et al., 2016).  
In the study by Martin and Santos (2014), the participants, rhesus macaque monkeys, saw 
the scenes in which a human agent was watching an apple moving between two boxes. 
They provided different scenarios of true and false beliefs, about the final location of the 
apple, for both the monkeys and the human agent by occluding parts of the apple's 
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movement from either the monkey or the agent. The results show that monkeys looked 
longer at scenarios that are not consistent with their own beliefs without considering other 
agent's beliefs. Their findings suggest that monkeys fail to represent others’ beliefs whereas 
human infants pass the experiment test and demonstrate belief representation (Martin & 
Santos, 2014). Martin and Santos (2016) in their recent paper argue that primates’ belief 
representation is limited to the relations between agents and information that is true and 
they are unable to represent relations between agents and untrue information.  
Consequently, they suggest that belief representation may be unique to humans as part of 
their core knowledge systems with automatic process that enable human infants to make 
sense of their physical and social environments (Martin & Santos, 2014).  
The models proposed in this thesis are inspired from experiments with non-human animals 
and human infants, from minimal theory of mind account and standard false belief task that 
have attempted to explain how some simple forms of theory of mind may be possible.  
This thesis mainly concentrates on the cognitive perspective by representing a systematic 
approach for belief representation and testing agents’ efficiency in a virtual society. It also 
explores the concept of a simple theory of mind in a social environment that is 
interconnected with ToM processes and reasoning at the cognitive level.  In addition, this 
thesis examines the conceptual domain by considering which agents are capable of various 
levels of simple theory of mind ability (including minimal ToM, belief representation and 
inferring others’ mental states). In other words, this thesis examines conceptually which 
agents are capable of theory of mind ability and why.  
1.3  AGENT-BASED MODEL (ABM) 
Over the years, agent-based models have been extensively emerged in various research 
fields, particularly in computer science, economics, sociology, psychology, philosophy and 
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cognitive sciences. Particularly, computational cognitive models in ABMs have 
increasingly combined into social and behaviour sciences (Schunn & Gray, 2002). 
An agent-based model (ABM) consists of independently operating agents that are able to 
perceive, make decisions and perform goal-directed actions (Yilmaz, 2015). They are also 
known in literature as multi-agent systems. 
ABMs enable us to simulate a real phenomenon to an artificial society. The idea of the 
simulation refers to designing a computer program model that produces the key features of 
the real phenomenon. By rerunning this program with various parameters, it would be 
possible to analyse and understand or predict the behaviour of the phenomenon.  This way, 
agent-based models provide a generative empirical research approach to sciences. They 
offer a natural environment to tackle interdisciplinary study problems. Applying agent-
based modelling for complex systems makes it possible to trace the problems analytically 
and computationally. ABMs are composed of agents, environments and interactions 
(Wilensky & Rand, 2015), and may results to emergence that are the main topics of this 
section. 
1.3.1  Agent 
Agents are the basic and active components of agent-based modelling. Agents are defined 
by their properties and their actions. Agents’ properties include their internal and external 
states such as the agents’ shape, colour, size, location, speed and direction. Agents’ actions 
are a set of rules that agent can use to govern its behaviour and make change to the 
environment, other agents or itself (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). Agents are capable of 
autonomously making decisions to interact with each other in a virtual environment that 
builds up the system behaviour. Casti (1997) suggests that agents should have a higher 
level of actions to be able to change their own behaviour.  
1.3.2  Environment (Space) 
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Humans and animals interact and communicate with each other in an environment. Similar 
to the natural world, agent-based models designs also consist of such an environment that 
makes interactions between the agents possible.  
The agents are placed in an environment, which might consist of inactive objects such as 
obstacle, energy resource, roads or food. Agents interact with each other through the 
environment. The environment also stores the positions of the agents (Gilbert, 2007). 
Spatial models, in which the environment represents a geographical space, have 
coordinates to indicate their location like grids. Network models are designed to link agents 
together with no spatial or grid space.  
1.3.3  Interaction 
One of the main distinctive characteristics of agent-based models is that agents interact 
with other agents, the environment or themselves. Examples of agent-self interactions, 
where an agent interacts with itself, are reproducing a new agent, removing itself or 
modifying its own properties. Agent-agent interactions, where an agent interacts with 
another agent, include consuming an agent and possessing its resources, or sharing 
information with another agent. Agent-environment interactions occur when an agent alters 
its neighbourhood or when the environment has some effect on the agent. For example, 
when the agent observes the environment or moves within it (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). In 
addition, the environment also interacts with itself; “Environment-self interactions are 
when areas of the environment alter or change themselves.” (Wilensky & Rand, 2015, p. 
258). For example, the amount of resources might increase or decrease due to some natural 
fluctuations such as diffusion of a variable throughout the environment (Wilensky & Rand, 
2015). These varieties of simple interactions produce a complex society (Wilensky & Rand, 
2015). Notably, these interactions within ABMs constitute the basis for emergent 
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properties (Gilbert, 2007), which is what makes agent-based modelling such a powerful 
method. 
1.3.4  Schedule 
The schedule is the model operation order and time management of the commands. It starts 
with initialization procedure that creates the environment, agents and sets the parameters. 
The central part of schedule consists of a main loop that defines agents’ actions, 
environment dynamics or other changes in one time unit of the model. There are different 
methods of updating the schedule in ABMs. The synchronous method is when all agents’ 
states update at the same time. The method known as asynchronous is when states of some 
agents update before others (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). 
1.3.5  Agents’ Characteristics  
Some of the key characteristics of agents include: 
Heterogeneity 
 Each individual agent is explicitly operated by its preferences or its rules that may differ 
from one another.  
Autonomy 
Each agent is an autonomous entity, that observes its environment, decides independently 
to perform an action and interact with other agents that make changes in the environment. 
Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality concern agents’ information and the computer power. Agents only 
have their neighbourhoods’ information, not global information and they do not have 
endless computational power (Epstein, 2012). People should be modelled as bounded 




The ability of an agent to perceive the environment and perform action to the dynamics of 
the environment (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Learning 
Agent-based models are capable of modelling individual learning as well as population 
learning. There are different scopes of learning in agent-based modelling: 
 Individual learning: Each agent can learn from itself through successful actions. 
 Population learning: Agents with more effective actions are expected to reproduce more, 
and next generation will tend to improve. 
 Social learning: Unlike individual learning and population learning, social learning 
builds on the agents' interactions. An agent is able to teach others (Gilbert, 2006).  
1.3.6  Emergence  
The behaviour of complex systems can be described in terms of individual agents’ level, 
which is known as micro level, or in terms of the system as a whole, which is called macro 
level (Gilbert, 1996). Typically, an initial population of agents is released into the 
environment to observe a recognisable macroscopic social pattern. The interactions 
between individual agents in micro level generate a central social structures and group 
behaviours.  Alternatively, the term emergent denotes to “stable macroscopic patterns 
arising from the local interaction of agents.” (Epstein & Axtell, 1996, p. 35). In other 
words, emergence is a property that is generated at the macro level but is not specifically 
encoded at the micro level. Emergence is a characteristic of complex systems. It comprises 







1.3.7  Reasoning Approaches in Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
The nature of agents are associated with the reasoning methodology behind them. Agents 
as entities are able to perceive their environment via their sensors and act in the 
environment through their actuators (Russell & Norvig, 2014). A rational agent acts to 
maximize its performance based on its prior knowledge and the information it has 
perceived from the environment (Russell & Norvig, 2014). The intelligent agents’ 
reasoning approaches are defined by their architecture in artificial intelligence. An agent 
architecture is a framework consisting of the elements from which agents are built and the 
methods of interaction with each other.  The agent architecture determines the way in which 
the agent represents information, the way that the agent reasons, makes decisions and the 
action it takes to achieve its goal (Chin et al., 2014). Generally, there are three main 
categories of agent architectures in AI which include semantic architectures, cognitive 
architectures and classical architectures. The classical architecture is classified into four 
types including the logic-based architecture, reactive architecture, Belief-Desire-Intention 
(BDI) architecture and hybrid architecture (Chin et al., 2014).  Figure 2 shows the hierarchy 
of the most dominant agent architectures in the literature. 




The semantic architecture involves semantic web technology. Using a logic-based (or 
deliberative) architecture is the classic approach for building intelligent agents in which the 
agent’s action and reasoning is based on logical deduction and symbolic representation 
(Weiss, 2013). The hybrid classical architecture is the combination of reactive and 
deliberative agent architecture. There now follows a summary and discussion of reactive 
architecture, BDI architecture and cognitive architecture including symbolic, emergent and 
hybrid.  
1.3.7.1 Reactive Architecture 
The reactive architecture allows to construct agents that react to their environment with no 
reasoning skills. Agents’ actions are based on mapping between stimulus and the response 
(Jones, 2008). Agents perceive the environment through their sensors and map the 
information they perceived to the one or more actions depending on the state of the 
environment. The best-known example of a reactive architecture is called the subsumption 
architecture which was developed by Rodney Brooks in the behaviour-based robotics 
research in 1986.  In the subsumption architecture implementation the behaviour modules 
are considered as finite-state machines with no symbolic representation and symbolic 
reasoning (Brooks, 1986).  Agents use a set of task accomplishing behaviour to make 
decisions. These behaviours map the perceptual information of the environment (situation) 
to actions. In addition, it is possible that many behaviours can be executed simultaneously. 
There is a mechanism that selects actions by applying a subsumption hierarchy for different 
behavioural modules into layers. The lower layers have a high priority and are able to 
inhibit higher levels which represent more abstract behaviours (Weiss, 2013). Inhibition is 
used to disable undesirable behaviours at a particular time or circumstance (Brooks, 1986). 
The subsumption architecture starts with a simple set of behaviours and then it is possible 
to extend it with the higher level of behaviours through further layers. This represents the 
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evolutionary design approach of the subsumption architecture (Jones, 2008). The 
subsumption layer is reactive and simple in nature. However, when the additional layers 
are added, they interfere with other layers and the control of the behaviours becomes an 
issue (Jones, 2008).   The other development in reactive agents is Markov models; their 
behaviours are probabilistic in a dynamic environment. Markov models are widely used in 
stochastic processes modelling as well as AI environments in which a sequence of 
decisions must be made over time (Weiss, 2013).  
Behaviour networks developed by Pattie Maes is another example of reactive architecture 
which is capable of selecting the best action for a given state of the environment. Behaviour 
networks consist of a network of behaviours with the related activation and inhibition links 
(Jones, 2008). 
In general, one of the advantages of a reactive architecture is that they are simple, extremely 
fast and can be easily implemented in terms of hardware and software agents. Besides, 
through agents’ interactions, it is possible that complex behaviours will emerge.  In 
contrast, the disadvantages of reactive architecture include; firstly, the environment needs 
to be simple. Secondly, the lack of sufficient information regarding the agents’ present 
states in their local neighbourhood to determine an acceptable action (Chin et al., 2014), 
makes the sequence of their actions problematic. Thirdly, the processing of agents’ 
neighbourhood information restricts future planning and learning capabilities of agents 
(Chin et al., 2014) as reactive agents make decisions based on local information. Fourthly, 
it is difficult to construct agents which contain extensive number of layers. For example, it 
becomes difficult to understand the different behaviours and their relationships for more 
than 10 layers due to the dynamics and interactions between the different behaviours of the 
layers which become too complex to understand (Weiss, 2013). 
1.3.7.2 BDI Architecture 
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The BDI architecture rests on the theory of human practical reasoning - the processes of 
deciding which action to take to achieve our goals - proposed by Michael Bratman in 1987. 
The concept of practical reasoning involves two key processes; firstly, “what goals we want 
to achieve” (Weiss, 2013, p. 28) which is called deliberation. Secondly, “how we are going 
to achieve these goals” (Weiss, 2013, p. 28) is known as means-ends reasoning. Beliefs, 
desires and intentions are the main mental state components of the BDI architecture. Beliefs 
represents the set of information an agent has regarding the state of the environment. These 
beliefs might not be necessary, correct or complete. Desires represents the agent’s goals, 
motivations and what it wants to achieve. Intentions are a key factor in practical reasoning 
which lead to actions. Generally,  an agent will not be able to reach all of its desires. 
Therefore, a subset of desires is selected to achieve them (filters). Intentions  are these 
selective desires that agents have commited to achieve.   One well-known example of BDI 
architecture which mimics the theory of human reasoning is called Practical Reasoning 
System (PRS). PRS data structure directly corresponds to beliefs, desires and intentions. 
Beliefs are the facts about the environments which are perceived via the sensors. A 
collection of pre-compiled plans (plan library) can be used by agents for the purpose of 
achieving different states of affairs depending on their desires and intentions. Desires 
represent a set of actions that agents should follow to achieve their goals. Each plan consists 
of a body and invocation condition (Weiss, 2013). The body of a plan is a set of actions 
that agents accomplish to achieve some particular state of affairs. The invocation condition 
defines the conditions whereby agents consider the plan. Thus, as the agent updates its 
beliefs through its interpreter, they continue to choose a plan which is consistent with the 
invocation condition and corresponds to the agents’ active desires that act as their 
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intentions. Then, one action can be selected by the interpreter that represents the agent’s 
present intentions and beliefs. Figure 3 shows a PRS representing of a BDI architecture.  
Figure 3. PRS in a BDI architecture for plan execution (Jones, 2008). 
Although decision making processes become more stable through intentions, BDI requires 
to balance the intentions in different environments; in highly dynamic and unpredictable 
environments, BDI  reconsiders its intentions often whereas in static environments less 
reconsideration is required (Weiss, 2013). One advantages of BDI architecture is that we 
intuitively understand beliefs, desires, intentions and the processes of choosing actions. In 
addition, the functional decomposition and subsystems for constructing an agent is clear. 
However, the problem is “how to efficiently implement these functions” (Weiss, 2013, p. 
35). 
1.3.7.3 Cognitive Architecture 
The cognitive architecture is used to implement intelligent agents through emulating 
human behaviour and cognitive abilities. The essential structure and the processes of 
human minds and performances are specified through this architecture. The integration of 
artificial intelligence and cognitive science is crucial for exhibiting intelligent behaviour. 
For this purpose, a systems-level architecture is essential to support complex cognitive 
behaviours through a range of tasks. The underlying cognitive architecture is capable of 
storing perceptual knowledge and goals into memory, representing the stored information 
into mental structures and then operating functional processes on these mental structures, 
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including performance mechanisms and learning mechanisms (Langley, Laird, & Rogers, 
2009). 
 Generally, based on two basic constituents of the cognitive architecture, memory and 
learning, three different subcategories are considered including symbolic, emergent and 
hybrid models. The symbolic architectures often apply a central control on information 
flow from sensors through memory to actions by using high-level symbols or declarative 
knowledge in a classical AI top-down, analytic approach (Duch, Oentaryo, & Pasquier, 
2008). A popular example of cognitive symbolic architecture is SOAR (State, Operator 
And Result) where “a state is a representation of the current problem-solving situation; an 
operator transforms a state (makes changes to the representation); and a goal is a desired 
outcome of the problem-solving activity” (Laird & Bates Congdon, 2015, p. 5).  Given 
each state can have only one operator at a time as SOAR runs, it uses the existing operator 
and selects the next operator until the goal has been achieved. The SOAR architecture 
comprises firstly a symbolic long-term memory that is encoded with the help of production 
rules for long-term knowledge to specify how to respond to different situations and 
secondly a short-term memory is structured as objects to store the information from 
sensors, current operators and current goals with properties and relations.  
Emergent architectures, as a subcategory of cognitive architectures, specifies an explicit 
interaction between processing elements of network nodes in which their internal states 
change and a pattern emerges. Emergent architectures use a bottom-up strategy and are 
inspired by connectionist approaches. One example of this type of architecture is IBCA 
(Integrated Biologically-based Cognitive Architecture) which attempts to simulate brain 
functionalities by emulating the brain’s high-level design. IBCA concentrates on posterior 
cortex (PC), frontal cortex (FC), and hippocampus (HC) regions of the brain which are 
responsible for the sensory and motor processing, dynamic and active memory and the fast 
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learning respectively (Duch, Oentaryo, & Pasquier, 2008). In order to provide a detailed 
structure of the modules, a large number of neurons is necessary to simulate cognitive 
functions. However, as the number of neurons increases, the issue of how well the emergent 
architecture simulates the cognitive function arises, this is referred to as the problem of 
scalability (Duch, Oentaryo, & Pasquier, 2008). 
Hybrid architectures, another subcategory of cognitive architectures, are developed to 
integrate the strengths of two symbolic and emergent architectures into a more 
comprehensive cognitive framework. Symbolic architectures are reliable in high-level 
cognitive functions, such as planning and deliberative reasoning. However, problems arise 
in the formulation of symbolic entities from low-level information and managing large 
amount of information. In contrast, emergent architectures are capable of capturing the 
context-specificity of human performance and dealing with a large scale of low-level 
information. Yet, a weakness remains in capturing higher-order cognitive functions (Duch, 
Oentaryo, & Pasquier, 2008). Thus, a hybrid version can benefit from overcoming these 
limitations. Common examples of hybrid architectures are ACT-R (Adaptive Components 
of Thought-Rational), CLARION (Connectionist Learning with Adaptive Rule Induction 
On-line) and LIDA (The Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent).  
The purpose of ACT-R is to simulate human cognitive tasks and to clarify the underlying 
mechanisms of perception, reasoning and action. ACT-R consists of a set of perceptual-
motor modules, two memory modules, buffers and a pattern matcher. The perceptual-motor 
modules act as an interface between the system and the environment.  The two memory 
modules include declarative memory (DM) and procedural memory (PM) for storing 
factual knowledge about the world and the way the system works respectively. The buffers 
act as temporary storage for communications between modules. The pattern matcher is for 
the purpose of finding a production in PM that matches the present state of the buffers. 
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ACT-R uses a top-down learning approach in a way that as a goal, factual knowledge or 
perceptual information appears, it becomes a chunk in the memory buffer. By applying 
Bayesian probability, the existing chunks that are used more frequently become more 
active and can be retrieved faster. Although, a large body of psychological research and 
intelligent tutoring systems have been implemented ACT-R architecture, still there is a lack 
of applications in reasoning and problem solving fields (Duch, Oentaryo, & Pasquier, 
2008).   
1.3.8  The use of ABM in social simulations 
Initially computational modelling as a research technique started in the natural sciences 
from astronomy to biochemistry, it was neglected in the social sciences due to the lack of 
a computational approach that satisfied procedures and needs in the social sciences 
(Gilbert, 2007). However, from 1990, researchers started to realise that agent-based 
modelling features such as interaction, emergence, and micro and macro levels of 
phenomena are all applicable to the social sciences (Abrahamson & Wilensky, 2005). Since 
then, the number of studies in the social sciences applying agent-based modelling has 
increased dramatically. Agent-based modelling is a potential research tool for evaluating, 
formulating, training, predicting and understanding the procedures and the consequences 
of theories in the social sciences (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2011). Agent-based modelling 
allows us to “grow” social structures in which certain sets of micro specifications lead to 
generating the macro phenomena of interest (Epstein & Axtell, 1996). 
In addition, the recent surge in applying simulations, and in particular ABMs, in 
computational neuroscience and social cognition modelling has made remarkable advances 
in the field. Cognitive approaches and experimental psychological studies have progressed 
to provide a better understanding of social cognition rather the “pure” one by development 
of cognitive social sciences and exploiting ABMs (Sun, 2012).  Macro-micro levels exist 
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in social-psychological interactions leading to complex phenomena in social and cognitive 
context (Tetlock & Goldgeier, 2000; Sun, 2006).  For example, Marsella et al. (2004) 
implemented an agent-based model tool called PsychSim, for modelling interactions and 
influences between groups or individuals. Each agent is able to have its own decision 
making criteria based on its beliefs about the world and recursive models of other agents 
by applying theory of mind. PsychSim is capable of updating agents’ beliefs based on other 
agents’ actions and their psychological motivations (Marsella, Pynadath, & Read, 2004). 
Figure 4 shows a screenshot of PsychSim interface. 
Figure 4. Screenshot of PsychSim interface 
There are a variety of agent-based modelling applications in social simulations that relate 
to the topic of this thesis. One example is the Mod game, which was implemented by de 
Weerd et al. (2014). It simulates human behaviour as in rock-paper-scissors game with n-
players. The Mod game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each action is 
played with equal probability. In a similar study, de Weerd (2013) and his colleagues have 
shown that the ability of using higher orders of theory of mind can be beneficial in some 
specific situations which will be discussed in section 3.5.  
The opinion dynamics and bounded confidence model (Hegselmann & Krause, 2002), 
which demonstrates consensus forming within a group, is another example of considering 
psychological aspects in social simulations. In this model, decisions on the individual level 
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is based on simple behaviour rules, whereas the aggregated level results in complex and 
clustering patterns.  
Another example is the attitude dynamics model (Brousmichea et al., 2016) which 
integrates a cognitive and an emotional component based on belief revision using a 
communication mechanism. The thesis now continues by explaining two of the most 
influential examples of ABMs in social simulations in more detail; segregation model and 
the game of life.  
1.3.8.1 Segregation Model (Schelling’s Model) 
Thomas Schelling (1971) introduced a model for racial segregation in United States cities. 
Schelling proposed a threshold of tolerance to define when people are satisfied with the 
place they live in which a certain ratio of their neighbours belong to the same ethnic group 
as themselves. The model consists of blue and green agents representing two different 
racial household types which are placed randomly in a grid environment as an urban area. 
Thus, each cell on the grid can be either empty or occupied by a blue or green agent. Agents 
belong to one of the two groups and they are able to move to another cell if they are not 
satisfied with their neighbourhood. In other words, when the ratio of agents with the same 
ethnic group within eight cells in its vicinity (Moore neighbourhood), is less than the 
tolerance threshold then they are unsatisfied. Thus, the unsatisfied agents search for an 
empty cell in which they become satisfied and move there. The effect of agents’ 
relocations, might unbalance the tolerance for the neighbours and cause some of them to 
become unsatisfied, resulting in a cascade of relocations (Gilbert, 2007). Thus, the initial 
random distribution of household segregation changes to patches of two groups, clustering 
together based on their group (Gilbert, 2007). These clusters indicate the racial prejudice 
could cause segregated patterns in cities (Schelling, 1971).   
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Figure 5 shows the segregation model with three different tolerance thresholds (F) in a city 
with a 0.2:0.8 ratio of group sizes. Three cases of integrity, mixed and segregation is 
demonstrated in this figure. (Hatnaa & Benensonb, 2012) 
 
Figure 5. Integrated, mixed and segregated persistent patterns of the Schelling model. 
The patterns produced by the Schelling model for the 0.2:0.8 Blue-to-Green size ratio (Hatnaa 
& Benensonb, 2012).   
 
                                                   
The Schelling model is very simple to understand, simulate and analyse it. The emergence 
of clusters and segregation pattern is not predictable from the agents’ micro level rules. In 
addition, the model can be tested with empirical data of cities and thus it has been an 
influential model in social simulations.  
1.3.8.2 The Game of Life 
The Game of Life, presented by mathematician John Conway in 1970, is a grid extending 
infinitely in all directions (cellular automaton). It is based on a few mathematical rules in 
which each cell can either be lit up and called alive, or, remain dark and is called dead. 
Whether a cell is alive or dead depends on its Moore neighbourhood, the eight cells in its 
vicinity. An alive cell dies of loneliness when there are either no neighbours or only one. 
Also, a cell with four or more neighbours dies because of overpopulation. A cell with two 
or three neighbours remain alive.  A dead cell with three neighbours becomes a live cell.  
By using these simple rules, the game of life simulation generates various interesting 
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patterns depending on its initial conditions.  The simple rules have a significant effect on 
the future patterns in the environment. In each time step, different shapes form and deform, 
a cluster of shapes move across the grid and reproduction happens with the new alive cells. 
Although the rules are simple the patterns which emerge are very complex. Figure 6 shows 
some of patterns of the game of life.  
                                            
                                         Figure 6.  Patterns of the game of life 
 
1.3.9  Simulation Software 
The increasing demand of agent-based modelling for different fields has led to the 
development of more user-friendly agent-based modelling platforms such as NetLogo, 
AnyLogic, and Repast. 
NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) is a general purpose agent-based modelling language which 
uses the Logo language syntax as a basis and includes a library of models in different fields. 
NetLogo is a high-level platform, with built-in graphical interface capable of reducing the 
programming effort, providing a simple but powerful programming language (Railsback, 
Lytinen, & Jackson, 2006). However, it lacks the flexibility of a standard programming 
language due to limitation of the control and structuring capabilities. 
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 The AnyLogic platform enables modelling complex phenomena by using a graphical user 
interface and Java code. The object-oriented paradigm which is supported by AnyLogic 
makes it a potential option for this study. However, the cost of the AnyLogic Research 
License is high. For the purpose of this project, Repast Simphony has been selected; a 
popular open source Java-based modelling platform that is capable of modelling complex 
systems such as theory of mind. Figure 7 shows the interface of Repast Simphony. 
Figure 7. The simulation environment in Repast Simphony 
 
1.4  Why does this thesis apply ABM for theory of mind? 
Agent-based modelling was selected as a methodology for the purpose of theory of mind 
simulation for several reasons. Firstly, the complex nature of theory of mind requires a 
powerful empirical research technique that naturally associates with the complex systems. 
One prominent technique for complex systems is ABM that enables the interaction between 
the parts of the system. This viable characteristic of ABM utilises the agents’ interactions 
to pursue their goals in the environment. More importantly, it facilitates the agents’ mental 
states anticipation or manipulation behind this interactions in the simulation of theory of 
mind in this thesis. Thus, ABM is a coherent research laboratory for the concept of theory 
of mind.  
40 
 
 Secondly, despite the large amount of important research in theory of mind literature, there 
is still ambiguity in research methodology and a lack of standard experimental methods in 
the field. ABMs are able to provide a promising approach to reconstruct and simulate our 
knowledge of theory of mind to understand its patterns and characteristics in the society.  
The agent-based models in this thesis attempt to imitate the concepts of understanding 
others’ belief and desires, based on the developmental literature, and explore the main 
patterns, efficiency and the process of the concept.  
Thirdly, the analysis of theory of mind procedure into a systematic approach is not directly 
feasible and there is no natural way for studying it as a social behaviour. However, ABMs 
as interdisciplinary approach are able to explore theory of mind concept from individual 
and social aspects simultaneously. Besides, ABMs are capable to serve as a proof of the 
underlying mechanisms of a concept (Sun, 2006) such as theory of mind.  
Fourthly, ABMs are capable of constructing and reconstructing concepts and procedures 
such as reasoning through simulation in a social context. Thus far, this has not proved 
possible through practical experiments with people. Therefore, agent-based modelling 
offers a reliable alternative for researchers in theory of mind field.  
Finally, developing an agent-based model to explain theory of mind features, from micro 
to macro level, enables us to manipulate the parameters and understand the effect of the 
changes on behaviour of the system. Moreover, ABMs act as a simplified model of reality, 
parallel to other modelling tools, capable of predicting the behaviour of the system and 
providing analogous algorithms.  
In general, it is not possible to study the mental processes merely by behavioural 
experiments; the complexity of human mind together with its manifestation in the flexible 
behaviour requires computational models to analyse the complex detail (Sun, 2008).   
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ABMs as computational models are not restricted by mathematical equations, thus they 
simultaneously are expressive and precise (Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005). Agent-based 
models not only hold flexibility and process-based characteristics, they also express both 
individual level and social aspects of the phenomenon. Besides, they are capable of 
showing the dynamics, interactions and parts in theory of mind processes. Based on these 


















































2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Two children are playing hide and seek in the jungle. The hider child first makes sure that 
the seeker does not see her as she is hiding. Why does she do this? How does she do this?  
This example reveals that children are able to track others’ field of view. There is a realistic 
link between children’s abilities to play games, such as hide and seek, successfully and 
applying false belief reasoning (Wellman, 2014). 
In everyday life, a large amount of belief processing, true and false beliefs, occurs in our 
mind. Yet, in order to efficiently build connections and communicate with others even in a 
small and simple group of people, it is necessary to distinguish others’ true and false 
beliefs. The inability to infer and understand others’ beliefs has been identified as one 
possible reason for deficits in social life interactions in individuals with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) (e.g. Frith, 2001; Roekel, Scholte, & Didden, 2010). 
One primary way to analyse belief representation is to distinguish between others’ true and 
false beliefs. The best presumption about others’ beliefs in everyday experiences is that it 
is the same as one's own because peoples’ ordinary beliefs are usually true and true beliefs 
are default beliefs (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Thus, understanding others’ true 
beliefs is a relatively straightforward process that involves a shared belief between one and 
others.  
In contrast to true belief, understanding others’ false belief is more demanding on cognitive 
resources such as memory and reasoning (Apperly et al., 2007). In addition, as already 
explained in general introduction section 2.1 , Leslie et al. (2004) suggest that to succeed 
in false belief task, it is necessary to inhibit the true belief default such that an alternative 
belief with different content can be selected. The objective of false belief tasks was to 
examine children’s ability of inferring others’ perspective, which was different from the 
real world state. This might be the underlying reason that understanding others’ false belief 
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is considered as an acid test for presence of theory of mind ability (e.g. Wellman & Bartsch, 
1988; Workman & Reader, 2014; Doherty, 2009).  
In contrast, Bloom and German (2000) are the principal opponents for considering false 
belief tasks as an acid test for theory of mind. Their critical paper explains two reasons that 
false belief tasks needs to be abandoned as a test for theory of mind. The first reason given 
is that to pass a false belief task it requires abilities other than theory of mind. Secondly, 
theory of mind does not require the ability to reason about false beliefs. This will be 
discussed in section 4.9.  
In a similar vein, minimal theory of mind proposed by Butterfill and Apperly “enables 
those with limited cognitive resources” “ to track others’ perceptions, knowledge states and 
beliefs” without “representing propositional attitudes, or any other kind of representation, 
as such.” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 1). They suggest four principles for minimal 
theory of mind to be able to track others’ perceptions and belief-like, which has been 
explained in the general introduction section 1.2.6. Apperly and Butterfill claim that one 
with minimal theory of mind ability is able to pass the tests which are supposed to be an 
acid test of theory of mind, as well as many false belief tasks. 
In addition to the lack of consensus on an acid test for theory of mind, the diversity of false 
belief task design has been rapidly increasing. A recent review by  Schaafsma et al. (2015) 
highlights that there are more than 36 different variety tasks such as false belief versus false 
photograph, story-based format for false belief, false belief versus true belief, false belief 
and subjective preference and false belief versus physical reality is employed in fMRI 
studies (Schaafsma et al., 2015). The design of false belief tasks sometimes contains 
ambiguity or complexity, which makes it difficult to accurately interpret the experiments 
results. Historically, the literature has expanded with the diversity of tasks and with very 
little consensus on core principles. This might be a practical motivation to address the 
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question that which sets of basic processes are shared across the different varieties of false 
belief tasks.   
This chapter presents a computational model of belief representation to address some of 
these inconsistencies in the literature. Besides, it explores some of the advantages and costs 
of understanding others’ beliefs.  For this purpose, an agent-based model called “Belief 
Representation Model” (BRM) was designed to shed light on false belief’s processes at 
both the micro and macro levels. On the micro level, BRM examines belief representation 
concept, procedures and the minimum resources it might require in a dynamic environment.  
On the macro level, the aggregated results of BRM are compatible with the empirical 
effects of passing or failing false belief tasks in a virtual society; the BRM simulation 
results reflect the effect of understanding others’ belief in agents’ performances.   
The Martin and Santos (2014) experiment, which has been outlined in general introduction 
section 1.2.8, formed the underpinning premise of BRM. The analysis of BRM will lead to 
a systematic approach to understand others’ beliefs, which determines the necessary shared 
process for belief representation. Building upon on their experiment, BRM has involved 
the design of two types of simple agents with different abilities of belief representation. 
One type of agent in BRM follows the standard false belief task procedure and understands 
others’ beliefs whereas the second type of agent is not capable of understanding others’ 
beliefs. This will be explained in detail in section 2.4.3. Furthermore, on the macro level, 
different agents’ performances will be assessed and analysed. This performance assessment 
highlights the efficiency of different theory of mind abilities.  
Moreover, the link between minimal theory of mind principles and the proposed systematic 
approach for belief representation will be described.  
2.2  BRM METHODOLOGY 
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An agent-based model is designed to simulate the process of others’ true and false beliefs 
and to explore the successful procedure of belief representation. The model consists of 3 
types of agents, representing different capabilities of tracking others’ beliefs in a virtual 
world.  
2.2.1  Environment 
The virtual environment is made of a grid space of 50 by 50 in which agents interact within 
the environment based on their rules to achieve food. The space is toroidal meaning that if 
agents move to one border of the grid; it appears on the opposite border.  
Time Step 
The time measurement is called a tick; it is a step in the simulation when agents 
simultaneously perform their actions depending on their rules. The default number of time 
steps for the simulation is 1000 ticks. 
Neighbourhood 
The agents’ first neighbourhood refers to the Moore neighbourhood which consists of eight 
cells around the agent’s cell that touch it (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). The second and third 
neighbourhoods consist of 24 and 48 cells respectively. Figure 8 illustrates different levels 
of neighbourhood for the red agent located in the green cell; the first neighbourhood 
consists of yellow cells, the second neighbourhood consists of yellow and grey cells 
whereas the third neighbourhood includes yellow, grey and blue cells. The concept of 
agents’ neighbourhood defines two important features in the simulation: field of view and 




Figure 8. Agents’ different neighbourhoods 
The first neighbourhood (yellow cells), the second neighbourhood (yellow and grey cells) and 
the third neighbourhood (yellow, grey and blue cells) of the red agent in the green cell. 
 
Field of view  
The agent’s field of view is the observed environment which consists of the cells within its 
neighbourhood.  
Field of movement 
An agent’s field of movement includes the eight cells around the agent and the cell it 
currently occupies, as is shown in Figure 9. These are the cells to which the agent may 
move.  
 
Figure 9. The area of field of movement 
The yellow area shows the field of movement of the red agent 
 
Food 
Food is indicated by green cells and agents are required to consume food. Agents’ ultimate 
goal is to consume as much food as possible. Therefore, the number of consumed food by 
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agents is a criterion for the performance measurements. The number of food parameter 
defines the number of available food in the environment in each time step.  
At the start of each time step, the food that was not used by any agent remains in the 
environment. While the food, which was used by agents, will be replaced randomly in the 
grid for the next time step. Therefore, the number of food in the environment remains 
constant through the simulation time steps. 
2.2.2  BRM General Rules  
The model consists of 3 types of agents interacting within the environment: Monkey, Infant 
and Control agents.  For ease of reference, Monkey, Infant and Control agents are 
initialised in capital letters. Note that the Monkey and Infant agents’ names are not based 
on similarity with monkeys and infants in the real world. However, the main motivations 
for these names are based on Martin and Santos (2014) experiment and the idea that there 
are two types of agents with and without belief representation capability. In other words, 
Infant agents represent the ability to understand others’ false beliefs whereas Monkey 
agents are unable to have others’ belief understanding competence. 
Each agent has visual perception from its own field of view. Agents encounter food in their 
field of view and correctly register their locations. Each time step agents move in a random 
turn. BRM class diagram, is shown in Figure 19, this represents the agents, their main 
functionality and the links with the environment.  
- At the start of each simulation run, the initialisation procedure will be run. A defined 
number of agents (for each type) and a defined number of food are randomly placed in the 
virtual world.  
- Agents move to an empty cell within their field of movement. 
- If there is food in the field of movement, agents move towards the food. 
- Agents can move to a cell that is not occupied by other agents. 
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- If there is no food in the first neighbourhood, agents move to a random cell depending 
on the agents’ strategies.  
Parameters 
The BRM simulation analysis is based on modifying two parameters; number of agents 
and number of food.  
Actions 
Agents move to the cells that contain food as their targets. However, their movement 
depends on their abilities, rules and strategies on the micro level. 
2.2.3  Agents’ Strategies 
Agents possess different abilities in terms of collecting information from their field of view 
and understanding others’ actions as they do not collect all of the information in their field 
of view. Then, agents process the information they have collected. Thus, each type of agent 
acts based on its particular ability and strategy as follow:    
 2.2.3.1  Monkey Agents’ Strategy 
The general diagram of Monkey agents’ strategy is illustrated in three processing directions 
of collecting information, recording information and action in Figure 10. Monkey agents 
are able to see the first neighbourhood as their field of view and collect the information 
about the location of the food they can consume, which is shown as collecting information 
in Figure 10. They do not reason about which food to choose, rather they randomly select 




Figure 10. Monkey agents’ arrow and box diagram 
 
Monkey agents can remember the location of the food from the past time step by storing it 
in their memory, that is demonstrated as recoding information in Figure 10. Therefore, 
when food is available their action is consuming the food whereas, once there is no food 
available, they are able to retrieve the location of the food from the previous time step and 
move towards it, which is shown as action in Figure 10. In addition, Figure 11 depicts their 
strategy of retrieving the location of food in more detail. At the time step t, as Figure 11.a 
shows the yellow Monkey agent encounters and stores green and black food ( In this 
situation, Monkey agent always moves randomly towards one food). It randomly chooses 
to consume the black food but stores the location of the green food in its memory. Thus, at 
the start of time step t+1, the yellow Monkey agent, which has stored the location of the 
green food, has no access to any food in its field of view as is demonstrated in Figure 11.b. 
Based on its rules, it will come back towards the green food.  Figure 11.c depicts that at the 
end of time step t+1, the yellow Monkey agent moves to its previous location, towards the 




                                                                      
Figure 11. The steps in which Monkey agents retrieve the previous food information. 
a) Monkey agent (yellow circle) moves towards the black food and stores the location of the 
green food in its memory at time step=t. 
b) Monkey agent has no access to food in its field of view (grey cells). It remembers the 
location of the green food at the start of time step t+1. 
c) Monkey agent moves to its previous location towards the green food in time step t+1. 
 
Monkey agents are able to recognise their own false beliefs over time; when they move 
towards a restored food and it is no longer is there. Nevertheless, they do not collect any 
information about other agents’ field of view and they are unable to take others’ perspective 
into account.  
2.2.3.2  Infant Agents’ Strategy     
Infant agents are able to collect information about the location of food and other agents’ 
perspective regarding the food. They are able to reason which information to collect and 
use. Infant agents are able to consider Monkey agents’ beliefs regarding the location of the 
food. In order to do so, firstly, Infant agents search in their first neighbourhood and collect 
information on the location of the food. Then, the Infant agents identify all Monkey agents 
in their third neighbourhood. Infant agents are able to see the first, second and third 
neighbourhood as their field of view. Moreover, Infant agents identify the food that is in 
each Monkey agent’s field of view which also exists in its own third neighbourhood. Note 
that the Infant agents only use the third neighbourhood to identify the Monkey agents’ 
perspective. This extension allows Infant agents to consider a reasonable numbers of 
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Monkey agents’ perspectives. Infant agents choose the Monkey agents and the information 
from their perspectives when they both have access to the same food at the current time 
step.  Infant agents make decisions to move towards a food based on two types of 
information: 
 a) The previous time step information about Monkey agents’ perspective regarding the 
location of the food. 
 b) The current time step information about the real world. 
As Infant agents track others’ field of view and store Monkey agents’ perspective in their 
memory, their first priority is creating false beliefs for Monkey agents by retrieving the 
information about Monkey agents’ perspectives. There are two cases where the Infant agent 
recognises Monkey agents’ false beliefs: 
Case I: Another agent consumes the registered food by the Monkey agent. 
Suppose Figure 12.a is the start of time step t, and the Infant agent (blue circle) encounters 
two food (green and black), and simultaneously stores the Monkey agent’s (yellow circle) 
perspective of the location of black and brown food.  
 
                                               (a)                                                      (b) 
           Figure 12. Infant agents’ strategy regarding Monkey agents’ false beliefs 
a) The Infant agent (blue circle) encounters green and black food whereas Monkey agent 
(yellow circle) encounters the black and brown food in their field of view in time step t. The 
red agent is another agent that has access to the black and green food.   
 b) Red agent, Infant agent and Monkey agent respectively consume the black, green and 
brown food. In Monkey agent’s perspective, the black food is still in its previous location. 
Infant agent memorises this perspective. Thus, the Infant agent identifies Monkey agents’ false 





Figure 12.b illustrates time step t +1, in which the red agent (can be Infant or Monkey 
agent) consumed the black food. Whereas, the Monkey agent and the Infant agent 
consumed the brown and green food respectively. The Infant agent predicts that the 
Monkey agent will return to its previous position for the black food in the next time step 
(t+2), and encounters a false belief situation, noticing that the Monkey has no alternative 
food. At this stage, the Infant agent identifies the false belief of the Monkey agent.  
Case II: Infant agent consumes the registered food by Monkey agent. 
One of the Infant agents’ main rules is to prioritise consuming the food that the Monkey 
has registered as an alternative food in its memory. Thus, as Figure 13 demonstrates, the 
Infant agent (blue circle) moves towards the black food to create a false belief situation for 
the Monkey agent (yellow circle). 
 
Figure 13. Infant agents’ strategy 
The Infant agent (blue circle) encounters two green and black food. Note that the Infant agent 
has already stored the Monkey agent’s perspective regarding the black food location, thus, the 
Infant agent’s priority is to move towards the black food to create a false belief for the 
Monkey agent (yellow circle). 
 
 
As already stated, unlike Monkey agents, Infant agents are capable of understanding the 
Monkey agents’ false beliefs. In order to do this, Infant agents need to inhibit their own 
perspective, which they normally use. The Infant agents’ perspective which includes the 
real location of the food has to be replaced with the Monkey agents’ perspective. The 
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location of the food in the Monkey agent’s perspective is different from the Infant agent’s 
own perspective when the Infant agent identifies the Monkey agent’s false belief.  
In a situation where there is more than one food, Infant agents plan and choose the food 
that creates a false belief for Monkey agents. Infant agents prioritise the food based on two 
conditions. Firstly, that the food has previously been stored in the Monkey agent’s memory 
and which in the Monkey agent’s perspective is still there. Secondly, that the Monkey agent 
has no alternative food in its field of view. In other words, Infant agents choose the food 
that could create false belief for Monkey agents, this is called priority function. In cases 
where there is no Monkey agent interested in the food, the Infant agent will choose the food 
which has the maximum number of agents around it. In fact, it uses the most vulnerable 
food because this might result in more competitors having no access to the food. Thus, for 
each food in their field of view, Infant agents calculate the total number of competitors at 
the current time step. Figure 14 illustrates an activity diagram of Infant agents including 
priority function. In addition, Figure 15 illustrates the general diagram of Infant agents’ 
strategy based on collecting information, recording information, retrieving information, 
reasoning process and expressing others’ belief-desire phases, which will be elaborated 
later in the discussion.  





Figure 15. Infant agents’ arrow and box diagram 
 
2.2.3.3  Controls Agents’ Strategy 
Control agents have been introduced as a control measurement. They collect information 
from their field of view regarding the location of food and other agents’ perspectives.  
Control agents are able to track others’ field of view. Control agents partly act similar to 
the Infant agents but they do not store Monkeys’ perspective information for using in the 
next time steps. In situations where there is more than one food available, Control agents 
calculate the total number of competitors which have access to the food and move towards 
the food with the higher risk of being consumed. For example, the Control agent (red circle) 
in Figure 16 encounters two green and black food. The black food has one competitor 
(yellow agent) whereas the green food has two other competitors. Thus, it selects to move 
towards the green food.  Control agents do not store Monkey agents’ beliefs information. 
They use the present time information about the world (part b of Infant agents’ information 
which has already explained in Infant agents’ strategy section) and have no access to the 
Monkeys’ past perspective information (part a of Infant agents’ information). Therefore, 
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Control agents’ performance is a reliable measurement because they are able to track 
others’ field of view at the current time, which is partly similar to the Infant agents, and 
also their field of view is wider than the Monkey agents.  
Figure 16. Control agents’ strategy regarding competitors 
Control agent (red circle) encounters two green and black food. It selects the food with the 
maximum number of competitors. It moves towards the green food with two competitors 
rather than the black food with only one competitor. 
 
 
Figure 17 shows the general diagram of their strategy based on collecting information, 
registering information and action procedures. 
 
 
Figure 17. Control agents’ arrow and box diagram 
 
 
2.2.3.4  A comparison between agents’ abilities 
There are certain preconditions for agents which enables them to understand others’ beliefs 
in BRM. Firstly, it is essential that agents are capable of tracking which one of the food 
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can be seen by other agents. Agents need to store the information about which food has 
been seen by which agents. In other words, sub-abilities such as tracking others’ field of 
view and registering others’ perspective of the location of the food are the starting points 
of understanding others’ beliefs. It is essential to retrieve the information regarding which 
agents had seen which food in the previous time steps.  
Table 1 shows Monkey, Infant and Control agents’ abilities; Infant agents possess all three 
abilities of tracking others’ field of view and registering their own and others’ perspective. 
Thus, Infant agents meet the preconditions of passing the false belief task. In contrast, 
Monkey agents only store their own perspective of the location of the food whereas Control 
agents are only able to track other’s field of view at the current time step. 
 
Table 1. Agents’ different sub-abilities 
 
All agents are able to use their vision ability; they are capable of seeing the local 
environment. Moreover, Infants and Control agents are able to track others’ field of view, 
while Monkey agents remember the food from the last time step. Infant agents are capable 
of recording and retrieving the information from Monkey agents’ perspective. They are 
able to inhibit their own belief about the location of food and use the Monkey agent’s 
perspective. In the case where this information is not similar to the current reality of the 
world, they can identify Monkey agents’ false beliefs. Although Control agents are able to 
track others’ field of view but they are unable to store others’ perspective regarding the 
location of the food. Control agents are not designed to inhibit their own perspective; 
therefore, they are not capable of passing the false belief task. 
2.2.4  How do Infant Agents understand Monkey Agents’ false beliefs? 
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Firstly, Infant agents collect information about the location of the food in their field of 
view.  Then, Infant agents track Monkey agents’ perspective about the location of the food. 
Secondly, Infant agents require memory to store the information about Monkey agents’ 
perspective about the registered food (in time step t-1) where the shared area of their field 
of view contains the food. Thirdly, Infant agents collect the current time step information 
about the location of the food (time step t) which no longer exists in Monkey agent’s field 
of view.  
Infant agents inhibit their own perspective and thus, do not use the real information about 
the location of the food, which is the same as their own perspective. Infant agents retrieve 
the stored information about Monkey agents’ perspectives, which are in their field of views. 
Infant agent temporarily ignores its own beliefs in regards to the location of the food and 
uses the Monkey agents’ beliefs. This is considered as self-perspective inhibition of Infant 
agents. Thus, the information processing continues based on retrieval of the Monkey 
agents’ perspectives information rather than the real information on the location of the food 
and the Infant agents’ perspective.  
Given the current information on Monkey agent’s location (time step t), and Monkey 
agent’s perspective regarding the food (from time step t-1), Infant agents reason about 
Monkey agent’s desire towards the food.  Unless there is an alternative and closer food 
available for the Monkey agent, Infant agent considers that Monkey agent’s intention is to 
move towards the food.  
Although, when the registered food by the Monkey agent is consumed by another agent, 
the Monkey agent still moves towards the food; this is because the Monkey agent believes 
that the food is still in that location. This condition is counted as Monkey agents’ false 
belief.  This process enables Infant agents to recognise Monkey agents’ false beliefs. Infant 
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agents are able to detect Monkey agents’ false beliefs as they store Monkey agents’ 
perspective simultaneously. 
The false belief representation in BRM, hinges on three different perspectives; Infant agent 
perspective, Monkey agent’s belief, Infant agent perspective of Monkey agent’s belief. In 
time step t, all of these perspectives are identical. However, in time step (t+1), there is a 
contradiction between Infant agent’s perspective about the location of the food and Infant 
agent’s perspective of Monkey agent’s belief. Thus, one critical parameter is the concept 
of time steps in BRM. This description is concisely depicted in Figure 18.  
 
    Figure 18. Agents’ perspectives in false belief situations 
False belief concept based on Infant and Monkey agents’ perspectives in BRM, where X is the 





2.2.5  BRM Implementation  
UML (Unified Modelling Language) is used to provide a visual version of the BRM design. 
UML is a standardised object oriented graphical modelling language with hundreds of 
modelling symbols for composing different kinds of diagrams (Unified Modelling 
Language, 2015). Class, sequence, state and activity diagrams are the most useful ones for 
ABM development (Bersini, 2012).  
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The BRM design consists of a society with two different type of agents moving to consume 
food in a grid space, in which agents and food have been placed. Figure 19 illustrates the 
BRM class diagram including the classes (which are basically templates for objects) and 
the relationships between them. The Society class is a composition of the Agent, Food, and 
Grid class. There is a composition association (the black diamond sign) between Society 
class and other classes indicating that Society class is a container for objects of other 
classes. Thus, when the Society ceases to exist at the end of the simulation, all of the objects 
inside it will be destroyed. 
The Agent class is an abstract class, inheriting from two sub classes, Monkey Agent and 
Infant Agent. The two subclasses of Agent class including Monkey Agent class and Infant 
Agent class, inherit Agent class methods. However, they have their own specific methods 
and are also able to redefine the methods of their superclass. For example, Infant Agent 
class has three additional methods including Prioritise, Reason and Record in addition to 
Move and Consume methods which are inherited from its superclass. Although, the Record 
method exists in both of the subclasses, they are different methods and have different 
parameters. The Record method in Infant Agent class, stores the information about Monkey 
agents as well as the food whereas this method in Monkey Agent class only has one 
parameter regarding the food.  There is a 1-1 association between Agent and Grid 
indicating that each agent is placed in one and only one cell of the grid. Similarly, there is 





Figure 19. Class Diagram of BRM 
 
There is a dependency relationship from the Monkey Agent class to the Food class. This 
relationship shows that the Monkey agent consumes the food by passing the information 
about the food, as a parameter, to Consume method. A similar relationship exists between 
the Infant Agent class and the Food class. Also, there is a dependency relationship from 
the Infant Agent class to the Monkey Agent class. The Move and Consume methods are 
the same for both of subclasses. The Food class includes the Decrease method that as the 
food has been consumed by an agent, it will be removed from the grid. Figure 20 shows a 
screenshot of running BRM in action. 
 
Figure 20.  Screenshot of BRM interface 
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2.2.6  BRM hypotheses and predictions 
There are two main agents in BRM; agents which are capable of understanding others’ 
beliefs regarding the location of the food and agents with no belief representation ability. 
The dependent variable is the level of belief representation and the independent variable is 
the performance of agents in a competitive environment. 
The hypothesis is that agents’ with belief representation ability perform significantly better 
than agents without this ability in the simulations. Also, the prediction is that agents’ 
performances in consuming food is related to their ability to understand others’ beliefs. 
Thus, the expectation is that belief representation ability acts as an effective factor in 
agents’ performances.  
Agents’ performances are determined by the total number of the food they have consumed 
at the end of each simulation run. The average performance is calculated by running the 
simulation for four times. The main analysis strategy in BRM is to compare each agents’ 
performance within different parameters of the virtual world.  Further criteria to compare 
the agents’ efficiency include the number of false beliefs of agents and the number of times 
that a function is used to create a false belief situation.  
Statistical methods are usually required if results are very noisy and effects are not clear-
cut. For example, if results from different parameter settings are overlapping and are not 
reliable. However, in BRM the parameter settings have been systematically changed and 
have provided clear cut results. In addition, the theoretical interpretation of the simulations 
focused on clear results. Hence, the application of statistical methods is not required when 









2.3  The BRM simulation Results 
The simulation runs consists of setups as follow: 
1) Infant agent and Monkey agent setup 
2) Control agent and Monkey agent setup 
The results are based on the average value of 4 times running the simulation for each of the 
parameters. Table 2 shows the chosen parameters: 
 
Table 2. Parameters’ values for BRM 
 
2.3.1  Why were these parameter values chosen? 
One critical reason for selecting these values for the parameters is that the number of 
Monkey agents’ false belief is high enough to provide results which show more precise and 
effective outcomes of the simulation. In fact, if the number of false beliefs of Monkey 
agents is very low, the study cannot achieve the aim set out earlier. Thus, it is necessary 
first to create enough false beliefs scenarios.  
Subsequently, it is possible to evaluate the agents’ performance in the context of false 
beliefs. Therefore, in situations where Monkey agents’ false beliefs do not happen there is 
no point in running the simulation to find the effect of false belief understanding. To 
illustrate this point, it is necessary to explain when this situation might happen. 
The main preconditions for creating false beliefs scenarios for Monkey agents are: 
i) There is at least one registered food in their memory from the past time step. 
ii) The previously seen food no longer exists. 
iii) There is no food available in their field of view. 
iv) It is possible to move to the previous cell where the food was seen.  
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These criteria demonstrate that the number of food and the number of each type of agents 
in the environment are the key parameters. Furthermore, the ratio of number of food to 
number of agents has a direct effect in meeting these conditions, which will be explained 
through this section.  
Another reason for selecting these values for parameters is to avoid the extreme values, 
which make the environment unpredictable and uncertain.  For example, when the number 
of food is less than 300 the uncertainty of food distribution is high.  In contrast, when the 
number of food is high, agents are able to consume food without applying their plans. In 
other words, because the number of food is excessive in the environment, agents readily 
consume food without considering their rules and thus the perspective of other agents is 
not relevant any more. For example, Infant agents’ ability regarding Monkey agent is not 
relevant to their performances. The chance that false belief scenarios happen decreases 
sharply in the case that the number of agents is less than 300, especially when the number 
of food is low as well. Moreover, when the number of agents is more than 1000, this means 
that more than 2000 agents compete in a dense environment (due to two types of agents 
participation simultaneously). The lack of sufficient freedom to move is another obstacle 
for agents to apply their plans. Thus, the selected values for parameters create optimum 
situations for the false belief scenarios to happen in BRM.  
2.3.2  Agents’ performances 
One of the main objectives of BRM is to explore the effects of parameters on agents’ 
performances.  Conceivably, the number of consumed food by agents is a measurement to 
evaluate the agents’ performances. Infant agents reflect the ability to understand others’ 
beliefs whereas Monkey agents are only able to remember the location of food. Moreover, 
Control agents are able to track others’ beliefs. Therefore, by comparing the agents’ 
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performances, it is possible to identify some patterns and links between agents’ 
performances, their abilities and the concepts behind their abilities.  
The simulation results illuminate the answers to many central questions: Which type of 
agents performs the most effective in this dynamic world? Why do these types of agents’ 
perform better? What factors improve the agents’ performances? Are there any critical 
preconditions to their high performance? If so, what are these pre-conditions? The 
following graphs which illustrate the differences between Monkey and Infant agents’ 
performances, and also the graphs which show Monkey and Control agents’ food 
consumption address these questions.  
   
Figure 21. The difference between Infant agents and Monkey agents 
The general performance of Infant agents and Monkey agents’ differences is illustrated in 
Figure 21.  The only consistent pattern for performance differences occurs when the 
number of food is equal to 800 where the performance differences show the lowest 
variation and lowest value. The difference between Infant agents and Monkey agents’ 
performances ranges from 2000 to 3100. The most salient performance difference happens 
when the number of agents is equal to 700 for each type of agents; nevertheless primarily, 
it is subject to the number of food. For example, when the number of food is 800, the 














































consume food without the occurrence of false belief situations. The prominent pattern 
shows that performances differences increase as the number of agents’ increases. However, 
the number of food has a great impact on this pattern. In fact, the lack of a solid pattern 
indicates the complexity and dynamics of the environment which is dependent on the 
fraction and interrelationship of the parameters.  
 
Figure 22. (Control Agents – Monkey Agents) Consumed Food 
 
Note that a simulation setup with Infant agents and Control agents yields no meaningful 
results. The reason for this is that  Infant agents are designed to understand others’ false 
beliefs while Control agents have no memory to store the information and follow the 
previous food, thus, the preconditions for Infant agents to follow their strategy in regards 
to understanding others’ belief is not met by Control agents. Therefore, a simulation setup 
with Infant agents and Control agents is misleading. 
However, Figure 22 shows the difference between Monkey agents and Control agents’ 
performances and by making a comparison between this figure and Figure 21, it is possible 
to compare the performances of Infant agents with Control agents. Figure 22 shows that as 













































increase in the number of food the difference decreases. The performance of Control agent 
is higher than Monkey agents only when the number of agents is equal or less than 500 and 
the number of food is higher than 700 as Figure 22 shows. Nevertheless, Monkey agents 
perform more effectively than Control agents, when the population of the world is higher 
than 1000, particularly when food availability is low for example 500. Thus, the 
performance of Monkey agents is consistently higher than Control agents when the number 
of agents increases and the number of food is relatively low. This contradicts the initial 
expectation that the wider field of view should improve performance in general. In fact, in 
this situation they are using their strategies more often. Thus, as they are using their rules, 
the field of view has no effect on their performances. In addition, Figure 22 shows that as 
the number of food increases for constant number of agents, the difference between Control 
agents and Monkey agents starts to decrease; because agents simply start to consume food 
with less effort rather than applying their distinct rules. However, in the case that there is 
no food available, Monkey agents can still apply their strategies, remembering the food 
from past time step, whereas this does not apply to Control agents. 
Noticeably, by comparing Figure 21 and Figure 22, it becomes clear that the differences 
between Infant agents and Monkey agents are consistently higher than the differences 
between Control and Monkey agents’ performances in both of the above situations. For 
example, in the case that Control agents perform better than Monkey agents, the number 
of agents are 400 and number of food as high as 800, which indicates that agents can 
achieve food easily; the difference between Control and Monkey agents is half of the 
difference between Infant and Monkey agents. This clarifies that Infant agents always 
perform more effectively than Control agents. These results indicate that Infant agents 
demonstrate the most efficient performance in the simulation. The Infant agents’ ability to 
consider others’ beliefs is their key to success.  
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The differences of Monkey agents’ consumed food in simulation with Control and Infant 
agents are shown in Figure 23. It demonstrates that Monkey agents’ performance in 
competition with Infants is less effective than the competition with Control agents. In other 
words, Monkey agents perform in a lower level with Infant agents than Control agents.  
 
Figure 23. Monkey agents’ Consumed Food Differences graph 
Simulation setup of (Monkey, Infant) and (Monkey, Control). 
 
2.3.3  The Number of false beliefs of Monkey agents 
At Monkey agent’s false belief scenarios, Infant agents send a message to the log window 
of the simulation environment as an output that there is a false belief scenario regarding 
the specific Monkey agent. In addition, at the end of the simulation run, there is a message 
displaying the total number of false beliefs that has happened to Monkey agents. More 
precisely, when in Monkey agent’s memory, there is a food in a specific location but in 
reality there is no food at that location based on Infant agent’s perspective, and Monkey 
agent has no alternative food in its neighbourhood, then the number of Monkey agents’ 
false beliefs increases by one. Note that in each time step, when there is more than one 
false belief, for each Monkey agent, only one is considered. In order to calculate the number 
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because Control agents have no memory about Monkey agents perspective, it is necessary 
for the Control agents to temporarily have access to that memory to check if Monkey agents 
had a false belief or not. Afterwards, this access ceases and they cannot use it for any other 
purposes. The number of Monkey agents’ false beliefs in both simulations, (Infant, 
Monkey) and (Control, Monkey), is illustrated in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. The number of false beliefs that happens to Monkey agents 
Simulation with Infant and Control agents, Food=500, 600,700, 800. 
 
The number of Monkey agents’ false beliefs starts to increase as the number of agents 
increases, in simulation setup with Infant agents and with control agents. The reason is that 
more Monkey agents are able to register the food and pursue it in the next step. Figure 24 
demonstrates that with the availability of 500 to 800 food items, the number of Monkey 
agents’ false beliefs is higher in competition with Infant agents than in competition with 
Control agents. Consistent with the previous results, the graph indicates that Infant agents 
create more false belief situations for Monkey agents.  This indicates that the aim of 
creating false beliefs, which is set by Infant agents, is successful. Also, Figure 24 shows 
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In general, Figure 24 shows that the number of Monkey agents’ false beliefs is negatively 
correlated with the number of food but it is positively correlated with the number of agents.  
As the number of food increases, the number of false beliefs decreases. Conversely, as the 
number of agents increases, the number of false beliefs increases. Similarly, Figure 24 
demonstrates that as the number of food increases to 800, the number of Monkeys’ false 
beliefs declines in simulations with Infant and with Control agents. Intriguingly, the line 
graphs of both simulations converge gradually as the number of agents decreases. 
Likewise, as the number of food increases to 800, this convergence gradually develops and 
at the same time the number of Monkey agents’ false beliefs decreases. Thus, the ratio 
between the number of agents and the number of food has a direct impact on this variation.  
2.3.4  Priority Function  
Infant agents use the priority function, which has been explained in Infant agents’ strategy, 
when there is more than one food in the field of movement. By applying the priority 
function, Infant agents prioritise moving towards the food that might create false beliefs 
for monkey agents. As the number of agents increases, the number of times that the priority 
function is used increases. However, by increasing the number of food (except for 600), 
the number of times that the priority function is used decreases as is shown in Figure 25. 
 





























For the number of 600 food, applying the priority function is optimal; nevertheless, as the 
number of food increases to 800, agents apply the function less because the rate of food is 
high enough to consume it, without using their strategies. In these situations, the number 
of false belief scenarios becomes lower and therefore the differences between agents 
decreases.  
2.4  In what way is BRM an effective model? 
This thesis argues that BRM is an effective model corresponding to the standard false belief 
task. BRM is a useful model in that its results clarify the concept of belief reasoning and it 
is able to answer some of the questions posed in the introduction. The model accuracy 
evaluation is possible through its validation and verification. Verification involves 
processes which verify whether the computational model follows its specifications and 
planned functions. Whereas the validation process assesses the computational model and 
its code and how they represent the aim of the model. Moreover, sensitivity analysis is 
useful to examine when the results are dependent on the model’s parameters. Sensitivity 
analysis is possible by changing the computational model’s parameters systematically to 
check whether the simulation results are changing. The explanation of BRM validation and 
verification processes provide an evaluation for model accuracy as follows:   
2.4.1  BRM Verification 
The procedure of understanding how a model works advances our understanding of the 
reasons of the proceedings in the model (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). BRM verification is 
discussed in the methodology section 2.2 by explaining the conceptual plan of the model 
and its arrow and box diagrams that depict the flow of the reasoning in false belief scenario 
of the model. For example, Figure 14 illustrates an activity diagram of Infant agents’ 
priority function. In addition, Table 1 clarifies the abilities of different type of agents’ 
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regarding tracking others’ field of view and registering their own or others’ perspectives 
and Figure 18 shows Infant and Monkey agents’ perspectives about the location of food in 
the past and present time steps. All of these conceptual descriptions of Infant and Monkey 
agents determine how they are carrying out the intended false belief setup. Besides, the 
details of how false beliefs scenarios occur and how infant agents recognise them is already 
explained in 2.2.4 section. 
Furthermore, BRM sensitivity analysis tests are explored by altering the model’s initial 
conditions; two parameters of the initial setting, the number of food and the number of 
agents, have been altered to various values to examine the model sensitivity to its initial 
conditions. The BRM results show that agents’ performances are sensitive in uncertain 
environments where it is not possible for agents to apply their rules and strategies. The 
ratio between the number of available food and the number of agents is one of the factors 
that determines how much food is enough for agents. In the case that the number of food 
is high enough, agents can consume food without using their strategies, thus agents do not 
use their specific strategies. The other related factors include the proportion of the number 
of food to the number of cells in the environment and the proportion of the number of 
agents to the number of cells in the environment. In respect to the verification testing and 
code check, for each sub function a small programming test has been conducted to examine 
whether its programming code works correctly. 
2.4.2  BRM Validations 
In terms of BRM validations, a detailed comparison between the model and the standard 
false belief task is described later in this chapter. By this analogy, the micro level rules of 
false belief procedure in the model have been elaborated which demonstrates the 
corresponding relationship between BRM and the practical false belief task. Moreover, the 
BRM’s macro level validity has been shown for each parameter through the simulation 
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results and its graphs. The aggregated results enable BRM to conclude general statements 
that practically match with the false belief task; this has been already explained in the 
section 2.3.2. 
Throughout the BRM implementation, the design and programing of agents have been 
constantly tested to check whether it theoretically represents the false belief concept and if 
not the design has been modified subsequently. This modification cycle had been continued 
to ensure that the preceding model truly corresponds to the false belief process.  
2.4.3  The analogy between the standard false belief task and BRM (Validation)  
Sally and Ann false belief task version, as already described, is used in BRM and the fit 
between the BRM and the false belief task is demonstrated in Table 3 by comparing their 
corresponding critical features.  More specifically, Infant agents are analogous to the 
participant child as they are active and moving towards the food, while the Monkey agents 
play a role similar to that of Sally. Any agent, which consumes the food that Monkey 
registered earlier, acts as ‘Ann’ in the task. Similar to Sally’s registration regarding the 
location of the ball in the basket, the Monkey agent registers the location of the available 
food in its field of view to use in the next time step. When Sally leaves the room it is similar 
to when the Monkey agent moves, causing the food to be no longer in its field of view, 
both unintentionally create environments, which have the potential for false belief scenario.  
Infant agents perceive Monkey agents’ field of view which is shared with their own. 
Notably, Infant agent is only able to store each Monkey agent’s perspective as long as it 
exists in Infant agent’s field of view. Moreover, similar to the child who is capable to pass 
the Sally and Ann false belief task, Infant agent is able to recognise the Monkey agent’s 
perspective and predict its desire towards a registered food in its memory. This prediction 
associates with the Infant agent’s priority towards the same food as the Monkey agent, 
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which signifies Infant competency of passing the false belief, and is analogous to the child 
ability to pass the false belief task. 
Accordingly, the perspective differences between Infant and Monkey agents are related to 
the location of food. The real location of the food is not the same as the Monkey agent’s 
perspective because the Monkey agent is unable to update the current location of the food. 
In contrast, the Infant agent has access to the real information as well as the Monkey agent’s 
perspective, both of which provide key information for the false belief task.     
Hence, the BRM represents the belief attribution to Infant agents similar to the child in the 
standard false belief task. However, these belief attributions occur simultaneously for a 
number of Infant agents relating to Monkey agents’ beliefs as they interact within the 
environment.  These interactions between agents create a number of typical false belief 
tasks at the same time.  Importantly, the social competence aspects of the belief attribution 
start to emerge naturally by the dynamics of this virtual society. A variety of own and 
others’ true and false belief scenarios develop through the simulation far beyond the 
isolated version of false belief task.  
  
Table 3. A comparison between Sally and Ann false belief task and BRM 
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2.5  DISCUSSION 
2.5.1  Belief Representation effects on Infant agents’ performance  
The Belief Representation Model (BRM) consists of three agents:  
- Infant agents are able to pass false belief task.  
- Monkey agents are able to remember and track the food from past time step. 
- Control agents are able to track others’ field of view regarding the food. They are used 
as a control measurement. 
The results of the simulation between Infant agents and Monkey agents’ consumed food 
differences  is gathered and show that Infant agents consistently perform better throughout 
the different values for the parameters including number of food and number of agents.   
Infant agents recognise Monkey agents’ belief representation; they track Monkey agents’ 
field of view, register and store Monkey agents’ perspective regarding the food. Moreover, 
BRM involves reasoning of beliefs and desires of agents’ behaviour. Infant agents reason 
about Monkey agents’ desires and beliefs. They also inhibit their own perspective 
regarding the location of the food and apply Monkey agents’ perspective. 
In BRM, all agents’ goal and desire are to move towards the food and consume it. More 
than one agent may have the desire to consume the same food. In the case where there is 
only one food to select, it becomes their only choice on that time step. Once an agent has 
access to more than one food, its reasoning style is to select one food from several, and it 
is influenced by its different capabilities and the information it perceives from the 
environment. For example, Infant agents’ reasoning style rests on their competence of 
understanding Monkey agents’ false beliefs. Infant agents’ preferences are for the food 
which effect Monkeys’ true beliefs. Each Infant agent’s representation is contingent on its 
perception, the information in its memory, and the way that it understands other agents’ 
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beliefs and the environment.  In fact, Infant agent’s memory stores some experiences of 
Monkeys agents’ perspective.  
At this point, Infant agents are able to recognise Monkey agents’ false beliefs. However, 
this recognition is not sufficient to perform successfully, it still requires using the 
information about this understanding together with other online information to set an 
effective plan, and subsequently to take an action based on the plan, to perform more 
efficiently. In other words, the efficiency of Infant agents’ performance is because of a 
series of proceedings: Firstly, their recognition of Monkey agents’ true and false beliefs 
regarding the location of the food and the related information of their field of view. 
Secondly, applying this understanding and information into a plan or a rule that enhances 
their chance to achieve their goals. Thirdly, performing an action by employing the plan. 
For example, in BRM, Infant agents create false belief scenarios for Monkey agents; 
subsequently Infant agents consume more food by increasing false belief situations for 
Monkey agents. 
There is no doubt that a combination of understanding others’ beliefs, reasoning about this 
information, planning and contributing an action based on this, are the main factors in 
producing a more efficient performance for Infant agents. 
2.5.2  Differences between Monkey agents and Control agents  
The main ability of Monkey agents includes storing the information about the location of 
the food and using it in the next time step when there is lack of food. Although, they 
remember the location of the food from the past time step, they are egocentric and do not 
consider other agents’ perspective. In contrast, Control agents are able to track other 
agents’ perspective regarding the food in the present time step. However, they have no 
memory and do not remember others’ beliefs from the past. The BRM results demonstrate 
that Control agents’ performance is less efficient in comparison with Monkey agents, 
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particularly when they are using their own strategies rather than the situations in which 
there is enough food in the environment to consume without using their strategies. 
However, in situations where the number of food is more than half of the number of agents, 
Monkey agents mostly do not use their strategy whereas Control agents’ strategy is still 
applicable. Therefore, in this situation Control agents’ performance is slightly higher than 
Monkey agents. Whereas, the Infant agents’ performance is more than twice as high as the 
Control agents’ performance in the same set-up with Monkey agents. These results signify 
that agents’ abilities and strategies in micro level can influence their performances in macro 
level when their strategies are put into practice. 
  
2.5.3  Infant Agents’ diagram (IAF)  
One important approach in agent-based models is to present the flow of data in a diagram 
to show the sequence of operations and processes performed within the system. A diagram 
that illustrates the control flow of the agents’ actions can represent the underlying logic of 
the complicated and interconnected procedures of the actions. Infant Agents arrow and box 
diagram, which is illustrated in Figure 15, represents the underlying basic phases that occur 
for an agent with understanding of others’ false beliefs. Thus, this section explores the 
concept behind each phase of this diagram and investigates the false belief procedure in a 
structured and coherent approach by classifying the procedure in to four phases as follow:  
2.5.3.1 -  Collecting Information  
Collecting information is a central phase in BRM; Infant agents collect essential 
information from their field of view in every time step. They collect the information about 
the location of food, the location of other agents and specifically the information about the 
location of food from the Monkey agent’s perspective. Infant agents reason about which 
information they need to collect. For example, they are interested in Monkey agents’ 
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perspective, as they both have access to the same food. In comparison with Sally and Ann 
false belief task questions, the BRM questions for Infant include: 
- Where does the Monkey agent store the location of food (which cell)? 
- Is the food still in the Monkey agent’s field of view?  
- Can the Infant agent consume the food, which is stored by Monkey agent? (Has the food 
been eaten by other agents?)                          
- Where will the Monkey agent search for the food, when it returns? 
These questions can be answered through the IAF phases. Infant agents collect the 
necessary information from their field of view, which are particularly related to the Monkey 
agents’ perspective of the location of the food. There is a dynamic link between the 
collecting information phase and the other phases of IAF in regards to each false belief 
scenario in BRM. The collecting information phase is parallel to the time and dynamics of 
the world; meaning that the collecting information phase is a continuous process 
corresponding to the time steps and environmental changes. These changes including 
agents’ movements and the location of the food create a dynamic world. Agents collect 
information in every time step in this dynamic world. In other words, agents continue to 
collect others’ belief scenarios’ information as the world changes through the movement 
of agents over time. Thus, the online raw information becomes available from the 
collecting information, which can then feed other phases of IAF to complete their related 
processing simultaneously. 
2.5.3.2 -  Recording Information 
In order for Infant agents to succeed in understanding others’ false beliefs, BRM 
demonstrates that there are memory demands on Infant agents to store data from the 
Monkey agents’ perspectives about the location of the food. BRM highlights the role of 
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memory to store Monkey agents’ perspective information. In the absence of memory, it is 
not possible for the Infant agents to retrieve this information in the next phases.  
2.5.3.3 -  Reasoning Process of Beliefs and Desires 
This phase of IAF involves complex information processing and demonstrates the 
capability of the Infant agents in understanding others’ false beliefs. Conceivably, there are 
two different versions of beliefs about the location of the food in false belief scenarios; the 
Infant agents’ own perspective, which is the last updated version of the reality, and the 
Monkey agents’ perspective which is not updated from the last time step. By default, agents 
use the last updated information about the location of the food due to the dynamics of the 
environment. However, firstly in this phase Infant agents inhibit their regular information 
temporarily and restore the Monkey agents’ beliefs. In other words, similar to the Sally and 
Ann task, the Infant agent inhibits its own belief about the current location of the food and 
retrieves the Monkey agents’ perspective which has already been stored. 
Secondly, the Infant agents reason about the Monkey agents’ beliefs and desires; Infant 
agents take into consideration that other agents have a common desire towards the food. 
The agents’ common desire causes a competitive environment. Subsequently, because 
Infant agents track others’ field of view and store others’ belief about the location of the 
food, they reason that if other agents have the same beliefs about the location of food, they 
are their competitors. They recognise Monkey agents’ beliefs, including true and false 
beliefs. The processes that Infant agents understand Monkey agents’ false belief has 
already been described in methodology. However, a brief explanation clarifies the 
reasoning phase. The procedure of Infant agents’ understanding Monkey agents’ false 
belief includes: 
-    Infant agents inhibit their own belief about the location of food temporarily. 
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- Infant agents retrieve the information of Monkey agents’ perspective about the location 
of the food.  
- Infant agents consider that there is food in location X in terms of Monkey agents’ 
perspective, when there is no food in location X in reality. In addition, at the present time 
step, there is no alternative food for Monkey agent from Infant agent perspective. In other 
words, if there is an alternative food for the Monkey agent (from Infant agent’s 
perspective), creating a false belief does not really affect Monkey agent’s performance. 
In sum, Infant agents reason about Monkey agents beliefs by first considering its own 
beliefs and the common desire with Monkey agents.  
Exploring this more systematically, the reasoning processes of beliefs and desires phase 
include three subroutines:  
- Self-perspective inhibition  
- Retrieving the protagonist’s perspective data (from memory) 
- Selective processing of protagonist’s (Monkey agent) belief and desire based on its own 
belief and desire.  
At this stage of the BRM, Infants recognition of Monkey’s beliefs is complete. Although, 
Infant has not yet demonstrated this belief understanding in its actions but the required 
processes for understanding of others’ beliefs is completed.  
The subtle borders between understanding belief representation and exposing or using this 
representation are two entirely different phases of Infant agents understanding the Monkey 
agents’ false beliefs. Analytically, based on BRM, the main procedure of belief 
representation finishes by the end of the third phase. Nevertheless, the last phase in which 
Infant agents act upon their understanding of Monkey agents’ perspective remains open. 
2.5.3.4 -  Expressing others’ mental states (actions as output) 
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This phase rests on the critical difference between having a competence and using it in 
agents’ actions. In other words, understanding other agents’ beliefs and desires’ 
information is essential for the Infant agents’ actions.  
Noticeably, expressing others’ beliefs and desires is analogous with the measurement test 
in the false belief tasks. Infant agents utilise the Monkey agents’ belief representation in 
their actions. Firstly, once the Monkey agent’s belief is true, the Infant agent prioritises 
consuming the food which creates a false belief for Monkey agents. Altogether, based on 
the simulation results, this strategy creates more false belief situations for the Monkey 
agents. 
Secondly, once the Monkey agent’s belief is false, then the Infant agents express their 
understanding of the Monkey agent’s false belief by sending a message as an output that 
‘There is a false belief regarding the Monkey agent number-x’.  At the end of the 
simulation, the message shows the total number of false beliefs that Monkey agents had 
and Infant agents recognised. Thus, the Monkey agents’ false beliefs have no direct effect 
on the Infant agents’ actions in BRM. However, each message signifies the understanding 
of Monkey agent’s false belief by an Infant agent. 
2.5.4  Applying minimal theory of mind principles to agents 
Butterfill and Apperly (2013)’s minimal theory of mind presents the ability to 
automatically track others’ belief-like perceptions without representing any sophisticated 
psychological states. Minimal theory of mind is based on four principles:  goal directed 
action, field and encountering, successful registration and action influenced by the 
registration, which has been already described in the general introduction. Apperly and 
Butterfill suggest that an individual with minimal theory of mind ability could pass many 
tests that were supposed to be acid tests of theory of mind such as false belief tasks. They 
also state that other principles and variation on the principles can be added to provide a 
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wider range of theory of mind abilities (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). These four minimal 
theory of mind principles are applicable to Control agents and Infant agents in the model 
as follow: 
Principle 1:  Each agent’s goal is to move towards food. 
Principle 2:  Each agent is able to see a limited local part of the world around itself as its 
field of view. Agent encounters and perceives the food and other agents which are in its 
field of view. An agent first encounters food in its field of view before any goal-directed 
action is taken for the food. These principles are described in the first phase of IAF. 
Principle 3:  Each agent registers the location of the food in its field of view correctly. 
Therefore, the agent simply has a belief that there is food in that location. The relation 
between the agent, the other agent and the food is defined by the registration. This principle 
has some similarity with the second phase of IAF, which will be explained later. 
Principle 4:  After a successful registration, each agent, based on its beliefs about the 
location of the food and its desire to consume the food, detects other agents’ beliefs and 
desires regarding the food. Subsequently, the agent takes action and moves based on its 
perspective of other agents’ beliefs and with other information from its field of view.  
Thus, agents use both other agents’ beliefs and the current information about the world to 
make decisions and act. The fourth principle in minimal theory of mind can be considered 
parallel to the fourth phase in IAF (an action).  
Therefore, Control agents and Infant agents have minimal theory of mind. Nevertheless, 
Infant agents do not use minimal theory of mind only.  They are also able to infer and 
understand others’ belief through reasoning, self-perspective inhibition and allocating 
memory to others’ beliefs. In contrast, Monkey agents fail minimal theory of mind ability 
because they do not hold all of the corresponding principles. For example, Monkey agents 
do not track others’ field of view. 
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2.5.5  True Beliefs in BRM 
This thesis argues that IAF is also applicable for true belief representation. The main 
difference between true and false belief representation reflects the match or mismatch 
between the protagonist’s perspective and the real situation. BRM includes both true and 
false belief scenarios for Infant agents in which a generic belief representation systematic 
approach can be developed.  
2.5.6  The Network in IAF 
IAF presents the key components of the belief representation processes, which consist of 
perception, memory, inhibitory control and selective process reasoning, in addition to 
complex reasoning resources, which is essential for expressing others’ belief. Together, 
these components represent a network of resources that shapes the individual’s ability to 
understand others’ beliefs which is compatible with the developmental literature 
underpinning theory of mind network (Mohnke et al., 2015) (Gallagher & Frith , 2003) 
(Carrington & Bailey, 2009). 
2.5.7  Complexity of the environment 
In each time step, each agent interacts within its local environment resulting in more 
changes in the world. These dynamic changes to the world will affect the agents’ decisions 
and actions. Beliefs based upon events in the past, may no longer be true in the present due 
to the dynamic nature of the model. All of the changes that happen between any two 
adjacent time steps are not observed by some agents, whereas they might be observed by 
some other agents, which might create false belief scenarios. In addition, the random 
placements of the food and some random movement of agents together with dynamics of 
agents’ actions escalate the uncertainty of the social environment. The dynamics of the 
simulation are high enough to change the situation regularly. For example, in the event 
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where there is no food in a particular cell at time step t, it is possible that this cell fills with 
food at the next time step (t+1). This is due to the random nature of food replacement.  
2.5.8  Imperfect Perception 
There is a general rule in agents’ vision ability that makes some of the information 
incomplete and imperfect; vision is more comprehensive in the centre of field of view, but 
as it reaches the edges of the field of view, the information is not as complete. In fact, as 
the shared area between field of view of two agents increases, the information they acquire 
from each other is more reliable and complete. This rule is simplified in Figure 26 by 
illustrating a square as the field of view of yellow agent. The arrows show the direction 
from comprehensive information in the centre towards the edges with more imperfect 
information. This information concerns objects or other agents in this field of view. For 
instance, consider the grey area as yellow agent’s field of view, the red square as the red 
agent’s field of view and the blue square is the blue agent’s one. The yellow agent is able 
to perceive precise information about the red agent, which is closer to the centre. The 
information about the blue agent that is closer to the edges of the grey square is less precise 
for yellow agent. Since the agents’ vision is depend on the size of field of view, agents’ 
perceived information is also limited.       
 
Figure 26. Incomplete Information 
The arrows show the flow from comprehensive information towards incomplete information. 
The yellow agent has more precise information about the red agent in the centre, than the blue 
agent at the edges, considering the grey square as its field of view. 
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2.6  Conclusion 
BRM is a reliable model which illustrates the underlying processes of Infant agents, which 
are capable of understanding others’ false beliefs, in a structured and coherent approach by 
classifying this procedure into four phases. The first phase, is called collecting information, 
in which agents collect information particularly in relation to other agents’ perspective on 
the location of the food. The second phase, recording Information, is when agents store the 
collected information including the other agents’ perspectives in their memory. This phase 
highlights the role of memory in belief representation. The third phase, which is called 
reasoning process of beliefs and desires, is the main phase for processing the information 
about others’ perspectives. In this phase, agents inhibit their own beliefs temporarily and 
restore others’ beliefs. Another part of this phase involves critical reasoning about others’ 
beliefs and desires. The last phase is concerned with deciding on an action by considering 
others’ beliefs and desires, which is called expressing others’ beliefs and desires. This 
phase identifies the critical difference between having belief representation ability and 
using it in agents’ actions. 
Furthermore, these four phases identify the key components of belief representation 
processes consisting of perception, memory, inhibitory control and selective process 
reasoning. These components represent a network of resources that shape the individual’s 
ability to understand others’ beliefs.  
In addition, Infant agents in BRM use more than minimal theory of mind as they are able 
to understand others’ beliefs through reasoning, self-perspective inhibition and allocating 
memory to others’ beliefs.  In contrast, Monkey agents fail the minimal theory of mind 
principles. 
Moreover, Infant agents perform better in the environment because: Firstly, they are 
capable of understanding others’ beliefs regarding the location of the food. Secondly, they 
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apply this understanding and information to a plan which enhances their efficiency in 
achieving their goals. Thirdly, they perform an action by employing the plan. Thus, the 
main factors in producing a more efficient performance for agents include a combination 
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3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Surprisingly, Mary left her wallet at home. Her mother found it. She thinks that Mary thinks 
that her wallet is lost. 
Humans are able to infer others’ mental states behind their actions.  How can one construct 
mental states connections with others? This mainly invisible connection relies on cognitive 
resources.   
People regularly understand others’ behaviour by attributing them mental states such as 
beliefs and desires. They make inferences about others’ unobserved mental states from the 
observed behaviour. These inferences are often precise and indispensable for humans’ 
social life. In general, people’s beliefs, desires, emotions, and other mental states are a 
dependable guide to their future actions. It is also possible to explain one’s action based on 
her mental states. Therefore, her planning process needs to be inverted; thus, they reason 
backwards to infer others’ beliefs and desires from their actions. In fact, inverse planning 
concerns working backwards from the action to the underlying mental states, to make 
inferences about beliefs and desires that caused one’s action (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 
2009). Accordingly, psychologists apply the same approach known as belief-desire-action 
reasoning. One’s beliefs and desires are the reasons for their goal-directed actions; this 
demonstrates a coherent picture of every day mental inferences (Wellman, 1990). 
Intriguingly, there is a body of evidence suggesting that human infants construe actions 
compatibly with an inverse planning paradigm (e.g.  Baker, 2012; Phillips & Wellman, 
2005). Furthermore, “the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to 
achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world” (Baker, 2012, p. 33) are known as 
the principle of rationality. Yet, one-year infants are able to use the principle of rational 
action to interpret and predict goal-directed actions and to make inferences about unseen 
aspects of their context (Csibra et al., 2003).  
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This chapter of the thesis raises several fundamental questions about theory of mind 
processes in human minds. What are the characteristics of the levels prior to a simple theory 
of mind ability? How do one’s own beliefs and desires interact with others’ beliefs and 
desires mentally? What is the shared set of basic processes of different varieties of theory 
of mind tasks? What are the steps of reasoning in understanding others’ beliefs and desires, 
including inverse planning? How does reasoning affect the level of complexity in theory 
of mind? Moreover, in terms of theory of mind advantages: How does theory of mind 
ability influence the agents’ performances in a competitive context? What are the other 
conditions, if any that makes agents with theory of mind ability perform better than others?  
To answer these questions and similar issues in the literature, an agent-based model has 
been implemented with 6 types of agents having different capabilities of understanding 
own and others’ mental states as interacting within the environment.  
The model for theory of mind presented in this chapter works similar to the two phases of 
IAF including recording Information and expressing phases. However, the collecting 
information and reasoning phases are more demanding in this model than the false belief 
model because here, agents infer others’ desires from the observed action rather than 
‘seeing and knowing’ scenarios. Nevertheless, these two phases are also consistent with 
the IAF phases but they include more steps.  
This chapter explores the advantages of a simple theory of mind ability in agents’ 
performances. For example, how understanding others’ beliefs and desires improves goal-
directed action’s efficiency. Furthermore, this model examines how agents infer others’ 
beliefs and desires by observing their actions, how they apply inverse planning and when 
they use rational principles. This agent-based model is called Mental State Model (MSM). 
3.2  MSM METHODOLOGY  
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An agent-based model is implemented to elucidate the core concepts and connections 
between the indirect inferences of others’ mental states and their actions in a simple theory 
of mind. MSM comprises of interactions between six types of agents, representing different 
capabilities of understanding others and their own desires and beliefs. Finally, MSM 
evaluates the agents’ performances to achieve their goals in a competitive society. 
3.2.1  Environment 
The environment is made of a grid space where agents act based on their rules to achieve 
their targets and survive. Initially, agents are randomly placed in this environment.  
At the start of each run of the simulation, the set up procedure defines parameters and their 
default values. It creates and places the defined number of each type of agent and the 
number of targets in the environment. There are other parameters, which will be explored 
in more detail in the next section. The environment consists of a grid of 50 by 50, through 
which agents move contingent on their individual rules and the position of the targets. 
When an agent achieves a target, that target will be removed from the environment. 
However, in the next step a target will be generated in another random cell. The space is 
toroidal therefore, if agents move to one border of the grid, it appears on the opposite 
border.  
Time Step 
The time measurement (tick) is a step in the simulation which agents simultaneously 
perform their actions. The default number of time step for the simulation is 1000 tick. 
Neighbourhoods 
The neighbourhood of an agent is the squared area around it in addition to its cell while the 
extent of its X-axis and Y-axis’ are equal. Hence, the length of neighbourhood (Ngh) is the 
same in both axes’ direction. For example if Ngh=3 then it includes the area of 49 cells. 
Field of view  
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Field of view is a parameter with the default value of Ngh = 2. It defines the square of 5x5 
around the agent (25 cells) within this area the agent is able to perceive the environment. 
The parameter of field of view changes from 2 up to 6 and one of the objectives of the 
simulation is to analyse the behaviour of the agents’ performance by these changes. 
Field of movement 
Field of movement consists of the agent’s first neighbourhood cells; the eight cells in agent 
vicinity and itself that is shown in Figure 9. 
Targets 
Target is a goal that each agent is required to achieve and it is demonstrated by a green cell. 
It is necessary for agents to reach their targets to enhance their survival rate. The survival 
rate is a criterion for their performance measurement. The purpose of target in MSM is 
similar to food in BRM. However, target is used here to represent the underlying concept 
of mental states whereas food cannot simply convey the impression. A parameter defines 
the number of targets available in the environment in each time step. For example, when 
number of targets are 250, it sets around one target in 10 cells of the world and the entire 
world consists of 2500 cells.   
At the start of each time step, the targets, which were not achieved by any agent, remain in 
the environment. The targets, which agents achieved, will be replaced randomly in the grid 
for the next time step. Therefore, the number of targets in the environment remains constant 
through the simulation time steps 
Parameters 
The analysis of the agents’ behaviour is based on modifying the following parameters: 
- Number of agents(N): 
The agents’ population is a critical parameter in the environment. 
- Agents’ field  of view(Ngh): 
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The area that an agent is able to observe the environment. MSM investigates the effect of 
field of view on agents’ efficiency. 
- Period of staying Passive(P): 
The number of time steps that agents stay Passive before they change to Active mental 
state. This parameter has direct influence on the time steps that agents need to achieve a 
target. Thus, it is a key parameter and will be analysed in MSM.   
- Number of targets(T): 
Undoubtedly, the number of targets is a crucial factor for agents to survive in this 
competitive world and the analysis of this parameter is essential in the simulation. 
3.2.2  Mental States (MS) 
Each agent has a mental state in every time step. There are two types of mental states:  
1) Active:  Agent needs to achieve a target. 
 
2) Passive: Agent cannot achieve a target. 
 
At the start of the simulation, the mental states of agents are Active. However, their mental 
states change through the simulation, which are subject to reaching a target. Unless an 
agent achieves a target, its mental state remains Active. The mental state of an Active agent 
that achieves a target changes to Passive. When the agents’ mental states become Passive, 
it remains Passive until a parameter that serves as a counter for Passive mental state, 
reaches zero. The number of time steps in which an agent must stay in a Passive mode is 
set by a parameter called period of staying Passive (P). After an Active agent reaches a 
target, its mental state stays Passive for a number of time steps that parameter P defines. 
Every agent with an Active mental state is required to achieve a target in the next time step.  
However, the agents with Passive mental states are not allowed to reach a target and should 
move to an empty cell which does not contain a target. Figure 27, the statecharts, illustrates 
changes from Active to Passive states and vice versa. Each Active agent that achieves a 
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target changes to Passive state in any time step. In contrast, an agent with a Passive mental 
state becomes automatically Active after staying in a Passive state for P time steps. In other 
words, when the agent’s period increases from 1 to P during P time steps, the agent’s mental 
states changes from Passive to the Active state. 
More precisely, it can be declared as:                      t 
ACTIVE
  +  P  >= t  
Where:                t 
ACTIVE
   = the last time step that the agent has been Active, 
                             t = the current time step, 
and                        P =     The number of time steps that agents must stay in Passive state. 
And Active agents that become Passive, should stay Passive for P time steps. 
 
Figure 27. Statecharts of mental states changes in MSM 
 
3.2.3  Agents’ General Rules  
There are six different colour-coded types of agents in the environment with their 
heterogeneous set of rules: Random agents (blue), Food agents (red), Control agents (grey), 
MinToM agents (orange), Infer agents (pink) and Reality agents (purple).  
 - Agents can move to a cell which is not occupied by other agents.  
- If there is no option to move to another cell, then agents will stay in the same cell. 
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- When a target is placed randomly in the same cell of an Active agent and there are no 
other targets in its field of view, then it can achieve the target. 
- Passive agents move towards an empty cell, which is in the neighbourhood of a target. 
- Agents are able to move towards a target, which is in their field of view but is further than 
the immediate vicinity. In order to move efficiently, agents use an intersection set between 
their field of movement and the neighbourhood of the target. For example, Figure 28 shows 
the intersection sets (red cells) between the agent (purple circle) and the two different 




Figure 28. The intersection sets 
The intersection sets (red cells) show the most efficient path between agent’s (purple circle) 
field of movement and the two different targets’ (green cross) neighbourhoods. The agent 




3.2.4  Agents’ Strategies 
Agents move towards a cell depending on their mental states and their strategies in each 
time step. Each type of agent applies different rules and strategies contingent on their 
abilities. As their abilities in relation to understanding others’ beliefs and desires become 
more effective the agents’ plans and rules improve.  
3.2.4.1  Random Agents’ (Rm) Strategy 
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These agents demonstrate random behaviour, they move randomly without any specific 
strategy, plan or even attention to goals. Although they follow the environment rules, they 
have no attention to their own or others’ mental states. They lack theory of mind ability in 
any kind and act as a control measurement.   
3.2.4.2  Food Agents’ (Food) Strategy 
Food agents are simple reactive agents which observe their field of view and act based on 
the information they perceive from the environment. Food agents recognise targets and the 
need to achieve them. However, they are not capable of planning or having efficient 
strategies for the future. Active Food agents move towards the nearest cell that contains a 
target. In situations where there is more than one target, agents choose one randomly.  
Moreover, they move randomly when their mental state is Passive. They only consider their 
own mental states and pay no attention to others’ mental states. They have no ability of 
theory of mind and they are used for control measurement purposes.   
Food agents’ perceptions, functions and memory abilities are shown in Table 4. As the 
table shows the Food agents’ perceptions abilities include target sensor; they collect 
information about the targets in their field of view and use the information about the targets 
at the current time step. Regarding memory, they are competent in using sensory memory 
to keep the location of the target in the current time step. Moreover, the table shows that 
they only consider their own mental states.  
3.2.4.3  Control Agents’ (Control) Strategy  
The Active Control agents move towards the nearest cell which contains a target similar to 
the Food agent. However, the Passive Control agents move to a cell which do not contain 
a target but there is a target in the vicinity of the cell. The difference between Control agents 
and Food agents appears when their mental state is Passive. Table 4 shows that Control 
agents’ abilities include target sensor, sensor memory and considering their own mental 
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states.  However, they are able to extend their field of view to search for a target if it is 
necessary. Figure 29 shows the arrow and box diagram of the Control agents.  
 
 
Figure 29. Control agents’ arrow and box diagram 
 
 
Table 4. The agents’ perceptions, functions and memory capabilities 
 It is based on understanding their own and others’ mental states (MS). 
 
3.2.4.4  Minimal Theory of Mind Agents’ (MinToM) Strategy 
MinToM agents are reactive agents which collect information about the target and other 
agents. MinToM agents register the location of the target from others’ perspective to track 
their field of view in the current time step. Subsequently, they move to a cell and use this 
information. The general diagram of the MinToM agents including collecting information, 




Figure 30. MinToM agents’ arrow and box diagram 
 
In general, MinToM agents move on the basis of two factors, the availability of targets and 
their mental states. They search for a target first in their field of movement and then in their 
field of view, and depending on their mental states they move to a cell with or without 
target.  The search starts from the nearest field of view and continues to the larger area.  
Thus, there are various conditions in which MinToM agents apply different sub-strategies 
based on the situation. 
In the case where there is no target in the field of movement, Active MinToM agents move 
towards a target with the minimum number of agents around it when there is more than one 
target in its field of view. On the other hand, Passive MinToM agents move towards an 
empty cell in the vicinity of a target and surrounded by the minimum number of 
competitors. In the case where they have the same number of competitors at the same 
distance, it chooses randomly.  
MinToM agents have all of the abilities of Control agents as shown in Table 4. Their 
abilities are more advanced than the Control agents due to tracking others’ field of view 
and applying short-term memory. Short-term memory facilitates agents’ calculations and 
keeps the information for processing in each time step.    
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3.2.4.6  Infer Agents’ (Infer) Strategy 
Infer agents collect the information regarding targets, other agents, and their actions. They 
are able to infer others’ mental states and use this understanding in their actions. Figure 31 
illustrates the diagram of the Infer agents which shows they collect information, and they 
record, reason and act based on the information about others’ perspective which will be 
elaborated later in the discussion.  
Infer agents observe other agents’ actions and infer their mental states from their actions. 
Principally, when they see that an agent achieves a target, they infer that the agent’s mental 
state becomes Passive.  Otherwise, they assume that the agent is Active. Suppose an agent, 
for example agent Y, is observed by the Infer agent as it achieves a target then: 
Infer agent observes agent Y achieves a target. ====> Mental states of agent Y is Passive.   
By applying the above proposition, Infer agents are able to infer other agents’ mental states 
and plan to achieve a target. Thus, the inferences of Infer agents are based on what they 
perceive from the environment. Infer agents are able to remember the agent Y’s inferred 
mental states, and use this until agent Y moves out of the Infer agent’s field of view. 
 




Working backwards from the action that agent Y has performed, the Infant agent is able to 
infer its desire, which caused agent Y to perform that action. To elaborate on the above 
proposition; when agent Y has achieved a target, it means that agent Y was in an Active 
states (because only Active agents are able to achieve a target) and has now become Passive 
(because of the rule that when an Active agent achieves a target, it automatically becomes 
Passive). In fact, Infant agents tacitly use inverse planning to infer others’ desires from 
their actions by applying these inferences.  
Subsequently, Infer agents employ belief-desire-action reasoning approach to agent Y by 
using agent Y’s beliefs and desires towards the target to infer its action. Thus, Infant agent 
makes different decisions based on agents Y’s belief and desires. Figure 33 illustrates this 
inference schema of Infer agent based on belief, desire and action. Therefore, Infer agents’ 
strategy depends not only on its own mental states, but also on other agents’ mental states. 
Infer agents with the ability of inferring others’ mental states are an evolved version of 
MinToM agents. Thus, Infer agents’ strategies are similar to MinToM agents’ strategies   
when they are unable to have appropriate information to infer others’ mental states.  
In general, Infer agents’ actions are based on the conditions of its own mental states, others’ 
mental states, and the number of available targets in their field of movement and their field 
of view. Similar to MinToM, the search for a target starts from the nearest area to its own 




  Figure 32. The search order for a target 
It starts from its first neighbourhood (yellow cells) to the wider area (turquoise cells) and ends 
in the blue cells. 
 
In the case where there is at least one target in the field of movement, Active Infer agents 
move towards the target with the maximum number of other agents (in Active state) around 
it. In the case where there is no target in Infer agent’s field of view, then the Infer agent 
moves randomly to an empty cell. If there is no target in the field of movement, the action 
of Infer agents is subject to the number of targets in its field of view.  
In the case where there is no target in the field of movement and at least one target in the 
Infer agent’s field of view, then an Active Infer agent moves towards a target with the 
minimum total number of Active agents. Note, Passive agents, which can become Active 
when the Infer agent reaches the target should be considered within the above calculation.  
To explain this in more detail, suppose: 
d = the minimum distance between the target and the other agent where distance is defined 
by the number of neighbourhoods between the other agent and the target.  
PofAgent = the period that other agent has been in Passive mode,   and 
P = the maximum period of staying Passive.  
If the condition                                           d ≤ P – PofAgent       (1)      
is true, then the other agent will not be in an  Active state by the time that the Infant agent 
reaches the vicinity of the target. The reason is that the distance between the target and the 
101 
 
other agent is less than the time that it takes for the agent to become Active. Therefore, by 
the time the other agent reaches the target, it is still in Passive state and cannot achieve the 
target. By using this formula, Infer agents can reason and predict when an agent will 
become Active. Founded on these predictions, Infer agents plan for the next step. The Infer 
agents’ rule to move is different in Passive state than when it is in an Active state.  
If there is no target in the field of movement and there is more than one target in its field 
of view, then a Passive Infer agent moves towards an empty cell that is in the vicinity of 
the target with the minimum of total number of agents in Active states. Infer agents 
consider other agent’s mental state as Passive if and only if all of the following conditions 
are met: 
1) If Infer agent has observed the competitor agent achieved a target. 
2) The other agent’s states does not change to Active by the time it reaches the target.   
                                                 d ≤ P – PofAgent                                    (2) 
3) The other agent’s period is less than or equal to the Infant agent’s period. Therefore, 
Infer agent becomes Active before the other agent.                                             
                                                  PofAgent ≤PofInfer                               (3)  
In the case where there is no target in Infer agent’s field of view, then the Infer agent moves 
to an empty cell randomly. Thus, in situations where there is more than one target in the 
field of view and no target in the field of movement, the general rule is that Infer agents 
need to search for the target with the minimum competitors. This criterion is necessary but 
is not sufficient. The distance between the target and the Infer agent needs to be less than 
or equal to the difference between the general period and the other agent’s period. 
Moreover, once Infer agent is Passive it is necessary to consider which agent will first 
become Active in the next step. Therefore, it is important to distinguish that the Infant 





Figure 33. Infer Agents’ inferences flowchart 
 
3.2.4.6  Reality Agents’ (Reality) Strategy 
The Reality agents’ strategy is similar to that of the Infer agents. The only difference is that 
the Reality agents have directly access to other agents’ real mental states and their period 
of staying Passive.  Therefore, the Reality agents do not infer the mental state of others. 
They do not require to store others’ mental states information. In essence, their strategy 
and the ability to understand, analyse, plan and act based on others’ mental states is similar 
to Infer agents without using the infer system. Reality agents’ design and analysis is 
beneficial to evaluate the infer system efficiency and its role in agents’ performances.    
3.2.5  MSM Implementation 
The MSM design comprises two abstract classes; Society and Agent.  Agents are moving 
to achieve their targets in a grid space where Society contains all of the other classes 
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including Agent, Target, and Grid. Figure 34 shows the MSM class diagram including the 
classes, the relationships between them and their methods.  The composition association 
between Society class and other classes, the black diamond sign in Figure 34, shows that 
Society class is a container for objects of other classes. Agent class is an abstract class 
including three main subclasses: MinToM Agent, Infer Agent and Control Agent. The 1-1 
association between Agent class and Grid class demonstrates that every agent is placed in 
one and only one cell of the grid. Likewise, the 1-1 association between Target class and 
Grid class indicates that each target can exist in one cell. 
 
Figure 34. Class Diagram of MSM 
 
The dependency relationship, shown by dots in Figure 34, illustrates the flow of the 
information, about the target, from MinToM Agent to Grid class as they achieve a target. 
A similar dependency relationship occurs from the Infer Agent class to the Grid class and 
also from the Control Agent class to the Grid class. The subclasses of the Agent class inherit 
its methods. In addition, they have their own specific methods. For example, Infer Agent 
class methods includes CollectInfo, Record, Infer, Expand-Ngh and Reason whereas 
MinToM Agent class methods are the CollectInfo, Register and Expand-Ngh methods. 
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Notice that although the name of some of the methods are the same and they are supposed 
to perform the same function, yet, they work differently with different parameters. The 
Decrease method of the Target class removes the target which has been achieved by an 
agent from the grid.  Figure 35 shows a screenshot of the MSM simulation run. 
 
Figure 35. Screenshot of MSM run 
 
3.2.6  MSM hypotheses and predictions 
The three main agents in MSM are competent of different levels of theory of mind ability. 
Agents which are capable of inferring others’ mental states (simple theory of mind ability), 
agents which are able of tracking others’ beliefs (minimal theory of mind ability) and 
agents with no theory of mind ability.  Thus, the level of theory of mind is an independent 
variable and agents’ performance is a dependent variable in the simulations.  
The hypothesis is that agents’ level of theory of mind has an impact on agents’ 
performances in achieving their targets in a competitive society. The ability of 
understanding others’ mental states is an important factor in agents’ performances. 
Therefore, the expectation is that agents’ performances correlate with their level of theory 
of mind ability. The most efficient agents are those with theory of mind ability. Next are 
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the agents with minimal theory of mind ability and the agents with no theory of mind ability 
are least effective. 
The general analysis of MSM is based on agents’ performances in achieving their goals. 
Simulations have four parameters with a diverse range of values including extremes. The 
variety of scenarios result in a significant amount of data with different scales requiring 
normalisation. Thus, a normalised formula is introduced to organise the data in a standard 
scale which enables the comparison between various situations in the simulation. The next 
step of analysis is concerned with the largest difference in performances between agents.  
For this purpose, the minimum and maximum baseline of agents’ performances is used to 
scale the differences between [0, 1].  In sum, the MSM analysis is divided into these three 
categories; the general performances, the normalised performances and the performance 
differences based on the minimum and maximum baselines. Each of this categories is 
explained in four subcategories based on each of the four parameters; number of agents, 
number of targets, period and neighbourhood.   
The simulations have been conducted with a variety of parameter values. These parameters 
have been systematically changed and the simulation runs demonstrate clear results and 
interpretations. Therefore, using statistical analyses is not necessary for the aim of this 
simulation.  
3.3  The MSM SIMULATION RESULTS   
The results of MSM simulation have created a large amount of data for evaluation and 
analysis.  In this respect, some classification is made to organise the results in a clear way. 
First, the simulation run consists of two initialization setups: 
- Setup with all types of agents in one environment that is called ‘Altogether run’. 
- Setup with each type of agent in a separate environment with the same values of      
parameters that is called ‘Single (Alone) run’. Thus, there are two results sections:  
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Altogether run and Single run. This section starts with the simulation graphs of both setups 
to check their results and analyse their differences. Then, the section continues only with 
the Single run simulations.       
Second, each of these sections includes five different parameters and their corresponding 
graphs. In addition, running the MSM simulation with a variety of parameter settings 
provides more reliable patterns and diverse results regarding the agents’ performances. 
The parameters and their randomly selected values are: 
- Number of targets (T) = 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300,400, 800, 1200 
- Number of agents (N) =  50, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 1200, 1600, 2000 
- Number of periods of staying Passive (P) = 1 to 10, 12, 15, 17, 21  
- Field of view (Ngh) = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
- Time Step = 1000 Ticks 
The average values for each set of parameters after running the simulation 10 times 
determine their values for the results. One practical approach to evaluate the performance 
of agents is to calculate the total number of time steps that Active agents fail to achieve a 
target. Such calculations for each type of agents in a similar environment indicates the 
performance of agents.  
The analysis of the results starts with the ‘general’ graphs of Altogether and Single 
simulation runs to provide a general insight of the agents’ performances. It is followed by 
examination of the effect of parameters of field of view (Ngh), number of agents (N), 
periods of staying Passive (P) and the effect of number of targets (T), in that order. It 
continues to analyse the normalised data based on the parameters N, T, P and Ngh. Then 
there is an evaluation of the main differences between agents’ performances. In addition, 
the differences of Infer and MinToM agents based on Reality and Control agents’ 
differences are explored more deeply. The results of Infer agents with a modified action, 
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and the general verification and validation of the model are explained at the end of this 
section.                        
3.3.1  MSM Agents’ Performances 
One main objective of MSM is to assess the relationship between the characteristics of 
agents’ levels of theory of mind and their efficiency in achieving their targets. The agents’ 
theory of mind capabilities have been introduced through their strategies. Thus, computing 
agents’ performances, the link between their capabilities and their success and analysing 
the results in respect to their own and others’ mental states is the aim of this section. In 
general, there are two possible situations for Active agents, as demonstrated in Figure 36.  
In the first situation, Active agents achieve their targets. In the second situation, agents’ 
desire is to achieve the target but they fail.  
 
Figure 36. Two possible situations for Active agents 
 
The total number of time steps in which Active agents fail to achieve a target is the 
performance measurement in the simulation (X). Therefore, as the value of this 
measurement increases, the efficiency of agents decreases. 
The significant amount of data produced from the simulation run demonstrates the agents’ 
performances with a variety of different parameters, which demonstrates the reliability of 
the results. The general pattern of agents’ performance efficiency in ascending order is: 
Random agents, Food agents, Control agents, MinToM agents, Infer agents and finally 
Reality agents. The majority of results evidence this throughout the simulation run. An 
example of this overall pattern is the Altogether simulation run with N=350, Ngh=2, P=4, 
T=250, shown in Figure 37 and Figure 38. The differences between Random agents and 
 Active Agent                                   Achieves the target 




other agents is large, thus Random agents were removed from the graph in Figure 38 to 
assess other agents’ performances more closely. The graphs show the performance of 
Random agents is the worst and Reality agents demonstrate the best performance. Infer 
agents perform approximately as high as the Reality agents. This suggests that the Infer 
agents’ strategy is a reliable method for inferring others’ mental states in this world.  
 
Figure 37. The results of Altogether simulation 
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Figure 38. The results of Altogether simulation without Random Agents 
Set up of 350 agents, 250 targets, Ngh = 2 and P = 4, in 1000 Tick. 
 
The analysis of parameters in the environment is crucial to understand the results of agents’ 
performances; the total number of agents in the environment is 1750, which is high, and 
there is a low number of targets, which is 250, in 2500 cells. The ratio between the numbers 
of targets to agents (1/7) indicates that on average, for every seven agents there is only one 
target available in the environment. The agents’ field of view is 2 which is equal to 
observing 24 cells in its neighbourhood. In addition, the parameter value of the number of 
time steps staying Passive (P) has an indirect effect on this ratio due to the fact that each 
agent required to stay Passive for 4 time steps before becomes Active (P=4). Another 
example of agents’ performances in the Single simulation context of MSM is shown in 
Figure 39 with parameters of N=1500, T= 250, P=4 and Ngh=2. The general patterns in 
these graphs are consistent with the previous graph’s results. The pattern of the best 
performance of agents in descending order is: Reality, Infer, MinToM, Food, Control and 
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the Control agents are unable to expand their field of view (Ngh=2) to a wider area in this 
setup.   
 
 
Figure 39. Agents’ Performances in Single simulation run 
Set up of Ngh=2, N=1500, P=4, T=250 in 1000 Ticks (10 times run). 
 
In the following sections, the analysis of the agents’ performance continues in greater detail 
and a more organised style based on different parameters’ effect on agents’ performance. 
3.3.1.1  The effect of Field of View (Ngh) 
Figure 40 and Figure 41 illustrate the effect of Ngh on agents’ performances. This effect 
does not apply to the Random and Food agents because field of view has no role in their 
strategies and actions. Thus, Random and Food agents are not included in these graphs. 
By increasing the field of view, the performance of the Control, Min ToM, Infer and Reality 
agents consistently increases. However, there are some limitations to this; for example, the 
Control agent shows a sharp increase from Ngh=2 to Ngh=3 but not the same applies from 
Ngh=3 to Ngh=4. Due to the distribution of food within the environment, it is highly 
unlikely that an agent will reach a target at Ngh=4 because another agent will have 
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increasing the field of view, the Infer and Reality agents have a systematic increase in their 
performances up to Ngh=4. 
 
          Figure 40. The results of Altogether simulation based on Ngh 




Figure 41. The results of Single simulation run based on Ngh 
Setup of N=1500 agents, T=250 targets, Ngh= 2, 3, 4 and P= 4, in 1000 Ticks. 
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Altogether Run: N=350, Ngh=2,3,4, P=5, T=250
The Effect of Ngh on Performances of Agents
 Ngh=2 Ngh=3 Ngh=4
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The effect of the number of agents on agents’ performances with setups of: N=250, N=300, 
N=350, N=400 and Ngh=3, P=5, T=250 of Altogether simulation run initialization is 
shown in Figure 42. This figure shows that as the number of agents increases, their 
performances consistently decreases which demonstrates that as the population increases 
the possibility of achieving a target with the same resources decreases.  
 
Figure 42. The results of Altogether simulation run based on N 
 
 
Similarly, the effect of the numbers of agents with: N= 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750 and 2000, 
Ngh=3, T=250, P=5 in a Single simulation environment is shown in Figure 43. It indicates 
that as the number of agents in the environment increases, the total number of time steps 
that each type of Active agent fails to achieve a target increases. This result includes 
Random agents, and intriguingly indicates that Random agents’ performances decreases as 
the number of agents increases, regardless of their lack of strategy. However, other agents’ 
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Figure 43. The results of Single simulation run based on N 
 
Noticeably, the agents’ performance for N=1000 is almost twice as efficient as for N=2000 
in a similar situation of targets and parameters. In other words, as the number of agents 
doubles, the efficiency of agents halves.  
3.3.1.3  The effect of Period of staying Passive (P) 
The graphs in this section concern the parameter P, the period of staying Passive, and its 
effects on the results of the simulation by varying P from 1 to 10. As expected, the results 
confirm that the agents’ performances improve as P increases. These results are comparable 
to the results of previous graphs; demonstrating that the efficiency of agents’ performances, 




































Single Run with: N=1000, 1250, 1500, 1750, 2000, Ngh=3, T=250, P=5
The Effect of Number of Agents on the Performances
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Figure 44. The results of Altogether simulation run based on P 
 
 
Figure 44 shows that as the period increases, the agents’ performances improve because 
their mental states stay in Passive state for longer. However, the percentage improvement 
varies between different types of agents. For example, Reality, Infer, and MinToM agents’ 
performances improve by around 4.8%, 4.6%, and 4.5%, respectively, while Control, Food 
and Random agents’ performances improve by 4.5%, 4.1% and 2.6%, respectively.  Since 
the number of agents are as low as 350, this percentage improvement varies with the 
number of agents.     
Similarly, the effect of altering the parameter period for the Single run with N=2000, 
Ngh=3, T=250 and P=1 to P=10, is shown in Figure 45. Similarly to the Altogether run 
results, as period increases, agents’ performances increase due to staying in the Passive 
state longer. In addition, it demonstrates that the order of the agents’ performance in terms 
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Figure 45. The results of Single simulation run based on P 
 
 
3.3.1.4  The effect of Number of Targets (T) 
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One important parameter of the simulation is the number of targets. The effect of the 
number of targets on the performances is shown in Figure 46, with the parameters of 
N=2000, Ngh=3, P=5, T=100 to 300 in a Single setup. The graph indicates that the Reality 
and Infer agents perform more efficiently than others, as expected. However, the Food 
agents’ performance is higher than the Control agents and also higher than MinToM agent 
when the number of targets is low (T=100). The reason for this is that when the number of 
targets are approximately one in 250 cells, the level of uncertainty is high for MinToM 
agents, which makes them unable to use their strategy to track others’ field of view. Thus, 
they are less efficient because their strategy criteria are unlikely to be fulfilled. The 
parameters in this graph demonstrate a low number of targets in the environment; the ratio 
between the number of targets and the number of agents is between 1/20 and 3/20, which 
is very low. All of the graphs to this point are only a snapshot of the MSM simulation run. 
The main results and the organised data are explained in the next section. 
3.3.2  The MSM Normalised Results 
Each of the MSM simulation runs produce a set of data. This significant amount of data 
can be shown in a large number of graphs to illustrate the patterns which, when analysed, 
answer the primary questions posed to MSM. For the purpose of comparison between 
various situations in MSM, it is necessary to normalise the data. Therefore, by operating 
normalisation, the data is organised in a standard scale which reflects a variety of situations 
and clarifies the relationships in the data. 
3.3.2.1  Normalised Formula 
The main value from the simulation run for each type of agent is the total number of time 
steps in which Active agents fail to achieve any target, and is called X. In fact, the value of 
X is a measurement for evaluating the agents’ performances. In every simulation run, the 
parameters, N, T, P and Ngh, determine the minimum and maximum performances of 
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agents (the minimum and maximum X values). Table 5 shows the parameters and their 
values which have been systematically selected by considering extreme values for 
analysing the normalisation. 
 
Table 5. Parameters and the values for MSM simulation 
 
By multiplying the number of different values each parameter can have, we can find that 
there are (6*4*6*4=) 576 different combinations of settings we can use to represent and 
analyse the results.  
Although X does show different agents’ performance efficiency within a simulation run, 
values of X from simulations with different parameters cannot be directly compared to each 
other. Therefore, to accomplish a standard evaluation of agents’ performances in all of 
these 567 simulations, it is essential to use an approach to normalise the data. A new 
approach to normalise the value of X has been calculated. The worst scenario, which 
illustrates the agent’s failure to achieve any target, happens when the value of X is at its 
maximum. 
Consider “P” is the period of staying Passive and “Ticks” is the number of time steps. The 
ratio of (Ticks/P+1) determines the maximum number of time steps that an agent is Active. 
Thus:                   M = (Ticks/P+1) * N       (where N is the number of agents) 
Here, M indicates the maximum number of time steps that agents can be Active. 
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For example, if N=50, ticks=1000 and P=1, then M = (1000/2)*50 = 25000, which indicates 
these 50 agents spend a maximum of 25000 time steps in the Active state in a 1000 tick 
simulation. 
Thus, the percentage of failing to achieve any target formula is: 
NormalisedX = ((X-M)/M)*100 
For example, consider two different cases of T=50 and T=800 with the parameters of N=50, 
Ticks=1000 and P= 1: 
 
Case I :  T=50 
As X=49,887 (this number comes from the simulation results), 
NormalisedX = [(49,877 - 25000)/25000]*100 
                                   NormalisedX = 99.50%   
The value of NormalisedX indicates that in 99.50% of time steps agents are in Active states. 
This indicates that agents do not achieve many targets and their performance is low. The 
performance of agents is inversely proportional to the value of NormalisedX (i.e. as 
NormalisedX increases, the agents’ performance decreases). 
 
Case II:   T=800 
As X=25,111,  
NormalisedX = [(25,111 -25000)/25000]*100 
                                   NormalisedX = 0.44%   (to 2 decimals) 
In this situation, the probability that agents fail to achieve a target is only 0.44%. In other 
words, agents are 99.56% successful in achieving their targets. 
NormalisedX values adjust X values to a percentage scale. Thus, NormalisedX values 
define the percentage of time that agents cannot perform effectively. Therefore, the higher 
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this percentage is, the lower the performances of agents.  For example, by a comparison 
between the above cases, X does not simply show the discrepancy of the performances in 
the two cases. Whereas, by calculating NormalisedX, it is possible to compare agents’ 
performances precisely. Undoubtedly, agents’ performance is significantly lower in case I 
than in case II. This shows that by multiplying the number of targets by 16 (from 50 to 
800), the agents’ performance increases by over 99%. 
3.3.2.2  Normalised Performance differences 
Analysis of differences between agents’ performances is a valid approach to assess their 
efficiency in more detail and identify the parameters involved in their improvement. The 
graphs of agents’ performance differences with a variety of parameters’ values show that 
there is a general pattern: the largest performance differences, in descending order, happen 
between MinToM agents and Infer agents, Control agents and MinToM agents, and finally 
Infer agents and Reality agents.  Figure 47 is an example graph that shows the general 
pattern of these differences. 
 























P= 2,  Ngh= 4,  AgentNo= 800
Agents' Performances differences
 T= 50  T= 400  T= 800  T= 1200
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The largest differences in agents’ performance occurs between MinToM and Infer agents, 
excluding the Random agents. This indicates that the Infer agents’ abilities to understand 
others’ mental states are the critical point behind these results. Therefore, this section 
concentrates on MinToM and Infer agents’ performance differences. Some of the 
conducted simulations graphs are presented in the following sections, and organised based 
on the effect of N, T and P parameters.  
3.3.2.3  The effect of Number of Agents in Normalised data 
The effect of the parameter N is shown in Figure 48 to Figure 51. All of these graphs depict 
normalised performances of MinToM and Infer agents based on the number of agents. 
Figure 48, with the setup of P=7, T= 50, Ngh=3 and N=50-2000, shows the performance 
differences between MinToM and Infer agents are very low. The reason is that the number 
of targets is 50, meaning the ratio of targets to cells in the world is 1/50, which is extremely 
low in relation to the size of the world (2500 cells). This extreme situation increases the 
uncertainty of the world, which consequently prevents the criteria that enable agents to 
practice their abilities and agents’ strategies become inactive.  
 
















N=50     N=400        N=800        N=1200       N=1600       N=2000
Normalised Performances






In contrast, all of Figure 49 to Figure 51 show that the performance differences between 
MinToM and Infer agents in variety of situations dramatically increases. For example, 
Figure 50 shows a difference of nearly 2% with parameters of P=7, T= 800, Ngh=3, N=50-
1200. Another example, Figure 49 shows an increase of approximately 3% for Infer agents 
performances when P=7, T= 400, Ngh=3, N=1600. However, Figure 51 illustrates that as 
the number of targets increases to 1200 and the agents’ population increases from 50 to 
800, the differences decrease because agents are able to achieve targets with less need for 
their specific abilities. 
In conclusion, as the number of agents increases, the normalised performance differences 
of agents in almost all situations increases, except in extreme circumstances which cause 
unpredictability and uncertainty in the environment. In uncertain situations, when the 
number of targets is very low, and also in situations where the number of targets is higher 
than the number of agents, the criteria that enables agents to use their individual rules 
decreases. 
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Figure 50. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) 3 
 
 
Figure 51. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) 4 
 
 
3.3.2.4  The effect of Number of targets in Normalised data 
Figure 52 to Figure 54 show the normalised performances of MinToM and Infer agents 
based on the number of targets. All of these figures show that the MinToM performances 
are significantly lower than the Infer agents’ performances in a variety of situations. For 
example, there is a difference of nearly 2% within the parameters of P=7, T= 400, Ngh=3, 
N=400 in Figure 52. In the same figure, as the number of targets increases to 800 and then 
to 1200, the differences gradually start to decrease because the number of targets are larger 
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and the number of agents is greater than 1 (T/N > 1) and the ratio between the number of 
targets and the total number of cells in the environments is more than 1/8, then agents start 
to achieve targets using less of their abilities corresponding to theory of mind. 
Noticeably, T/N is an important factor in agents’ performances. This ratio has a great 
impact on the number of times that agents are able to use their strategies regarding their 
theory of mind ability. There are two extreme situations relating to the ratio which create 
two different situations; in the first case, the ratio is very low, therefore the number of 
targets are very low in relation to the number of agents, and in the second case when the 
ratio is high, this means that the number of agents are lower than the number of targets. In 
the first, case agents’ performances are low and conversely in the second case, agents’ 
performances are high. However, in both cases, agents are mostly unable to use their theory 
of mind ability and strategies. Hence, their performances do not directly reflect their theory 
of mind abilities in these two extreme cases. Moreover, the T/N ratio is not the only factor 
that directly influences the performance of agents. Certainly, other factors such as P, Ngh 
and N and T are involved. 
 
 








Figure 54. The third Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with T 
 
3.3.2.5  The effect of Period of staying Passive in Normalised data 
The graphs from Figure 55 to Figure 60 show the results of MinToM and Infer agents’ 
performances with different parameter values including  P=1, 2, 7, 12, 17 and 22. The main 
pattern in all of these figures shows that, generally, by increasing the parameter P, the 
normalised performance decreases. It also indicates that as P increases, the performance 
differences decreases. The explanation is that by increasing P, the time steps that agents 
stay in a Passive state increases and therefore agents achieve fewer targets.  
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All of the figures from Figure 55 to Figure 59 suggest that Infer agents’ performances are 
more efficient than MinToM. Nevertheless, there are exceptions which occur in uncertain 
environments. For example, Figure 60 shows that both agents’ performances are similar 
when the number of agents and the number of targets are equal to 50. Thus, it is less likely 
for agents to apply their rules and strategies in this situation.   
 
 
Figure 55. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with P, (1) 
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Figure 57. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with P, (3) 
 
 
Figure 58. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with P, (4) 
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Figure 60. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with P, (6) 
 
3.3.2.6  The effect of Field of View in Normalised data 
The effect of field of view on Control, MinToM, Infer and Reality agents’ normalised 
performances is shown in graphs from Figure 61 to Figure 84.  The effect of field of view 
depends on the number of targets in the environment. Thus, the results are divided into 
three categories based on the density of the number of targets in the environments; low-
density, medium-density and high-density.  
 Low-density Environment 
The most effective impact of field of view arises when the density of targets in the first 
neighbourhood is very low. In other words, when there are no targets in the first 
neighbourhood. Therefore, agents need to use their vision to search for a target at a further 
distance. Agents do not expand their field of view unless it is crucial. For example, in the 
case where there is a lack of targets in the nearest neighbourhood, agents expand their field 
of view to find a target at a further distance. Thus, this enables them to plan for the next 
time steps (by applying their strategies) and while there is no target in the first 
neighbourhood, they will move towards the nearest target in their field of view with the 
fewest competitor agents around it, which might enhance their performance.   
128 
 
In an environment with a low-density of targets and of agents, causing an uncertain 
situation, the role of Ngh parameter influences the agents’ performances.  Figure 61 shows 
that all types of agents’ performances improve by between 64% and 70% as the field of 
view increases from 2 to 6, with parameters of P=7, T=50, Ngh=2, 3, 4, 6, N=50. 
Intriguingly, in this situation, agents’ abilities in relation to others’ perspectives are less 
applicable in the current time step, due to insufficient targets in the first neighbourhood, 
regardless, they are still able to follow the targets at the further distance by expanding their 
field of view. Furthermore, by increasing the number of agents to N=400, Figure 62 shows 
that agents’ performances improve by approximately 6% as the field of view increases from 
2 to 6, with the parameters P=7 and T=50. Similarly, for N=800, Figure 63 illustrates 4% 
improvement for MinToM agents and Infer agents’ performances, whereas for Control 
agents, it is 3% as the field of view increases from 2 to 6. It is striking that from Ngh=2 to 
Ngh=3, the agents’ performance changes more than from Ngh=4 to 6. This indicates that 
the expansion of field of view from Ngh=2 to Ngh=3 occurs because the likelihood of 
having a target in Ngh=3 is higher. 
However, in a low-density environment, as the number of agents increases, the effect of 
field of view decreases. For example, a comparison between Figure 61 and Figure 63 
indicates a decrease in the effect of field of view in agents’ performances from 65% to 3% 
while the number of agents increases from 50 to 800 and the field of view increases from 
2 to 6. Similarly, in a low-density environment, as the number of targets increases, the 
effect of field of view declines. For example, a comparison between Figure 61 and Figure 
66 shows that Infer agents’ performance improves by 70% and 0.5%, respectively, when 




In contrast, in a low-density environment, as the period increases, the effect of field of view 
increases. In general, the ability to expand agents’ field of view will improve agents’ 
performances in low-density environments. 
Figure 61. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (1) 
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Figure 63. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (3) 
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 Medium-density Environment 
For medium-density environments, the probability of having one food in the first Ngh is 
high. However, it also depends on the ratio between the number of targets and the number 
of agents. Thus, the effect of field of view decreases because agents are mainly able to use 
their individual strategies. In addition, the uncertainty of the environment is lower than for 
low-density environments. For example, Figure 68 with N=400, T=800 and P=7, shows 
that the effect of field of view occurs mainly from Ngh=2 to Ngh=3 and the expansion of 
field of view after that does not have any dramatic effect. This is because it is possible for 
agents to find targets in the neighbourhood 2 or 3. Thus, agents do not need to use the wider 
neighbourhood to find targets. 
 High-density Environment 
Noticeably, in situations where the number of targets is high, such that agents can achieve 
targets without using their abilities, the effect of field of view decreases sharply. For 
example, Figure 84 with T=1200, N=800, P=2, shows that increasing field of view has little 
to no effect, especially for Infer agents. The highest level of the differences between Infer 
and MinToM agents occurs when the ratio between the number of agents and the number 





Figure 66. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (6) 
 
Figure 67. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (7) 
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Figure 69. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (9) 
 
 
Figure 70. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (10) 
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Figure 72. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (12) 
 
Figure 73. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (13) 
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Figure 75. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (15) 
 
Figure 76. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (16) 
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Figure 78. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (18) 
 
Figure 79. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (19) 
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Figure 81. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (21) 
 
Figure 82. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (22) 
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Figure 84. Normalised differences (Infer agents, MinToM agents) with Ngh, (24) 
 
In addition, graphs from Figure 95 to Figure 99, in appendix 1, show how many times Infer 
agents have used their expanding Ngh function, as well as the number of times that they 
have used their infer system and thus theory of mind ability.   
3.3.3  Differences of Infer and MinToM agents based on maximum and minimum 
performances 
The results of the simulation have shown that the descending order of agents’ performances 
is Reality, Infer, MinToM and Control agent. Besides, the general pattern of results shows 
that the largest differences occur between Infer and MinToM agents. Moreover, the large 
amount of data from simulation runs structured by normalisation in a standard scale of 
graphs demonstrates differences of Infer and MinToM agents’ performances. The focus of 
this section is to use the minimum baseline of performances of agents (Control agents) and 
the maximum one (Reality agents) in a way that the normalised data demonstrates 
differences of Infer and MinToM agents’ performances more effectively. For this purpose, 
the NormalisedX Value of Reality agents is used as the maximum and NormalisedX Value 
of Control agents as the minimum value for rescaling data which indicates the differences 
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Therefore, the efficiency of Infer agents in comparison with MinToM agents is calculated 
based on the efficiency of Reality agents in comparison with Control agents as follows: 
(NormalisedX_Infer - NormalisedX_MinToM) / (NormalisedX_Reality - NormalisedX_Control) 
This formula evaluates the Infer agents’ efficiency in relation to that of the MinToM agent 
and normalises it with the difference between Reality and Control agents. Thus, these 
differences contain the area of variation between the upper and lower limits on agents’ 
performance scale, including agents which lack theory of mind ability (Control agents) and 
agents with precise understanding of others’ mental states (Reality agents) with the same 
parameters in the simulation. 
The results of the simulation and this formula are depicted through Figure 85 to Figure 89.  
Figure 88 shows the extreme values of N=50 and T=50. The normalised formula does not 
include the extreme values as agents’ performances are random. This figure shows the 
lowest differences and indicates the lowest agents’ performances in an uncertain 
environment. In particular, the fluctuating differences signal a highly unpredictable 
environment. By increasing the number of agents, as shown in Figure 89, the stability 
improves therefore the normalisation formula applies for N= 400-2000 and T=50. The 
instability of the situation is consistent in other graphs including Figures 85 to 87 for N=50 
with an improvement due to increased number of targets. Moreover, Figures 85 to 87 show 
as the period increases, this low efficiency improves; this is because agents are more likely 
to stay Passive and do not need to achieve targets. As the number of targets increases to 
400 in Figure 87, the efficiency of Infer agents increases, especially by increasing the 
number of agents, the differences reach an average of 80%. This efficiency continues to 
rise in Figure 86 for the number of agents of 800 with average differences of under 90%. 
For T=1200 in, the stability improves for N=50 and remains with high differences of above 
90%, as is shown in Figure 85. However, the most significant improvements of differences 
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occur at T=400 and T=800. One possible reason for this is that as the ratio of T/N becomes 
larger, the possibility that agents achieve targets regardless of their abilities increases. 
Thus, the difference between agents decreases.   
 
 
Figure 85. Performance differences of Infer and MinToM agents, T=1200 












































Differences of Infer and MinToM Agents
P= 1-22,  Ngh= 2-6,  T= 1200,  N= 50-800




Figure 86. Performance differences of Infer and MinToM agents, T=800 
Setup: Ngh=2, 3, 4, 6 and P=1, 2, 7, 12, 17, 22 
 
 
Figure 87. Performance differences of Infer and MinToM agents, T=400 















































Differences of Infer and MinToM Agents
P= 1-22,  Ngh= 2-6,  T= 800,  N= 50-1200
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Figure 88. Performance differences of Infer and MinToM agents, T=50, N=50 
Setup: Ngh=2, 3, 4, 6 and P=1, 2, 7, 12, 17, 22 
 
 
Figure 89. Performance differences of Infer and MinToM agents, T=50, N=400-2000 
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Differences of Infer and MinToM Agents
P= 1-22,  Ngh= 2-6,  T= 50,  N= 50




Furthermore, the graphs of the simulation illustrating each type of agents’ performance in 
every time step of 1000 ticks are shown in Figure 100 to Figure 105 in the appendix 2.  
Although, these graphs are beyond the scope of this thesis, the pattern of the graphs show 
Infer and Reality agents reach their targets faster and stay Passive for the remaining time 
steps while other agents reach fewer targets and reach an equilibrium faster.  
3.3.4  The cost and required resources of inferring others’ mental states 
Certainly, Infer agents’ ability of understanding others’ mental states and reasoning 
demands more resources and costs.  The main resources, which have already been 
described in IAF and BRM, are also applicable in MSM. By referring to Table 4, these 
resources, comprising a network of perception and attention (first phase of RAF in MSM), 
three types of memory for storing information (second phase of RAF in MSM), inhibitory 
control and reasoning resources (third phase of RAF in MSM). Noticeably, other agents 
such as MinToM and Food agents require a very limited version of these resources, for 
example, MinToM agents require sensory and short-term memory but they do not need 
long-term memory, inhibitory control and reasoning resources.  
Furthermore, in order to calculate the inferring others’ mental states cost, the agents 
isolated processing time is computed for each type of agent. However, this processing time 
had no effect on the simulation and MSM results because of software time settings (Repast 
Simphony). The results demonstrate that Random agents are the fastest and that Infer 
agents are the slowest. There are two possible reasons for Infer agents requiring long 
processing time; firstly, reasoning beliefs and desires in both reasoning phase and 
expressing phase takes additional time to gather and evaluate the corresponding 
information as the amount of information is larger than other agents. Secondly, inhibition 
step requires a shift from Infer agents’ own beliefs and desires in the present time to others, 
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which consumes more time for retrieving the information from the memory. Hence, based 
on RAF, devising an infer system and performing with high efficiency comes at the cost of 
time, as well as efficient interconnected resources including memory, perception, reasoning 
and inhibitory control and larger amounts of information.  
3.3.5  Applying an alternative strategy for Infer Agents 
Infer agents’ strategy has been a reliable and effective method to achieve targets. The 
questions then arise: What if the Infer agents' strategy changes? How do these changes 
affect the agents’ performance? What is the role of the strategy that links the information 
about understanding others’ mental state to an action?  In order to address these questions, 
there are two options: First, a more planned and sophisticated strategy, or second, simply 
reduce some parts of planning of the current strategy. The first option is not fit to answer 
the questions because it will increase the Infer agents’ efficiency. The second option 
provides insights into the impact of applying less planning. Thus, the Infer and MinToM 
agents’ strategies have been altered by removing the two situations that agents use in their 
plan, for the next time steps. The first situation involves the agent in an Active state but 
there is no target available in the field of movement. The second situation involves the 
agent in Passive state with more than one cell option to move. Thus, instead of applying 
their strategies, agents move randomly because in these situations there is no direct access 
to targets. Consequently, the simulation results with this strategy show that the efficiency 
of Infer agents decreases and matches with MinToM agents’ performances. 
For example, the results of conducting eight series of simulations for Infer and MinToM 
agents with and without a plan in two environments with parameters: T=400, P=2, Ngh=3, 




Figure 90. Performance differences of (Infer, MinToM) agents with No plan (_NoP) 
 
 
This graph shows that Infer agents with No Plan (Infer_NoP) perform similarly to MinToM 
agents with No Plan (MinToM_NoP) whereas Infer agent performances are more effective 
in comparison to MinToM agents in the same environment.  
Intriguingly, these results suggest that a fruitful use of understanding others’ mental states 
involves a certain level of reasoning and planning. In other words, a successful goal-
directed action requires applying the information about others’ mental states in rational 
plans in a competitive society. 
3.4  In what way is MSM an effective model? 
This thesis presents MSM as an effective model for a simple theory of mind ability. The 
following explanation for MSM validation and verification provides the model accuracy 
arguments.  
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It is important to describe in depth how MSM works; the agent’s simple rules, actions and 
abilities need to be clear. The descriptions of each agents’ strategy and the related diagrams 
have been extensively discussed in MSM methodology section 3.2. In addition, Table 4 
indicates different type of agents’ perceptions, functions and memory abilities; all of these 
conceptual descriptions especially regarding Infer agents and MinToM agents determine 
how they carry out the intended theory of mind ability and tracking others’ field of view 
respectively. Figure 33 shows the inference scheme, the steps where Infer agents observe 
other agents achieve targets and update its desires. 
The code verification for each agent has been tested to examine that the corresponding code 
works correctly based on agents’ methodology. A code verification cycle including 
applying a breaking point, running and testing the printed results for each sub function is 
implemented for each type of agent. 
Furthermore, by altering four parameters’ values in the initial conditions including: number 
of food, number of agents, agents’ field of view and period of staying Passive, model 
sensitivity to its initial conditions are examined. Agents’ performances are sensitive to the 
initial conditions, particularly where agents are unable to apply their rules and strategies in 
uncertain situations. The analyses are in the results section and previously explained. 
3.4.2  MSM Validations 
MSM validations mainly consist of validating that Infer agents are able to infer others’ 
mental states and that MinToM agents are able to track others’ field of view. The micro 
level validation has already been explained in strategy section. Moreover, the MSM macro 
level validation has been shown in the simulation results and graphs. The MSM aggregated 
results and concluding statements are described in the results section. 
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MSM implementation involved a rigorous modification cycle of the design and programing 
of different agents. Specifically, Infer agents and MinToM agents have been constantly 
examined to ensure they theoretically represent the expected methodologies. 
3.5  DISCUSSION 
The MSM simulation results consistently suggest that there is a strong relationship between 
the agents’ theory of mind capability and their performance efficiency. Theory of mind 
competence is a reliable factor for higher performance in this competitive society. The 
reason for Infer agents’ high performance is their ability to infer others’ desires in their 
neighbourhood. The second higher performances are MinToM agents due to their ability 
to track others’ field of view. Control agents, which are only able to observe the wider area, 
have the third most effective performance. In addition, Food agents with understanding of 
their own desires are in the fourth position whereas Random agents, which move randomly, 
are the least efficient position. Moreover, Reality agents’ best performance is due to their 
direct access to others’ mental states and they are designed for control measurement 
purpose. 
As the ability of theory of mind develops from the simple level of understanding their own 
mental states to the level of tracking others’ field of view and to the more complicated level 
of constructing inferences about other agents’ mental states, the performance of agents 
effectively increases. 
Similarly, de Weerd et al. (2013) assessed whether higher-order theory of mind advances 
individuals’ performances in an agent-based model for a single-shot rock-paper-scissors 
and Limited Bidding games.  Agents with first-order theory of mind can consider the game 
from the perspective of their opponents, and determine what they do in the position of the 
opponents. Agents with a second-order theory of mind ability believe that their opponents 
might use the first-order theory of mind to predict their behaviour. The results of their 
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simulation shows agents perform better than their rivals that are more limited in their ability 
to model others; particularly their study demonstrates that agents with the first-order and 
the second-order theory of mind ability would benefit upon their opponents with lower 
order in simulation (de Weerd, Verbrugge, & Verheij, 2013). However, their study did not 
show the same pattern for more than the second order. 
These findings are consistent with theory of mind’s impact on social situations in real life. 
For example, the absence of theory of mind (in autism) involves with deficits in 
understanding and reasoning about mental states (Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Moreover, 
Volkmar et al. show in a study that autistic individuals exhibit social and communication 
dysfunction (Volkmar et al., 1987). The study by Frith et al. (1994) found children who 
lack theory of mind are very low level in social adaptation. The research by (Baron-Cohen 
, 1989) claims that there is a lack of social abilities in autistic individuals. The majority of 
research suggests that theory of mind deficit is a potential reason of social dysfunctions 
(Peterson et al., 2009) and the mainstream of these studies focus on impaired theory of 
mind ability in children. In fact, the link between theory of mind and social life have been 
studied by taking different perspectives. For example, Humphrey proposed a social 
intelligence hypothesis that suggests social competition generally activated primate 
cognition (Humphrey, 1976). Alternatively, competition for resources in group living, may 
have caused in primates to evolve ‘social intelligence’ (Whiten, 2000).  
The results of differences between agents’ performances in MSM demonstrate a solid 
pattern with their underlying strategy and the maximum amount of information they need.  
As it might be expected, the MSM results show that the largest differences happen between 
Random agent and other agents. This shows that the consequence of having no strategy 
results in the lowest performance. Indeed, having no strategy signifies there is no need to 
use any information.    
149 
 
 Besides, the simulation results show that the differences between MinToM agents and 
Infer agents are consistently significant through various values of parameters. This finding 
indicates that the ability to understand others’ mental states plays a critical role in agents’ 
performances in this competitive environment.  
The highest level of the differences between Infer and Min ToM agents occurs when the 
density of the total number of agents and targets is more balanced between 2/5 and 4/5 of 
the environment cells, indicating the strategy of Infer agents is more applicable in such 
environments. Almost all of the simulation results show that Infer agents’ performances 
are higher than MinToM. The ability to track others’ field of view is used by both of agents. 
The two main abilities of Infer agents consists of; firstly, their infer system to infer others’ 
desires and secondly, tracking others’ field of view. MinToM agents possess the second 
feature. The second ability might be used with or without the first one. For example, in 
situations that Infer agent is unable to observe other agents achieving a target, it is 
consequently unable to update the information and infer others’ mental states. Thus, Infer 
agent can only rely on its own ability to track others’ field of view. It applies its pre-
assumption and considers all of agents’ mental states as Active, similar to MinToM 
meaning MinToM agents are a basic version of Infer agents. Therefore, MinToM agents’ 
ability is a subset of Infer agents’ ones.  
Infer agents’ complex strategy demands more information, processing and reasoning 
resources which results to their high level of performance.  Whereas, in MinToM agents’ 
strategy, the maximum amount of information they need and their reasoning level are lower 
than corresponding ones in Infer agents which makes their performance less efficient than 
Infer agents. 
On the other hand, the performance difference between Infer agents and Reality agents are 
low.  Almost similar level performances of Infer and Reality agents indicates that Infer 
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agents inferences works reliably. It also proposes that inferring other agents’ mental states 
has a significant impact on Infer agents’ performances.  
Although Reality agents have the highest performance, yet their information is limited to 
their field of view likewise other agents. In addition, their strategy is not perfect and it still 
can be improved.  Hence, Reality agents’ performances are not completely ideal and 
faultless. 
The simulation results show that the lowest differences occur between Food and Control 
agents. The strategy of Control and Food agents are similar for Active states, as it has 
already been explained in section 3.2.3. The main difference is that Food agents’ field of 
view is limited to 2, while Control agents’ field of view depends on the parameter of field 
of view. A comparison between these findings and the differences between Infer and 
MinToM agents concludes that the effect of understanding others’ beliefs and desires is 
significant whereas expanding field of view effect has less effect based on their 
performances.   
In addition, the Infer agents’ high performance comes at the cost of time because they need 
more time ( not in the simulation time because of the software’s settings) to collect more 
information and importantly to reason, inhibit their own perspective and retrieve the 
information regarding others’ mental states. Correspondingly, RAF phases are consistent 
with the developmental literature demonstrate a network of resources for Infer agents (with 
theory of mind competence) including perception, memory, self-perspective inhibition and 
reasoning resources. 
Finally, Infer agents’ strategy has been altered to a version with less reasoning regarding 
others’ mental states. By removing some rational points and links about other agents’ 
mental states (Passive or Active), their performance decreases. This shows the different 
approach of actions influences agents’ performance where using theory of mind 
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understanding. The result of altering the strategy initially elucidates the significance of 
reasoning interplay in theory of mind actions. These results suggest that one potential 
reason for individual differences in their actions (based on theory of mind) is diverse 
approach of reasoning. Although the information about others’ mental states are identical, 
but the agents’ actions require proper rational reasoning to achieve their goals.  Noticeably, 
Hughes has already stated this point that children do not perform their theory of mind 
understanding similarly in their social life (Hughes, 2011-a).  
3.5.1  Infer Agents diagram (RAF) 
The process of understanding others’ mental state is a complex system and it requires a 
dynamic analysis. The diagram of Infer agents (RAF) clarifies and verifies the crucial 
phases of this procedure.  It considers the objective of the process and interactions between 
these phases simultaneously.  
RAF simplifies and generalises the main phases of understanding others’ mental states 
process which is shown in Figure 31. RAF reflects the process of how Infer agents infer 
other agents’ beliefs and desires and use this information within the four phases. These 
phases are as follow: 
 - Collecting Information 
Collecting information is crucial in understanding others’ mental states. Infer agents collect 
information about other agents’ perspective from their field of view as well the location of 
food and other agents. Infer agents observe other agents’ actions when they reach a target 
and track other agents’ field of view regarding the locations of targets. There is a reasoning 
behind which information to collect and use first. For example, they use the closest 
information first, and when unable to reach their targets, then they expand their field of 
view to observe more information. 
152 
 
Infer agents observe other agents’ actions of reaching a target and use this information to 
feed the reasoning phase. In addition, they collect information about the location of targets 
as input for the other phases, enabling them to make decisions where to move. Thus, this 
phase is highly interconnected with other phases of RAF.  
Collection information phase is a dynamic and online procedure, which is parallel with the 
changes of the world over time.  
 - Recording Information 
Undoubtedly, MSM shows that there are memory demands on Infer agents to understand 
others’ mental states. Infer agents store other agents’ desires and beliefs regarding the 
targets in their memory, which will be accessed in the reasoning phase. Infer agents are 
able to store the information by exploiting the relevant types of memory.  In fact, there are 
three types of memory. The first type relates to very simple information from the 
environment such as the location of the food in the current time step (sensory memory). 
The second type is designed to store simple calculated information about other agents’ 
perspective in the current time step (short-term memory) and the third type stores the 
inferred  information about other agents’ desires and beliefs from past time steps (long-
term memory). These types of memories are essential for Infer agents and enable them to 
have access to necessary information especially information about others’ mental states. 
The two main distinctions between these types of memory is associated, firstly, with the 
length of time that information remains in the memory and secondly with the volume and 
complexity of their content especially with the information about others’ perspectives.  
 - Reasoning Process of Beliefs and Desires 
This phase defines a central information processing unit for Infer agents’ theory of mind 
ability. Infer agents possess their own beliefs and desires. Based on these desires and 
beliefs, Infer agents choose the agents in their field of view which have access to shared 
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targets. Then the Infer agents detect and infer the chosen agents’ beliefs and desires. Infer 
agents inhibit their own desires towards the target and temporally retrieve the other agents’ 
perspective from the memory. Once Infer agent observes that another agent, for example 
agent Z reaches a target, it concludes that agent Z’s mental state was Active and thus agent 
Z reached a target. Therefore, their mental state is Passive in the current time step. This 
enables Infer agents to infer others’ desires. Infer agents track other agents’ field of view, 
which have the same belief about the location of a shared target. Thus, they initially choose 
the agents with the same beliefs about a target and infer their desires. In general, there are 
four different mental states situations for both of the Infer agent and the other agent (agent 
Z), which is shown in Table 6. Hence, the reasoning phase procedure rests on analysing 
these mental states.  Infer agents’ actions are different for each of these four cases by 
considering first their own and then others’ mental states. 
For example, if Infer agent is in an Active state and infers that agent Z‘s mental state is 
Active, then the Infer agent assumes that agent Z believes that there is a target at a specific  
location and therefore, Infer agent considers that agent Z believes that this is a potential 
target. Otherwise, if agent Z’s mental state is Passive, depending on Infer agent’s own 
mental state it might consider calculating the number of remaining time steps until agent Z 
becomes Active. In sum, Infer agents assess whether it is necessary to consider other 
agents’ mental states. This assessment is contingent on four different conditions of its own 
and other agents’ mental states which was described earlier.  
 
 





Reasoning phase for Infer agents involves the following five generic subroutines: 
- Inferring others’ desires from their observed behaviour 
- Processing its own desire and belief  
- Self-perspective inhibition of its own desire  
- Retrieving information about the subject agents’ mental states (from memory) 
- Subject agents’ desire and belief process  
By the end of this phase, Infer agents’ reasoning about the other agents’ mental states are 
completed. However, Infer agents have not revealed the understanding of other agents’ 
mental states in their actions yet.  
 - Expressing Others Mental States (Actions as output) 
This phase of the MSM is concerned with deciding on actions by considering others’ 
mental states. Infer agents’ actions are influenced by others’ desire and beliefs and also the 
current state of the environment. Therefore, Infer agents’ action is based upon two types of 
information; firstly the information which they directly perceive from the environment and 
secondly the information which they infer about others’ mental states. There is a delicate 
but important distinction between understanding others’ mental states and using this 
understanding of others’ mental states in Infer agents’ actions. This clarifies the logic 
behind the distinction between recognising others’ mental states in the first three RAF 
phases and the expressing phase. In two identical situations of the environment, Infer 
agents’ actions depend on other agents’ mental states; they act differently based on whether 
the other agent’s mental state is Active or Passive. Infer agents use the information 
resulting from their theory of mind ability in this phase through their actions. A level of 
inevitable reasoning in this phase rests on principles of rational action to achieve their 
goals. This level of reasoning combines the concept of understanding others’ mental states 
through an action which expresses the understanding of others’ mental states.   
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3.5.2  RAF and MinToM agents’ process 
The processes of MinToM agents is not exactly the same as Infer agents in RAF as one 
might expect. However, there are similarities between them. In the first phase, they collect 
information about others’ field of view. In phase two, they register the information and use 
this in the current time step but do not record this information for future time steps. 
MinToM agents do not need the reasoning phase of RAF because they only track others’ 
field of view which is not involved with the reasoning phase. Therefore, RAF includes the 
process of MinToM agents’ ability. In sum, the distinction between RAF and MinToM 
agents’ process includes the reasoning phase and the differences between registration and 
recording as explained earlier.      
3.5.3  Infer system complexity 
RAF and MSM shows that infer system is an underpinning feature of cognitive theory of 
mind ability. The relationship between the infer system, the reasoning level and perceived 
information, in terms of their quantity and quality, determines the level of complexity of 
the task. As perceived information becomes more complicated, the more robust infer 
system is required to disentangle others’ mental states. 
One of the formal distinctions between the first and second system of the two systems of 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) concentrates on inference and reasoning capability. The 
second system relies on the infer system whereas the first system lacks any inferences about 
others’ mental states. Furthermore, the second system information encompasses 
propositional attitudes as such, whereas the first system involves with simple belief-like 
such as the location of an object. Thus, the two systems implicitly demonstrate the 
relationship between the perceived information and the complexity level of inferences 
about others’ mental states, which is consistent with MSM results. 
3.5.4  Perception, functions and memory in MSM 
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All of the agents, except Random agents, are able to perceive targets in their field of view. 
Random, Food and Control agents are unable to reflect other agents’ presence and 
perspective into their plans and actions. Moreover, Control, MinToM, Infer and Reality 
agents are capable of extending their vision to a larger area for their plans based on the Ngh 
parameter. 
Internal functions including tracking other’s field of view, considering their own mental 
states and understanding others’ mental states are main functions to differentiate between 
the levels of theory of mind ability. The results of these functions provide information that 
facilitate making decisions for goal directed actions.  
As the agents’ abilities develop from simple to complicated one on the micro level, it is 
necessary that agents develop from a simple sensory memory to more advanced storage 
such as short-term memory and long-term memory. This storage is vital for coding and 
decoding the required information about inferences. This suggests that agents need 
different types of memory for different levels of belief representation. MinToM agents, 
which register the location of the target and are able to track others’ field of view, need 
sensory memory and short-term memory for the current time step.  However, Infer agents, 
with theory of mind ability, need an additional long-term memory to store others’ desires. 
Therefore, the memory of agents become more complicated as the level of theory of mind 
improves.      
3.5.5  Presumptions of mental states (biases)  
All types of agents which are Active, except Random agents, have the desire to achieve a 
target. In addition, they have their presumption about others’ mental states. These 
presumptions are made when agents lack any reasons to think in a different way, these 
default assumptions (or biases) constitute the most suitable and productive way to make 
generalisation and often they are not correct (Minsky, 1988).  
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These presumptions about mental states are updated when corresponding information 
becomes accessible within the changes of the environment. Infer agents are capable of 
updating their presumptions regarding others’ mental states as they observe other agents 
achieving targets. The efficiency of Infer agents’ decision-making advances through this 
capability, for example they can move towards a less vulnerable target. At the start of the 
simulation, Infer agents’ presumption is that other agents’ mental states are Active which 
is correct.  As other agents’ mental states change, this presumption is not necessarily 
accurate any more. However, the presumptions will be updated with Infer agent’s online 
inferences about other agents’ mental states over time and build a reliable input for Infer 
agents’ actions.  
Correspondingly, the Reality agent has access to others’ mental states as a control 
measurement and there is no need for mental states presumption. 
Furthermore, MinToM agents consider other agents as Active (as their presumption). In 
contrast with Infer agents, they are unable to update this presumption through the 
simulation.  
Moreover, Control and Food agents assume other agents are always Passive through the 
simulation. Similarly, they are unable to change this presumption.  This presumption, that 
all agents are Passive, reflects that Control and Food agents ignore other agents. They are 
egocentric and are only concerned with their own beliefs and desires. The Random agent 





Table 7. Mental state presumptions regarding other agents 
 
3.5.6  Agents’ own and others’ mental states  
MSM simulate three different levels of mental states understanding for agents, which is 
depicted in Figure 91. Firstly, Control agents only consider their own mental states and 
ignore other agents; they are self-centred agents. Secondly, MinToM agents always assume 
other agents are Active; other agents are considered as competitors with a desire towards 
the target and they register their beliefs, they are able to track other agents’ beliefs about 
the location of the target.  Thirdly, Infer agents have the ability to infer others’ desire and 
register their beliefs regarding the targets. They are constantly updating their perspective 
about others’ desires and beliefs throughout the simulation. 
 





3.6  Conclusion 
One important finding of MSM shows the basic phases of understanding others’ mental 
states processes. The process of how agents infer other agents’ beliefs and desires and use 
this information is reflected within four phases.  
In the first phase, collecting information, agents perceive other agents’ actions of reaching 
targets and track other agents’ field of view regarding the locations of targets. The primary 
function of this phase is to provide this information to the other interconnected phases. 
Recording phase is the second phase when agents store other agents’ mental states in their 
memory. MSM suggests that there are three types of memory in a simple theory of mind 
process. Sensory memory relates to simple information from the environment such as the 
location of the food in the current time step. Short-term memory stores simple calculated 
information about other agents’ perspective in the current time step whereas long-term 
memory is capable of storing the inferred information about other agents’ mental states for 
future use.  The two main features of different types of memory corresponds with the length 
of time that information remains in the memory and the volume and complexity of the 
information about others’ perspectives. MSM also suggests that as the level of theory of 
mind develops more complex memory is demanded. 
The third phase, reasoning process of beliefs and desires, defines a central information 
processing unit for agents’ with theory of mind ability. This phase involves five generic 
subroutines; inferring others’ desires from their observed behaviour, processing its own 
desire and belief, self-perspective inhibition, retrieving information from memory 
regarding others’ mental states and finally processing others’ mental states. 
The fourth phase, expressing others’ mental states, is associated with action based upon 
consideration of others’ mental states. The important distinction between understanding 
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others’ mental states and using this understanding in actions is clarified through the first 
three phases and the expressing phase respectively. 
The other MSM simulation results consistently show that there is a solid relationship 
between the agents’ theory of mind ability and the agents’ performances. Theory of mind 
competence is a main factor for higher performance in this competitive society. The reason 
for agents’ high performance is their ability to infer others’ mental states in their 
neighbourhood. The second highest performance belongs to agents with ability to track 
others’ field of view. Agents with no ability of theory of mind, as we would expect, have 
the third most effective performance.  Agents’ performance increases as the level of theory 
of mind develops through the three levels; understanding their own mental states, minimal 
theory of mind ability, making inferences about other agents’ mental states.  
Moreover, these four basic phases of theory of mind ability demonstrate that agents with 
theory of mind competence need a network of resources including perception, memory, 
self-perspective inhibition and reasoning. This finding is consistent with the developmental 
literature. The MSM results demonstrate a solid pattern between agents ToM ability level 
and the maximum amount of information they require.  Thus, agents’ high performance 
comes at the cost of time because they need to collect more information and more 
importantly to reason, inhibit their own perspective and retrieve the information regarding 



































4.1   Introduction 
Recently, theory of mind research has been significantly increased through various fields. 
However, its underlying processes are still under considerable debate. The lack of 
structured and standardised basic building blocks for a simple theory of mind in the 
literature brings confusion in the measurements of theory of mind abilities. Schaafsma et 
al. (2015) argue that a scientific concept of theory of mind requires a set of simpler 
processes rather than its current definition as the essence of a mental representation of 
minds, which does not permit an easy breakdown into its basic components. Consequently, 
they suggest the reconstruction of a concept of theory of mind with the necessary links to 
its more basic processes. To achieve this, Schaafsma and her colleagues propose two steps: 
breaking down theory of mind and its associated concepts into cognitive components that 
describe more basic processes, and then reassembling these basic blocks into different 
features of theory of mind.  
Accordingly, this thesis offers a generic scheme for many belief-reasoning tasks called 
Belief Representation Systematic Approach (BRSA), which highlights the key phases of 
belief representation processes. BRSA is a simple and robust approach that breaks down 
theory of mind tasks, including false belief tasks, into four cognitive phases describing the 
basic processes of understanding others’ mental states. In addition, BRSA is capable of 
reconstructing various levels of theory of mind by assembling some features of its phases 
in different ways.  
This chapter provides a standard theoretical framework for theory of mind processes 
consistent with IAF and RAF from the previous chapters. The aim of this chapter is to 
develop BRSA and its concept in further detail, explaining where BRSA comes from, 
BRSA phases in the standard false belief task and BRSA phases in developmental 
literature. Subsequently, BRSA’s explanation for participants’ failure in false belief tasks, 
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as well as the link between minimal theory of mind and BRSA are discussed. Other 
applications of BRSA, such as analysing the conditions in which the false belief task is a 
decisive test for theory of mind based on BRSA and in the literature will also be explained.  
Finally, analysis of minimal theory of mind as a decisive construct for theory of mind based 
on BRSA will be explored. 
4.2  Where does BRSA come from? 
Agent-based models embrace a bottom-up principle where all rules and parameters are 
defined at the micro level (Salamon, 2011). The processes of agents’ actions and transitions 
that originate from the micro level can be shown in a generic diagram. A diagram such as 
a flowchart is a symbolic description of the model that shows the decisions points and the 
processes in the computer program (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). “These symbols provide a 
clear way of understanding how control flows through the software” (Wilensky & Rand, 
2015, p. 314).  
“The behaviour of agents in many agents-based models is often expressed as logical rules. 
Hence, it is very common to see flowcharts and pseudo-code (or even computer code itself) 
used to represent agent behaviours” (Onggo & Karpat, 2011, p. 674). There are visual tools 
in some platforms that facilitate illustrating agents’ complex behaviour diagrams. Some of 
commercial agent-based platforms include the process flow diagram, functions and 
behaviour of agents. For example, AnyLogic includes different types of diagrams; Business 
Process Model Notation (BPMN) is a visual modelling tool for process description and 
process execution using diagrams for simulation and Repast Simphony includes Statecharts 
framework, which clarifies the underlying logic of the model.  
Therefore, one of the advantages of simple agent-based models is to allow the user to 
explore the crucial processes in the model comprehensively, and also the effect of these 
processes on the results (Wilensky & Rand, 2015).  The diagrams of agents with minimal 
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theory of mind ability (Figure 30), agents with understanding of others’ false beliefs 
(Figure 15), and agents with theory of mind ability (Figure 31), are gathered in Figure 92.a 
to Figure 92.c to show a comparison of agents’ procedures with different levels of 
understanding others’ minds. This figure shows that for a minimal theory of mind, three 
phases of collecting information, registering information and action are essential, whereas 
for belief representation, the phases of recording information and reasoning other’ mental 
states should be added. Note that in registration, the access to the information is only 
possible at the current time step while in recording the information, it is possible to store 
the information for using in future time steps. 
The diagram of agents with the ability of inferring others’ mental states needs an additional 
step of inferring others’ mental states in the reasoning phase, in comparison to the diagram 
of agents with belief representation ability. However, the basic phases are identical. This 
figure illustrates that as the level of theory of mind increases the demand of resources and 
reasoning rises.  
First, BRSA is derived from the diagram of Infant agents (IAF) in BRM, an agent-based 
model introduced in chapter 2, which illustrates the procedure that occurs within agents 
with the ability of understanding others’ beliefs. This diagram was identified through 
examining the behaviour and the dynamic processes of decision trees of Infant agents. 
Thus, the diagram of BRSA is identical to agents with belief representation ability in Figure 
92.b, by concentrating in cognitive aspects rather than computational, which is shown in 
Figure 93. 
Essentially, BRSA provides insight into the cognitive processes that drive the complex 
procedure of understanding others’ beliefs. Compatibly, BRSA is applicable for agents 




Figure 92. Agents’ arrow and box diagrams with different levels of theory of mind ability 
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Figure 93. Belief Representation Systematic Approach (BRSA) 
 
4.3  BRSA and its Applications 
BRSA elaborates the underlying blocks and basic processes of belief presentation as 
precursors to a simple theory of mind, which is generalised into four phases: 
 Perception (Collecting Information) 
 Memory (Recording Information) 
 Reasoning Process of Beliefs and Desires 
 Action (Expressing others’ mental states) 
Three first steps including perception, memory and reasoning processes of beliefs and 
desires signify belief representation. The last additional phase, action, is a benchmark to 
express or test false belief understanding. 
In addition, BRSA is beneficial as an analytical approach for distinguishing behavioral 
tasks from belief representation tasks, two characteristics that are not easy to separate.  
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BRSA is able to extract the beliefs and desires from other information through three 
subroutines in the reasoning phase. The behavioural tasks lack beliefs and desires to extract 
in the reasoning phase of BRSA. Thus, it is possible to distinguish the behavioural tasks 
from belief representational tasks.  
Moreover, BRSA demonstrates the systematic link and the flow of information through its 
phases, as illustrated in Figure 93.  The following sections of BRSA’s applications provide 
some examples and more detail on this.  
4.4  BRSA and Standard False Belief Task 
Throughout the process of Sally and Ann false belief task, the child observes and collects 
the information from the world and updates this information to answer the questions such 
as: 
- Where does Sally put the ball? 
- Can Sally see the ball? (if Sally leaves the room) 
- Where does Ann put the ball? ( Sally is not in the room)  
-    Where will Sally search for the ball, when she returns? 
BRSA offers a generic false belief algorithm, a structural approach to investigate false 
belief tasks core principles. This algorithm uncovers underlying phases by which one can 
successfully pass the false belief test.  
The four phases of BRSA in Sally and Ann false belief task are as follows: 
4.4.1  -  Perception (collecting information)  
The perception phase in Sally and Ann false belief task centres on the participant child who 
needs to collect supplementary information over time.  
It is essential that the child correctly answer the above questions before any claim regarding 
the child’s success in passing the false belief task. The participant child watches the Sally 
and Ann scenario, collects the information from her/his observation and updates its 
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information as the scenario continues. In fact, this critical phase is directly connected to all 
of other three phases and feeds them with online and updated information about the 
environment as illustrated in Figure 93.   
4.4.2  -  Memory (Recording information) 
This phase, based on BRSA, in standard false belief task relates to storing information 
regarding others’ perspective. The participant child is required to record Sally’s perspective 
regarding the location of the ball (which is in the basket). Essentially, the child needs to 
store Sally’s perspective information. Whilst Ann moves the ball to the box, the current 
location of the ball is no longer the same as Sally’s perspective. Therefore, the child needs 
to allocate its memory to Sally’s perspective information. Later in the task events, the child 
must retrieve this information to successfully pass the false belief test.  
4.4.3  -  Reasoning Process of Beliefs and Desires 
Based on BRSA, this phase involves the information processing which includes:  
1) Self-perspective inhibition; the participant child inhibits its own belief about the location 
of the ball. 
2) The child must retrieve Sally’s perspective from her/his memory. 
3) The child reasons about Sally’s desire; she wants the ball when she returns to the room. 
Therefore, the child is able to successfully pass the false belief test. 
In summary, the participant child is supressing his/her own belief of the reality of the 
location of the ball while activating and retrieving Sally’s perspective. A successful child 
who passes the false belief test, reasons that Sally’s desire is to reach the ball and her belief 
regarding the location of the ball differs from the actual place of the ball. 
4.4.4  -  Action 
The last phase of BRSA in standard false belief task is the question: “Where will Sally 
search for the ball when she returns?”  Thus, the child should answer the question by 
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pointing at the object or answering verbally. This phase is referred as a measurement test 
(Bloom & German, 2000). 
4.5  The evidence from theory of mind literature for BRSA 
This section explores some of the evidence, gathered from theory of mind literature, which 
supports the BRSA phases. The evidence for each phase of BRSA is presented separately 
as follows: 
4.5.1  -  Perception (Collecting information) 
The perception phase plays a crucial role in false belief tasks. Wellman (2014) explains 
that Sally has a false belief in the task because she did not see the exact key set of events; 
she did not see that the ball was moved by Ann. Therefore, Wellman (2014) includes 
“seeing leads to knowing” in false belief understanding. He uses the term “information 
access” to clarify how having access to information is critical and explains that pre-
schoolers who pass standard false belief tasks are able to pass related seeing-knowing tasks.  
Similar to the perception phase of BRSA, the second principle of minimal theory of mind 
proposed by Butterfill and Apperly (2013) is concerned with the concept of field and 
encountering together as a substitute for perception phase. A field represents the agents’ 
related area that includes objects. Whilst the object is in the agents’ field of view, the 
relation of encountering occurs between agent and object, which have already described in 
general introduction.  
In other words, agents are able to perceive other agents or objects in their field of view by 
encountering them; they collect the information in their field of view, which are critical for 
false belief task and for minimal theory of mind ability. 
4.5.2  -  Memory (Recording information) 
Similar to BRSA, there is a strong body of evidence in child development research which 
suggests that at least a minimum level of working memory is necessary for false belief task 
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(e.g. Perner, 1991; Wimmer & Hartl, 1991; Davis & Pratt, 1995; Gordon & Olson, 1998; 
Keenan, Olson, & Zopito, 1998; Hughes, 1998; Keenan, 1998; Carlson, Moses, & Casey, 
2002; Doherty, 2009; Slade & Ruffman, 2005; Apperly, 2012). The registered location of 
the object in protagonist’s perspective in the standard false belief task is different from the 
real location of the object. To answer the false belief test question, retrieval of others’ belief 
perspective from the memory might assist the belief representation process which have 
been stored through the task. (Hollebrandse, Hout, & Hendriks, 2014) 
4.5.3  -  Reasoning process of beliefs and desires 
The reasoning phase of BRSA consists of three sub-routines: self-perspective inhibition, 
retrieving the data from memory and selective process of others’ belief and desire. These 
sub-routines have been elaborated in the literature from different views. For example, false 
belief tasks encompass reasoning of everyday beliefs-desire psychology, a system of 
reasoning about mind, behaviour and their connection to the world that provides 
explanation and predictions of actions through the individuals’ beliefs and desires 
(Wellman, 2014).  Precisely Wellman describes that belief-desire psychology includes in 
one hand a range of concepts such as preferences that forms an individual’s desires and in 
other hand, “perceptual-historical experiences” forms one’s beliefs.  
Moreover, the studies by Diamond (1991) and Carlson et al. (2002) have suggested that self-
perspective inhibition together with working memory are associated with false belief task. It 
may be necessary to inhibit the reality information in a coherent belief representation 
(Apperly et al., 2007). The executive function is necessary for belief representation perhaps 
by inhibition of self-perspective (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). 
Research by Leslie et al. (2004) proposes theory of mind mechanisms (ToMM) consisting 
of three principles. The first principle relates to a meta-representational system for belief 
and desire as such, while the second principle explains a selection process (SP) system that 
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enables inhibition of own true beliefs. In the third principle, they devised the term “true-
belief default” that explains the best guess of another’s belief is that it is the same as one’s 
own. Thus, to succeed in a false belief task, one must inhibit true-belief default. For 
example, to predict Sally’s action, Leslie explains that the child must consider Sally’s 
desire and beliefs. At first, the true-belief as default is the most salient. If the child is able 
to inhibit its own perspective, then the false belief becomes more salient and the child 
selects it (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Furthermore, there is a strong body of 
evidence that there is a correlation between executive functions (e.g. working memory, 
inhibitory control) and false belief task (Hughe, 2011a).  
These arguments in literature are consistent with the BRSA’s subroutines. Firstly, this 
phase of BRSA clearly illustrates Wellman’s belief-desire psychology and the connection 
between beliefs and desires, which will lead to the actions. Secondly, self-perspective 
inhibition is a critical subroutine of this phase of BRSA which is compatible with the 
literature. Thirdly, the role of memory, retrieving the information from memory and using 
it in the process of theory of mind ability is another subroutine of the reasoning phase of 
BRSA.  
4.5.4  -  Actions  
This phase results in an action based on understanding others’ mental states such as their 
beliefs and desires. This action is based on three earlier phases in BRSA. This phase is 
parallel to the false belief task’s test, and depending on the task, it comes in various forms. 
For example, in nonverbal false belief tasks eye gaze time or eye tracking can measure it.  
While in verbal false belief tasks, this is through a verbal response to a specific question 
such as “Where will Sally search for the ball?” 
In theory of mind literature, this phase has been subject to considerable debate. For 
example, (Mitchell, 1996) argues that children acquire theory of mind before it can be 
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measured by a theory of mind task due to lack of sufficient executive function skills such 
as inhibitory control and memory. In fact, a measurement task for theory of mind is 
analogous to this phase of BRSA. The expressing phase might require more complex 
reasoning separate from understanding others’ beliefs. This means, it is important to 
distinguish between theory of mind ability demands and theory of mind measurement task 
ones. 
Hughes argues that the ability to understand or infer others’ mental states differs 
significantly from the use of this information (Hughes, 2011-a). She states that recognition 
of others’ mental states such as thought and feelings do not certainly certify concern for 
others. Besides, she emphasises an important distinction between having an ability and 
performing it in our behaviour. The study by Hughes argues that children with theory of 
mind ability use their understanding in different ways when interacting with peers. She 
claims that there are robust findings suggesting that the relationship between theory of 
mind ability and using this ability in social life is stronger for some children than for others 
(Hughes, 2011-a). The constructed concept of theory of mind is required in combination 
with the ‘use’ of the concept of theory of mind to show the link between theory of mind 
and peer relationships (Caputi et al., 2012). 
In false belief task, Doherty (2009) clarifies that explanation is easier than prediction for 
children. The expressing phase includes different measurement tasks conveying different 
levels of complex utilities and reasoning.  Hence, the complexity of the measurement task 
sometimes might be a barrier for the child to pass the false belief task. 
Intriguingly, computational models and developmental literature consistently propose that 
mental states inferences and the actions influenced by these inferences are empowered by 
the principle of rational actions: “The expectation that agents act efficiently, within 
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situational constraints, to achieve their goals” (Jara-Ettinger  et al., 2015, p. 1). Thus, the 
principle of rational action is applicable in the expressing phase.  
In addition, another influential thread in false belief research proposes that there is a 
correlation between children’s verbal ability and their false belief understanding (Astington 
& Jenkins, 1999; Watson, Painter, & Bornstein, 2001; Farrar & Maag, 2002). Nevertheless, 
Slade and Ruffma, (2005) suggest that early child language correlates with later false belief 
but not the reverse. This evidence is consistent with the BRSA argument that reasoning 
and expressing others’ beliefs involves more than understanding it. 
4.6  BRSA and the reasons for failure in false belief tasks  
 There are different reasons for failure in false belief tasks based on BRSA. These reasons 
include: 
1. Lack of effective resources or apt reasoning in the expressing phase; for example,        
lack of apt rationality to achieve goals (e.g. in real life: deficiency in language 
development, linguistic ability and language comprehension). 
2. Lack or impairment of rational reasoning in reasoning phase 
3. Self –perspective inhibitory dysfunction 
4. Memory problems in storing or retrieving data 
5. Issues in perception phase such as incorrect information or attention problem. 
6. A combination of these reasons  
There is extensive literature on the role of memory in theory of mind (e.g. Fliss et al., 2015; 
Arslan et al., 2015; Hughes, 2011-b; Samson et al., 2004; Carlson et al., 2002). The self-
perspective inhibition part in false belief task (e.g. Hughes, 2011-b; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; 
Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). The linguistic ability and language development role in 
false belief task (e.g. Schaafsma et al., 2015; Jones, Gutierrez, & Ludlow, 2015; De 
Villiers, 2005; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007; Astington, 2001). Language 
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comprehension (Frank, Baron-Cohen, & Ganzel, 2015) and reasoning (Birch & Bloom, 
2007) in support of the reasons of failure in false belief tasks in BRSA.  
4.7  The link between minimal theory of mind and BRSA  
The first principle of minimal theory of mind, goal directed action, is a pre-assumption in 
BRM and BRSA. This includes the general rule that each agent has a goal to move towards 
food. The second principle, field and encountering, is parallel to the perception phase of 
BRSA during which agents encounter food and other agents in its field of view. The 
registration and successful registration as the third principle of minimal theory of mind 
corresponds to the memory phase in BRSA. However, there is a subtle difference between 
registration and recording information, which relates to the length of time and the type of 
memory that the information stores. In registration, the information is only accessible for 
the current time step whereas in recording the information is accessible for future time 
steps. The last matching point is the action of the fourth principle in minimal theory of 
mind and expressing (action) phase in BRSA. The difference between these actions is that 
action in minimal theory of mind does not involve any reasoning whereas action in BRSA 
might involve with reasoning depending on the task.   
 Clearly, the reasoning belief and desire phase, which is the third phase in BRSA, does not 
exist in minimal theory of mind. The reason is that minimal theory of mind does not involve 
any reasoning and sophisticated concepts (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). A comparison 






Figure 94. A comparison between minimal theory of mind principles and BRSA phases 
 
 
4.8  In which conditions is false belief task a decisive test for theory of mind 
based on BRSA? 
False belief tasks in the literature involves challenging actions, engaging with complex 
reasoning, intellectual connections or skills such as linguistic abilities, which might be 
more demanding than understanding others’ beliefs. Particularly, children’s false belief 
tasks are in this category.  
As already alluded in section 2.5.3 and section 3.5.1, BRSA illustrates the demands on 
memory, inhibitory control and reasoning in its third phase. Moreover, BRSA shows that 
the expressing phase is a separate phase from understanding others’ false beliefs. The 
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expressing phase which includes an action or a measurement test needs its own resources 
and separate reasoning, depending on the task.  
The reason that the standard false belief task might not meet the conditions as an acid test 
for theory of mind is that firstly the reasoning phase of BRSA demands cognitive resources. 
The subroutines of reasoning, which include mental states reasoning, inhibition, retrieving 
the information about others’ mental states perspective from memory, and the required 
interconnection between them are not  basic resources. Therefore, having these resources 
is a pre-condition for success in false belief tasks.   
Secondly, the expressing phase demands more than understanding others’ beliefs.  
Hence, BRSA validates the point that false belief tasks require sufficient resources as 
preconditions to act as a decisive test for theory of mind. Note that the concept of the theory 
of mind is different from minimal theory of mind as Apperly suggests. In other words, if 
the precondition of resources is met, then a false belief task is a decisive test for higher 
level than a minimal theory of mind.  
4.9  In which conditions is false belief task a decisive test for theory of mind 
in the literature? 
The false belief task is used extensively and recognised by researchers as an acid test for 
theory of mind ability (e.g. Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Doherty, 2009; Apperly, 2011; 
Workman & Reader, 2014). The central aspect of false belief task is that the child needs to 
predict others’ behaviour by inferring their perspective, which is different from the current 
world.  For example, to successfully pass the standard false belief task, the child must focus 
on Sally’s perspective rather than the present location of the ball. This is the underlying 
reason that understanding others’ false belief has been considered as an acid test for the 
presence of theory of mind ability.  
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On the contrary, Bloom and German (2000) advocate the abandonment of the false belief 
as an acid test for theory of mind. Their critical paper explains two reasons that false belief 
task needs to be abandoned as a test of theory of mind. Firstly, they propose that to pass 
the false belief task requires abilities beyond those of theory of mind. They point out the 
difficulties of the false belief task for example; the child needs to follow the actions of Sally 
and Ann such that remember the locations of the ball which Sally and Ann used. In 
addition, the child needs to comprehend that Sally could not have seen the ball’s new 
location as she left the room. Furthermore, the child has to fully understand the test 
question. Bloom and German also state that the false belief task is impossible to understand 
for a child of 2 years of age and hard for 3 year old children due to insufficient attentional 
and linguistic resources. Moreover, Bloom and German argue that it is important to 
simplify the task or question as is shown by the results from some studies (e.g. German & 
Leslie, 2000; Surian & Leslie, 1999; Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Freeman & Lacohee, 
1995; Moses, 1993; Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991; Freeman, Lewis, & Doherty, 1991; Lewis 
& Osborne, 1990). These studies show that children might often succeed at the age of 3 
which indicates that developmental change happens earlier than expected. However, as 
already indicated Wellman’s meta-analysis (2014) show no consistent effect. Secondly, 
Bloom and German analyse that an autistic individual fails the false belief task due to the 
lack of theory of mind, whereas a typical 3 year old child who has sophisticated ability to 
reason about mental states might fail the task because of inefficient processing abilities 
(Bloom & German, 2000). 
Conceivably, the subject child in false belief task needs to first understand the measurement 
test question. The link between the false belief task scenario and the measurement test 
question requires a certain ‘level of reasoning’. The reasoning level is critical for false 
belief task to be decisive for theory of mind.  When the reasoning level and cognitive 
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resources such as memory is higher than the subject child ability in the false belief task, 
the condition that false belief task is a decisive test for theory of mind is not complete. 
4.10  Minimal theory of mind as a decisive construct for theory of mind 
based on BRSA 
One important advantage of minimal theory of mind construction includes its capability to 
demonstrate systematic success on measurement tests for theory of mind including many 
false belief tasks (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). On one hand, minimal theory of mind 
concerns someone “with limited cognitive resources or little conceptual sophistication” 
(Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 1) and on other hand, “Where a task goes beyond these 
limits, we can be sure an agent is not using minimal theory of mind only.” (Butterfill & 
Apperly, 2013, p. 6). Minimal theory of mind does not include reasoning phase of BRSA. 
More precisely, the first three principles of minimal theory of mind are critical for 
understanding beliefs-like and are not for the purpose of representing psychological 
attitude as such. The fourth principle is concerned with an action that expresses the 
understanding of others’ simple beliefs. The action in the fourth principle does not involve 
any complex resources and it is free from any sophisticated demands. On this basis, BRSA 
and its analysis of phase three and four, concerning reasoning and an action respectively, 
as described earlier in this chapter, supports Apperly and Butterfill’s claim that minimal 
theory of mind is capable of explaining systematic success on tasks that are supposed to be 































5.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 A meaningful social life relies on understanding others’ mind and behaviour as well as our 
own. Theory of mind is the ability to reason about an individual’s mental states such as 
beliefs, desires and intentions, and to understand and predict how these mental states shape 
an individual’s behaviour.  
This dissertation has offered a computational framework to develop a systematic 
understanding of simple theory of mind competence. Agent-based models (ABMs) provide 
a computational platform to simulate individual or collective autonomous entities, as 
agents and their actions. Agent-based simulations evaluate the effect of agents’ interactions 
within their environment. ABMs are robust technical laboratories for assessing agents on 
micro and macro levels. For this purpose, Repast Simphony, a Java based simulation 
platform, was used to design and implement two agent-based models; one to simulate belief 
representation based on standard false belief tasks (BRM) and the other to simulate a simple 
theory of mind (MSM). At first glance, an agent-based model for theory of mind seems 
eccentric in developmental literature as theory of mind research methodology traditionally 
relies mostly on experimental and brain imaging studies. However, cognitive science can 
greatly benefit from agent-based models for analysing cognitive processes and social 
aspects of cognition through agents’ interactions (Sun, 2006). Throughout this study, the 
analyses of BRM and MSM were originally dedicated to agents’ performance in a virtual 
competitive society, and more importantly, the core procedures of understanding others’ 
mental states. An agent’s interactions in the environment manifest as two types of actions; 
their own movement and other agents’ movement, which influence each other. The first 
model, BRM, consists of three different types of agents that move in their neighbourhoods 
to consume food: Infant agents, Monkey agents and Control agents. While Infant agents 
are able to understand Monkey agents’ perspective regarding the location of food and store 
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this information, Monkey agents are only capable of storing the location of food. Control 
agents are used as a control measurement and they are able to track Monkey agents’ fields 
of view. The performances of agents are assessed based on their ability to consume food. 
The results of the simulations show that Infant agents perform higher than Monkey agents 
do. In addition, Monkey agents’ performance is higher than Control agents, particularly in 
situations in which agents use their strategies often.   
The second model, MSM, consists of six types of agents with two mutually exclusive 
mental states regarding the target: Active or Passive. Agents, including Random, Food, 
Control, MinToM, Infer and Reality agents, move to achieve a target when they are in an 
Active state, whereas they cannot achieve any target while in a Passive state. Infer agents 
are able to infer other agents’ mental states from their behaviour in achieving a target and 
storing this information. MinToM agents register other agents’ perspectives regarding the 
location of food. Control and Food agents are both able to only sense the location of food, 
but they differ in terms of their expansion of field of view and their strategies when they 
are in a Passive state. Random agents move randomly, and Reality agents’ strategy is 
similar to Infer agents but they do not infer others’ mental state, instead they have direct 
access to them. Agents’ performances are evaluated based on the number of time steps that 
agents are in an Active state but are not successful in achieving a target. The results of 
simulations show the descending order of performance is Reality, Infer, MinToM, Control, 
Food and Random agents.    
The case in point is that agents with theory of mind ability (Infer agents) in MSM decide 
their own movements while simultaneously interpreting others’ movements, which are 
associated with both an agent’s own mental state (such as beliefs and desires) as well as 
others’ mental states. In the same vein, Infant agents in BRM are capable of representing 
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their rival agents’ (Monkey agents) beliefs. Monkey agents are unable to recognise others’ 
beliefs.  
Thus, both models’ simulation results have consistently suggested that understanding 
others’ mental states has an impact on successfully achieving goals in a competitive 
society. In general, the results show that agents with theory of mind ability perform better 
than agents that have minimal level, which in turn perform better than those agents that 
lack this ability. However, there are uncertain environments in which agents are unable to 
use their abilities and apply their strategies leading to different results. For agents with 
theory of mind ability to perform effectively, a rational link between the belief 
representation and the related action (the action that expresses the understanding of others’ 
belief) is required. This reveals that the ‘use’ of understanding others’ mental states 
requires rational reasoning.  
Whilst the results of MSM demonstrate higher efficiency for agents with theory of mind 
ability, the agents capable of tracking others’ field of view (MinToM) are the second 
highest in performance. These results suggest that considering others’ field of view is the 
minimum scaffolding needed to understand others, enabling agents to track others’ belief-
likes which is consistent with Butterfill & Apperly’s (2013) minimal theory of mind. 
There is a synchrony between the information that each agent perceives then uses in 
processing inferences of others’ mental states and the level of that agents’ theory of mind 
competence. As the complexity of perceived information and the processes become more 
advanced, agents’ performance increases: initially from understanding their own mental 
states, then tracking others’ field of view and finally making inferences about others’ 
mental states. There is a coherent association between the agents’ level of theory of mind, 
their strategy and the necessary information they require. 
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The largest improvement in agent performance (excluding Random agents) occurs from 
MinToM agents to Infer agents, signifying the importance of understanding others’ mental 
states in a virtual society. Due to bounded rationality features and uncertain environments 
in MSM and BRM, even Reality agents with direct access to mental states do not perform 
perfectly.  
5.1.1 BRSA in a nutshell 
This thesis presents a set of basic processes for a simple theory of mind, derived from BRM 
and consistent with MSM. The implementation of these two models has revealed the 
foundation units of theory of mind processes which is called Belief Representation 
Systematic Approach (BRSA).  
BRSA illustrates the underlying processes that are identical across a variety of theory of 
mind tasks including false belief tasks. BRSA is powerful enough to address some of the 
ambiguity behind theory of mind tasks by breaking a task into the standard phases that 
clarify its processes. BRSA is also able to simplify and explain some of the complex 
characteristics within the tasks. It unifies various credible findings in the literature.  
BRSA represents the main basic blocks of a simple theory of mind procedure within four 
phases: perception, memory, reasoning beliefs and desires, and action.   
The first phase involves agents’ perception (collecting information from the environment). 
This mainly corresponds to information about others’ mental states as well as the location 
of targets. This phase is consistent with the second principle of minimal theory of mind, 
which regards field of view and encountering, (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013) that enables 
agents to see other agents or objects in their field of view by encountering them. Agents 
collect information, and then recognise the link between the object and the information in 
this phase. Perception phase includes reasoning to determine what information regarding 
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the target is more important to select and in what priority. For example, the information 
about the nearest targets and the agents with a shared target has the highest priority.  
Similarly, one of the social information gathering skills in human infants in real life is 
decoding the social environment information and discerning the information about an 
entity such as an object (Baldwin & Moses, 1996) which is analogous to this phase. In 
addition, information access is a precondition for pre-schoolers to be able to pass false 
belief tasks (Wellman, 2014) by perceiving their environment. This is analogous with the 
first phase of BRSA in BRM, in which Infant agents need to gather information about 
Monkey agents’ beliefs regarding the location of the food.  
Accordingly, Infer agents collect information by observing other agents’ actions when 
reaching a target in MSM. In general, the perception phase is interconnected with other 
phases of BRSA as an online access to the information.    
The second phase of BRSA involves storing the information into agents’ memory and using 
it in future time steps (for the reasoning of others’ mental states). Thus, memory is 
indispensable in this phase of BRSA, which is analogous to the need for memory in false 
belief tasks (Apperly et al., 2007) and memory is one of multiple domains in social 
understanding processes (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2004). For example, the key point 
in BRM relates to the location of the food; the real location of food is different from the 
protagonist agent’s (Monkey agents) perspective, which has already been stored in the 
agent’s (Infant agents) memory.  
Likewise, MSM elucidates memory demands on Infer agents to store necessary 
information. This information will be used to infer other agents’ desires and beliefs.  
Both models demonstrate the importance of memory resources in the process of belief 
representation.   
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The third phase of BRSA is called the reasoning process of beliefs and desires, and 
encompasses three subroutines: the selective process of beliefs and desires, inhibition and 
retrieving data from the memory. 
In the first subroutine, agents start to reason about their own beliefs and desires. For 
example, in BRM, Infant agents’ desire is achieving food, whereas their beliefs about the 
location of food changes due to the dynamics of the environment. In fact, the present 
information creates their new beliefs, and their information about others’ beliefs will be 
stored into their memory and will be used in the next time step. These “perceptual-historical 
experiences” (Wellman, 2014, p. 24) form the Infant agents’ beliefs about others’ 
perspectives. Subsequently, Infant agents need to reason about others’ beliefs and desires: 
Monkey agents’ desire is to achieve food. Monkey agents’ beliefs, when they no longer see 
the previous food, remain the same (for one time step). This might result in a contradiction 
between the real location of the food and the Monkey agent’s belief. Therefore, in this 
situation, there are two different beliefs about the location of one food, Infant agent’s belief 
and that of the Monkey agent. Thus, Infant agent needs to temporarily inhibit its own true 
belief about the location of food, and consider Monkey agent’s belief from its memory 
(self-inhibition subroutine). Intriguingly, the role of inhibition is prominent in false belief 
situations.  
The last subroutine relates to retrieving information from the protagonist’s perspective, 
which was stored in the memory in the second phase. For example, Infant agent retrieves 
Monkey agents’ perspectives regarding the location of the food. 
One significant difference between the two models appears in the reasoning phase: MSM 
uses a higher level of reasoning than BRM. This is because, in MSM, agents infer others’ 
mental states by observing their actions, whereas, in BRM, agents directly observe others’ 
beliefs with no inferences. This suggests that the reasoning phase determines the level of 
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complexity of the theory of mind task. However, the subroutines of the reasoning phase 
are indispensable for false belief and theory of mind tasks and new subroutines can only 
be added to the reasoning phase as its complexity increases.  
Undoubtedly, the reasoning phase indicates a central information-processing step for 
theory of mind competence. In addition, the contribution of the executive function to belief 
representation (Apperly, 2011) has been elucidated by the reasoning phase of BRSA: 
 1) The role of ‘memory’ in retrieving the information subroutine, 
 2) The role of ‘inhibitory control’ in self-perspective inhibition subroutine, 
 3) The role of ‘reasoning’ in selective process of belief and desire subroutine 
Indeed, belief representation is accomplished by the end of the reasoning phase. However, 
agents have not exhibited any evidence of this understanding in their behaviour yet.  
The last phase of BRSA relates to expressing the understanding of others’ mental states as 
an action or behaviour. In other words, performing an action by using a mental 
representation (Hughes, 2011-a). This phase is analogous with the measurement test (for 
example, a question like ‘Where will Sally look for the ball?’ in the Sally and Ann false 
belief task) in false belief tasks.  
In real life, the action of this phase might be as simple as an eye gaze and eye tracking or 
a complicated action that requires separate reasoning from the reasoning phase. Therefore, 
the distinction between having theory of mind ability and using this ability in an action is 
important to prevent the existing confusion about theory of mind measurement tests, such 
as the linguistic ability necessary for the false belief task in children. 
In general, it is possible to express understanding of others’ mental states with different 
actions, as has been shown for Infer agents in MSM. ‘How to use’ this ability might be an 
obstacle to pass the measurement test of theory of mind.  Besides, by considering ‘how to 
use’ this ability, the principles of rational actions is essential.  
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BRSA elucidates the delicate boundary between understanding mental representation and 
expressing or using this representation that might sometimes cause confusion in the 
literature. It is valuable to articulate one of these common issues concerning false belief 
task below. 
5.1.2 False belief task as a decisive test for theory of mind 
In spite of the fact that false belief tasks have been widely used as a decisive test for theory 
of mind ability, the contrary discourse argues that success on false belief tasks might need 
more than understanding others’ mental states (Bloom & German, 2000; Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Hughes, 2011-a). This view is compatible with BRSA, which 
demonstrates: firstly, the reasoning process of beliefs and desires phase is demanding in 
cognitive resources such as memory and inhibitory control, and secondly, expressing 
others’ belief (action phase), which is equivalent with the passing false belief tests, might 
involve more than understanding others’ belief. Thus, the third and fourth phase of BRSA 
determine the level of reasoning and the necessary resources for false belief task 
preconditions. Therefore, for a false belief task to be an acid test, it requires preconditions 
of resources and reasoning. This demonstrates an important condition on interpreting the 
relationship between patterns of success or failure on false belief tasks in terms of theory 
of mind abilities. 
Similarly, to pass false belief tasks in real life, children need to link complex series of 
events (Moses, 2001). Therefore, children may fail to pass false belief test due to requiring 
higher order control to express their belief representation competence (Moses, 2001). This 
corresponds with the findings about the level of reasoning and resources required in 





5.1.3  Reasoning role in theory of mind 
In line with the conclusion from BRM and MSM, the role of reasoning is highlighted in 
the third and fourth phases of BRSA for theory of mind and false belief task. This shows 
that improvement in the complexity of reasoning and cognitive resources reinforces the 
improvement in both forms of understanding others’ mind and using this understanding. 
This also suggests that, as the complexity and amount of information regarding others’ 
mental state increases, the level of reasoning can also increase. 
In general, BRSA in a simple theory of mind model (MSM) replicates the same procedure 
in Belief Representation Model (BRM), applying similar phases except with more 
reasoning for inferring others’ mental states. 
One result of BRSA and its analysis lends weight to the reasoning phase in theory of mind 
processes and shows its heuristic nature. However, the link between theory of mind and 
reasoning still is an open question in the literature. For example, research by Vaart and 
Hemelrijk (2014) questioned how sophisticated reasoning level in animals is, regardless of 
whether they have a theory of mind. 
5.1.4  BRSA and minimal theory of mind 
This study also seeks to provide clarity on how BRSA, which represents basic theory of 
mind procedure through its phases, particularly the reasoning phase, responds to minimal 
theory of mind principles; the ability to track others’ perception, knowledge and belief-
likes with limited cognitive demands and without conceptual sophistication (Butterfill & 
Apperly, 2013). In general, minimal theory of mind is constructed upon four principles: 
goal directed action, field and encountering, successful registration and action influenced 
by the registration. For example, in BRM, Control agents and Infant agents satisfy these 
four principles: the agents’ goal is to consume food (Principle 1), the agent has a field of 
view to observe and encounter objects in its limited neighbourhood (Principle 2), agents 
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register the location of the food in their field of view as a belief-like (Principle 3), and 
agents track other agents’ beliefs about the location of food in their field of view and use it 
to take an action (Principle 4). Based on these principles, Control agents and Infant agents 
possess minimal theory of mind ability. However, Infant agents are using more than 
minimal theory of mind. This suggests that minimal theory of mind is the minimal sub set 
of understanding others’ beliefs.  Similarly, it suggests that MinToM agents in MSM have 
minimal theory of mind ability. 
Furthermore, a scrutiny on BRSA phases reveals the link and difference between belief 
representation process and minimal theory of mind principles. Firstly, goal directed action 
is a presumption in BRSA, which is associated with the first principle of minimal theory 
of mind. The second principle relates to field and encountering, which corresponds to 
perception phase of BRSA. The third principle of minimal theory of mind, registration and 
successful registration, is parallel to the memory phase of BRSA. There is a delicate 
difference between these two concepts; registration in minimal theory of mind refers to 
registration of other’s perspective and use of it in the current time step, whereas memory 
phase in BRSA reflects both recording others’ perspective in agents’ memory for using in 
the next time steps, and registration. This difference shows the role of mental time traveling 
(using information in the current and future time steps) and different memory demand 
(short-term and long-term) in theory of mind. The fourth principle in minimal theory of 
mind regards an action that is influenced by registration, which is compatible with the 
action phase in BRSA.  
Since minimal theory of mind does not involve mental representations as such and 
sophisticated concepts (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013), one difference between BRSA and 
minimal theory of mind is that phase four of BRSA and its subroutines, involving reasoning 
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process of beliefs and desires such as self-perspective inhibition, do not exist in minimal 
theory of mind.  
Apperly and Butterfill argue that someone with minimal theory of mind ability could pass 
the tests, which are supposed to be a decisive test of theory of mind ability including false 
belief tasks. Through the lens of BRSA and its analysis, their argument is strong and 
credible for two reasons; firstly minimal theory of mind concerns someone “with limited 
cognitive resources or little conceptual sophistication” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 1) 
and “Where a task goes beyond these limits, we can be sure an agent is not using minimal 
theory of mind only.” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 6). This again highlights that minimal 
theory of mind does not include phase three of BRSA and the resources and the 
preconditions that it requires.  Secondly, the fourth principle, which is parallel with phase 
four of BRSA, includes an action without involving complex resources or reasoning levels. 
Therefore, the principles of minimal theory of mind exclude the two preconditions of 
resources that are essential for false belief task to be an acid test. 
This concludes that BRSA covers both of the two systems of humans’ belief tracking 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009) by removing the central process of reasoning phase and taking 
into account the time and memory differences in registration principle in minimal theory 
of mind and phase two of BRSA. 
5.1.5  BRSA as a filter for behavioural tasks 
This thesis concludes that BRSA is capable of identifying pure belief representational tasks 
from behavioural tasks, which would otherwise cause ambiguity in experiments. The 
reason for this capability is that BRSA phases give structure to the task, and are able to 
logically extract one’s beliefs and desires from other information. The analyses of beliefs 
and desires in the reasoning phase and its three subroutines provide the extraction steps for 
beliefs and desires. In this way, the behavioural tasks lack the analyses of beliefs and 
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desires and reasoning phase in BRSA. Therefore, the BRSA phases filter the behavioural 
tasks from belief representational tasks.  
5.1.6  Theory of mind for planning 
Another aspect of simulation results of MSM demonstrates that by reducing the reasoning 
and planning beyond the action of Infant agents, the efficiency of Infant agents’ 
performances decreases sharply. Essentially, theory of mind information feeds actions with 
planning for future time steps, resulting in higher performances in agents with theory of 
mind capability. This crucial distinction between theory of mind competence and the use 
of it in actions has already been suggested in a children’s study by Hughes (2011-a). 
Moreover, children use their theory of mind understanding in different ways in their social 
life with their peers (Hughes, 2011-a) which relates to how we ‘use’ the information about 
understanding others’ mental states in the action phase of BRSA. 
5.1.7  Imperfect perception 
Intriguingly, there is a general rule in perception in both models, BRM and MSM, which 
provides an environment that agents’ access to information is not complete and perfect. 
Observed information is more precise the closer it is to the agent, and so the information 
perceived at the edge of an agent’s field of view is incomplete in comparison the 
information perceived near the centre of an agent’s field of view. Although both pieces of 
information are in the field of view, their accuracy is not at an equal level. This is because 
the amount of information (about other agents) which is outside an agent’s field of view 
increases as the distance from its centre of field of view increases. The agents’ imperfect 
vision has a direct impact on their perception of the environment.  
5.1.8  Resources and costs 
BRSA demonstrates that perception, memory, inhibition, and selective process reasoning 
form the main components of belief representation processes. Besides, it also shows that 
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expressing others’ beliefs might require reasoning. Collectively, these components form a 
network of resources (Schaafsma et al., 2015; Mohnke et al., 2015; Gallagher & Frith, 
2003; Carrington & Bailey, 2009) to represent others’ beliefs.  
Furthermore, understanding others’ mental states in MSM comes at the cost of time and 
resources. The results of MSM demonstrate that Infer agents are slower since they require 
more time to reason and retrieve information about others’ mental states. Similarly, BRSA 
shows the inferring process requires interconnected resources of perception, memory, 
inhibitory control and reasoning.  
5.1.9  Uncertainty 
The interaction between agents and the environment enhances the dynamics of the world 
and has a direct impact on agents’ beliefs regarding the location of food and also their 
decisions and actions. Together, this dynamic nature of the environment and its randomness 
(such as random placement of the food) escalates uncertainty and complexity in the 
environment. The other factors that determine the uncertainty of the environment are the 
number of agents, the number of targets and the ratio between them. If the uncertainty in 
the environment is large, agents may be unable to use their strategies. 
5.1.10  Summary 
In conclusion, in this thesis, the key concepts of understanding others’ beliefs and a simple 
theory of mind are simulated in two different dynamic environments, in BRM and MSM, 
respectively.  
The results of two models indicate that understanding others’ mental states such as beliefs 
and desires have a direct positive impact on agents’ performance in a competitive society.  
The link between “micro motivates and macro behaviour” (Schelling, 2006) in both models 
demonstrate a pattern from the individual agents’ rules and abilities (in terms of theory of 
mind) to the efficiency of their performances at macro level.   
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The overall basic blocks of belief attribution processes and also a simple theory of mind 
process is identified and is depicted in a Belief Representation Systematic Approach 
(BRSA). The underlying building blocks and fundamental processes of theory of mind 
(Schaafsma et al., 2015) are elaborated by BRSA into four phases. The three first phases 
(perception, memory, reasoning of beliefs and desires) signify belief representation. In 
addition, the action phase is a benchmark to measure or use the understanding of others’ 
mental states.  
5.2  Limitations and future work 
This thesis proposes two innovative agent-based models that demonstrate that agents with 
higher level of theory of mind ability perform better in achieving their goals in a 
competitive society. More importantly, these computational models offer a novel belief 
representation systematic approach for the underlying processes of theory of mind ability 
and false belief tasks. The shared sets of basic processes of different theory of mind tasks 
(Schaafsma et al., 2015) are defined through four phases in BRSA. This is a step forward 
towards clarifying the basic structure of theory of mind ability, which is often inconsistent 
in the literature.   
This study is stimulating because it attempts to understand two distinct dimensions of the 
demands of mental states; in BRM, agents focus on others’ beliefs because their desires are 
the same, whereas, in MSM, agents infer others’ desires first. Although this might be 
considered as a drawback in MSM, it demonstrates that desires might have priority over 
beliefs and this is not truly a limitation.  
Agents in MSM have either an Active or a Passive mental state in each time step. In other 
words, the possibility of different degrees between Active and Passive is not considered. 
At first glance, this approach of two mental states appears to be very simple. However, the 
simple modelling of the two states leads to a deeper practical understanding than if an 
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analogue model was used, as the analogue theories that claim to be closer to reality become 
more complicated in the end (Minsky, 1988). However, it would be reasonable to extend 
the model with degrees between the two mental states and examine the results by applying 
complexity theory. 
Whilst the models work for a reasonable number of agents, when attempting to increase 
this to a very large number of agents, for example one million agents, it becomes 
computationally intensive to calculate all of the interactions and actions of agents and 
reduces the simulation running speed to a halt.  Undoubtedly, there are computational ways 
to tackle this problem, but this does not affect the current results, which are sufficient.   
In addition, this study highlights that reasoning plays a key role in theory of mind and 
individual differences in expressing understanding of others’ mental states. However, more 
work is needed to establish when, why, and how reasoning methods are different in theory 
of mind tasks in individuals considering the principle of rational action.    
BRSA is a generic framework for belief representation. Thus, it is feasible to utilize BRSA 
in many applications of ToM ability. For example, the game and gamification design 
involving understanding others’ beliefs and desires would benefit from applying the BRSA 
structure to the players’ performances.    
Both models presented in this thesis have applied discrete time design fulfilling the aim of 
this study. Nevertheless, continuous time could be explored in future work. In fact, by 
applying continuous time, it is possible to measure the time consumed by each type of 
agent to process others’ beliefs and desires. Thus, one option for future work regarding 
continuous time, is to examine how fast agents with lower levels of theory of mind act as 
opposed to agents with higher levels of theory of mind. Based on BRSA, agents with higher 
levels of theory of mind require more time to collect and store information about others’ 
mental states and to reason than agents with lower levels. For example, agents with only 
195 
 
minimal theory of mind ability might be faster than agents which are able to infer others’ 
mental states. 
Past theory of mind research has been heavily experimental, rather than using 
computational models. Therefore, a useful direction for future work could be to perform 
more fine-grained analysis by undertaking a similar experiment with human participants 
and a comparison between these results and the virtual ones.   
This study outlines simulation results and mainly focuses on the processes of theory of 
mind ability. There are, nevertheless, other approaches which are beneficial to our 
understanding of underlying theory of mind cognitive processes; For example, Bayesian 
theory of mind, Markov decision processes and probabilistic inferences about partially 
observable events, which consider causal inferences regarding belief, desire and action.  
Besides, another important approach would be to implement agents which can learn to 
improve their understanding of others’ mental states in both cooperative and competitive 
environments, and examine the effect of learning in theory of mind from a variety of angles. 
The models proposed in this study, particularly BRSA, could not be explained under a 
specific account of theory of mind such as theory-theory. Indeed, this study was not 
intended to prove one specific account of theory of mind, and instead has demonstrated 
that coherent aspects from different accounts of theory of mind could be integrated 
together. Therefore, more research is needed to focus on details of different characteristics 
in each account. 
BRSA provides the basic cognitive processes of theory of mind. However, it is possible to 
apply a structural cognitive architecture such as the CLARION to advance our 
understanding of social cognitive features of theory of mind. CLARION is an integrative 
architecture consisting of functional subsystems (e.g. the action-centred subsystem, the 
metacognitive subsystem, and motivational subsystem) with two dual implicit and explicit 
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representational structures for each subsystem (Sun, 2006). Nevertheless, CLARION is not 
completely operational yet. This indicates that agent-based modelling in psychology is still 
in its first steps, and by utilizing AI and complexity theory, it will improve substantially. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This thesis has implemented two computational models for false belief tasks and theory of 
mind ability. Firstly, this thesis offers a novel standardisation for the building blocks of 
theory of mind processes, a Belief Representation Systematic Approach (BRSA). This is 
the first attempt in the field, at least in the author’s knowledge, in which the process of 
belief representation has been organised in a collective systematic set of phases, a 
methodological framework for a variety of theory of mind tasks including false belief tasks. 
It consists of four indispensable and linked phases for processing others’ mental states;  
collecting information as perception, recording information in memory, reasoning process 
of belief and desires, and finally, expressing others’ mental state as an action.  Thus, BRSA 
phases identify a network of resources for theory of mind competence including perception, 
memory, inhibitory control and reasoning resources. Secondly, the models demonstrate 
how theory of mind ability improves the agents’ performance in achieving their goals in a 
virtual competitive environment compared to agents with minimal theory of mind, which 
in turn perform better than those agents that lack this ability. 
Intriguingly, minimal theory of mind principles for someone with limited cognitive 
resources (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013), are a sub set of BRSA phases. To understand the 
link between BRSA and minimal theory of mind, minimal theory of mind needs to remove 
the reasoning phase in BRSA and consider the time difference between registration and 
recording information in memory phase. This indicates that two systems proposed for 




This study concludes that BRSA is able to distinguish pure belief representational tasks 
from other tasks such as behavioural tasks, which are problematic. BRSA places emphasis 
on the reasoning phase in theory of mind processes and shows its heuristic nature. 
The author’s expectation, therefore, is that BRSA, a novel standard approach to analysis of 
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Figure 97. The number of times ToM and Ngh functions are used: T=800, N=800 
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Figure 99. The number of times ToM and Ngh functions are used T=1200, N=800 
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Figure 100. Performance of Reality Agents in each Time Step 
 



















































































































Performance of Reality Agents in each Time Step




















































































































Performance of Infer Agents in each Time Step




























































































































Performance of MinToM Agents in each Time Step



















































































































Performance of Control Agents in each Time Step
P= 12,  Ngh= 3,  T= 800, N= 800, Tick=1000




Figure 104. Performance of Food Agents in each Time Step 
 
 





















































































































Performance of Random Agents in each Time Step
















































































































Performance of Food Agents in each Time Step
P= 12,  Ngh= 3,  T= 800,  N= 800,…
